Title of Submission
CEO Types and Firm Efficiency
Start Date
14-10-2022 1:00 PM
End Date
14-10-2022 2:15 PM
Location
Discovery Hall 206
Submission Type
Competitive Paper
Track
Accounting and Finance
Abstract
This paper investigates the connection between CEO types and firm efficiency. I utilize the general ability index (GAI) as a proxy to examine and separate CEO types: generalist CEOs and specialist CEOs. Initially, I applied the pooled ordinary least square on 26,830 firm-year observations to explore the GAI effect on firm efficiency. The finding shows that GAI has a negative impact on firm efficiency. It indicates that CEOs with lower GAI are better at improving firm efficiency; for instance, specialist CEOs are preferable to generalist CEOs. Further analysis of CEO types using the quadrant method supports this result.
Included in
CEO Types and Firm Efficiency
Discovery Hall 206
This paper investigates the connection between CEO types and firm efficiency. I utilize the general ability index (GAI) as a proxy to examine and separate CEO types: generalist CEOs and specialist CEOs. Initially, I applied the pooled ordinary least square on 26,830 firm-year observations to explore the GAI effect on firm efficiency. The finding shows that GAI has a negative impact on firm efficiency. It indicates that CEOs with lower GAI are better at improving firm efficiency; for instance, specialist CEOs are preferable to generalist CEOs. Further analysis of CEO types using the quadrant method supports this result.
