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A DIFFERENT WELCOME HOME: HOW ACCUSATIONS OF BRAINWASHING
AFFECTED THE EXPERIENCE OF THE RETURNING AMERICAN POWS FROM
THE KOREAN WAR

A Thesis

Presented to the

Graduate Faculty of the History Department

and the

Faculty of the Graduate College

University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

University of Nebraska at Kearney

By

Margaret Merithew

August 2023

THESIS ACCEPTANCE

Acceptance for the faculty of the Graduate College, University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History, University of Nebraska at Kearney.

Supervisory Committee

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June 22, 2023

Date

Abstract

American POWs from the Korean War had a different experience than POWs from other wars. The POWs who returned from the Korean War faced a home front that was suspicious of them. Due to the prevalence of McCarthyism in America during this time, the military, government, media, and citizens all worried that the returning POWs may return as communists. The military and FBI investigated the POWs and court-marshaled a few for collaborating with the North Koreans while in the camp. The experience of what happened to the American soldiers in the POW camps has received much scholarly attention, but the topic of their experience, when they returned home, has received less, usually just the concluding chapter in scholars' books. Although prisoners of war were a reality in other wars, the experience of American POWs from the Korean War returning home was different because of the suspicions they encountered when they returned home due to McCarthyism, how the government and military treated them due to fears of brainwashing and communism in the POW camps, and how the newspapers and magazines reported on the returning men. Archival records from the National Archives, Eisenhower Presidential Library, and Truman Presidential Library along with oral histories, newspapers, and magazine articles, will demonstrate what the POWs faced when they returned home. This topic will add to the historiography of the Korean War and to the historiography of American Korean War POWs because it will provide a more in-depth analysis of the unique experience they encountered.

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Introduction

Many people refer to the Korean War as the “Forgotten War.” The Korean War began on June 25, 1950, and ended with an armistice agreement on July 27, 1953. The Korean War took place between World War II, in which there are many stories of Americans coming together to help the cause and brave men serving to defeat the evil Third Reich or the Japanese, and the Vietnam War, a war in which many did not condone and returning soldiers faced scrutiny and hardships due to the unpopularity of the war. The men who fought in the Korean War grew up under the impression of the great World War II soldiers and that the Korean War was their chance to be brave and save the county. Unfortunately, this was not the case for many of the Korean War soldiers. America did not come together as it did in World War II. Historian Melinda Pash stated, “the lack of meaningful home front participation in the form of rationing or other personal sacrifice soon made Korea only a minor distraction for the American public.”¹ The homecoming for these men was not always as elaborate as those who returned from World War II, but not as severe as those returning from the Vietnam War. The Korean War experience was different from those of other wars and one of the reasons is due to the experiences of the prisoners of war (POWs) who spent time in Chinese and North Korean camps. This was due to insinuations that the enemy had brainwashed American POWs into believing in Communism during a time many Americans feared it.

¹ Melinda Pash, *In the Shadow of the Greatest Generation: The Americans Who Fought the Korean War* (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 1.

To truly understand what happened to these returning POWs and why it happened, it is important to look at what was happening in the United States at this time. During this period, America was engaged in the Cold War and was at the height of McCarthyism. The movement received its name from Senator Joseph McCarthy from Wisconsin. The height of McCarthy's reign was 1950-1954, though McCarthyism and the persecution of Communists lasted much longer.² McCarthyism and the pursuit against Communists lasted approximately ten years from 1946 to 1956.³ Senator Joseph McCarthy was not alone in his quest against Communists. Schrecker and Deery state, "identifying the anti-Communist crusade with Senator McCarthy narrows the focus and slights the more important roles played by people like FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and President Harry Truman."⁴ These individuals and others used the fear that the Cold War created, especially against the Soviet Union and Communism, to create the fear in America that those in or affiliated with the Communist party would threaten national security. Schrecker stated that "In the name of protecting the internal security of the United States against the threat of Communism, thousands of people lost their jobs, went to prison, or were punished in other ways."⁵ The fear and the consequences of having a Communist label were real. Officials violated civil liberties and those in power joined

² Ellen Schrecker and Phillip Deery, *The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents* 3rd ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2017), iv.

³ Ellen Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), xvi.

⁴ Schrecker and Deery, *The Age of McCarthyism*, 2.

⁵ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, x.

forces to make that happen.⁶ The House Un-American Committee, called many individuals in to testify about their ties to Communism. Some individuals like Alger Hiss, were accused of being spies for the Soviet Union. Thus, when newspaper reports began to appear that stated that the Chinese and North Koreans brainwashed POWs in the camps, military and government officials, as well as the American public, began to look at them with suspicion and fear that they now were Communists.

The American POWs endured harsh conditions and the Chinese and North Koreans subjected them to a variety of atrocities during their stay at the camps. These included death marches, starvation, and inadequate food, shelter, and medical care. This thesis concentrates on the experiences of the more than four thousand men who returned home. While Americans welcomed some of the men home with great fanfare, others were not because of the insinuation that they were now Communists. The idea that the Chinese and North Koreans brainwashed American POWs and that they may return home and act differently began appearing in newspapers before any of the men returned to the United States, planting the idea in many Americans' heads. Operation Little Switch, in which 149 sick and wounded POWs returned to the United States, presented the first opportunity for the military, government, and American people to deal with the potential of brainwashed POWs. This test came to a head with the POWs known as the Valley Forge POWs. The military separated this group of men because they believed they succumbed to Communist indoctrination. Newspapers reported on the POWs and their ties to Communism. The military flew them directly to Valley Forge General Hospital in

⁶ Schrecker and Deery, *The Age of McCarthyism*, 2.

Pennsylvania and did not allow the press to interview them. A committee observed the Valley Forge POWs from May 3 through May 6, 1953, and gave recommendations on their level of indoctrination. Also, the Valley Forge POWs learned of their new label of being Communists and became very bitter over the accusation. The Chinese and North Koreans accused the United States and other countries of conducting germ warfare during the Korean War. This topic led to the torture of many Air Force and Marine Corps pilots and the captors taught this to other POWs during indoctrination classes. The issue of germ warfare demonstrates many issues that POWs, the military, and the United States government had to contend with after the war including what to do about POWs who confessed or collaborated with the enemy. Some of the men confessed to germ warfare because of the torture and mistreatment they experienced. When they returned home, they all recanted their statements and stated they only made them under duress. The military then had to decide what to do about those that did confess. Each branch of the military handled this differently. The Air Force and Marine Corps opened official inquiries, but each decided not to court-martial their soldiers. The Army, on the other hand, did court-martial their soldiers, not for confessing to germ warfare, but for confessing and collaborating with their captors.

The Korean War experience was unique. One of the reasons was because of the dominance of McCarthyism and the accusation that the Chinese and North Koreans brainwashed them. Newspaper articles from this time present a look into what the Americans thought and believed about these men as well as what the government and military presented to the public. The Eisenhower Presidential Library records provide

information on the various committees, including the POW Working Group, created to deal with the issue of the POWs and insight into the actions behind the scenes of the government. The Korean War POWs battled harsh conditions and treatment while in the camps, but some also returned home to a different battle. This battle was one in which they had to prove that they were not Communists and one in which some had to fight for their freedom after the military court-martialed them for their actions. Richard Bassett, a Korean War POW, and co-author Lewis Carlson stated, “After all, former prisoners of other twentieth-century wars did not suffer such indignities.”⁷ Although prisoners of war were a reality in other wars, the experience of American POWs from the Korean War returning home was different because of the suspicions they encountered when they returned home due to McCarthyism, how the government and military treated them due to fears of brainwashing and Communism in the POW camps, and how the newspapers and magazines reported on the returning men.

The Korean War has received less scholarly attention than other wars fought by the United States. Scholars use a variety of different methodologies to study the Korean War and the POWs, though most scholarship on the experience of POWs after they returned home is just a small part of the scholarly work. One of the first books about the Korean War was I.F. Stone’s book *The Hidden History of the Korean War* published in 1952. Stone is not a historian, but an American Investigative Journalist. He published this book before the war had ended, making some of the arguments premature since there was

⁷ Richard Bassett and Lewis Carlson, *And the Wind Blew Cold* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2002), 93.

no clear evidence. Stone traces the origins of the war, actions by General Douglas MacArthur during the war, and the failed armistice negotiations. Stone argues that the official versions of events are not in line with what was truly happening in the war. For example, Stone argues that both Dulles and MacArthur knew that the North Koreans “might be preparing an aggression against South Korea,” but chose not to say anything because both men wanted “to commit the United States more strongly against Communism in the Far East.”⁸ Stone states that he looked at the Korean Blue Book but did not find it a helpful source. He “relied exclusively, therefore, on United States and Union Nations documents, and on respected American and British newspaper sources.”⁹ This account does not mention POWs during the war, which is not surprising since the POWs had not returned home.

One of the first books discussing Korean War POWs is Eugene Kinkead’s *In Every War But One* published in 1959. The book is based upon material from an article that Kinkead published in *The New Yorker* on October 26, 1957, entitled “The Study of Something New in History.” Kinkead uses a study conducted by the Army on the POWs, which the Army granted his access to in 1955, and interviews with former POWs that were part of the study. He also interviews Hugh Milton, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Forces, who was now the Under Secretary and was in charge of the Army’s POW study. In his book, Kinkead argues that one in three

⁸ I.F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952), 21.

⁹ Stone, *Hidden History*, xxi.

American POWs collaborated with the Chinese and North Koreans in some capacity, no soldier was able to successfully escape, and a large percentage, 38 percent, died in captivity.¹⁰ Kinkead states that the American public argued that the brainwashing techniques of the Communists were the reason for the traitorous collaborations, despite a lack of evidence of brainwashing or gross mistreatment.¹¹ Instead, he argues the American public was wrong and the reason many POWs died was because of their own “ignorance or the callousness” of their actions¹². Kinkead concludes “the roots of the explanation goes deep into diverse aspects of our culture,” and that a lack of discipline in the U.S. Army was the reason the POWs in the Korean War acted the way they did.¹³ Kinkead’s book speaks directly to the treatment of the American POWs after the Korean War, but he blames the actions of the POWs themselves, not the Chinese. The interviews with former POWs and the Army POW study provides interesting information on what the Army was thinking just a few years after the war.

Albert Biderman, a sociologist, published *March to Calumny: The Story of American POWs in the Korean War* in 1963. Biderman’s book is a response to Kinkead’s *In Every War But One*. Biderman refutes Kinkead’s argument and argues that POWs

¹⁰ Eugene Kinkead, *In Every War But One* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1959), 16-17.

¹¹ Kinkead, *In Every War*, 17.

¹² Kinkead, *In Ever War*, 17.

¹³ Kinkead, *In Every War*, 18, 170.

were the subject of propaganda and counterpropaganda during and after the war.¹⁴ His purpose is to correct the story of Korean POWs' history by challenging Kinkead's arguments and providing new evidence of truth. Biderman states that the belief that American POWs collaborated with the Chinese and North Koreans due to "unprecedented misbehavior" and an "alarming new weaknesses in our national character," is not true, but that this argument was a result of "propaganda activities during the war."¹⁵ Biderman concludes that the American POWs "with few exceptions are about as intensely anti-Communist as they can be."¹⁶ Biderman further states that "the Americans in Korea behaved by and large as have others in history who have had similar kinds of demands placed upon them," and that the Chinese and North Koreans subjected the POWs to mistreatment and attempted to reform them.¹⁷ Biderman uses documents from different U.S. Congress committees including the Committee on Armed Forces, Committee on Appropriations, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Committee on Government Operations, Permanent Sub Committee on Investigations, and the U.S. Department of Defense. He also utilizes psychological and sociological journal articles concerning POWs. This book deals directly with the issue of the treatment of American POWs after the Korean War and the role that Communism played. It is an

¹⁴ Albert D. Biderman, *March to Calumny: The Story of American POWs in the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), 1.

¹⁵ Biderman, *March to Calumny*, 2.

¹⁶ Biderman, *March to Calumny*, 259.

¹⁷ Biderman, *March to Calumny*, 143, 271.

early work that shows that ten years after the cease-fire, scholars began to raise questions about the treatment of American POWs by Americans after the war. He concludes that there is no evidence to show that indoctrination in the camp worked or that they lacked discipline.

Historians began to write more traditional military histories of the Korean War in the 1980s. Bevin Alexander published *Korean: The First War We Lost* in 1986.

Alexander is a military historian, but he also served as the commander of the 5th Historical Detachment during the Korean War. This book follows a military history methodology that chronologically examines the military actions throughout the entire war. Alexander argues that the United States received signs of aggression and entry of China, which could have prevented the Chinese from entering the war.¹⁸ Alexander also states that the United States, South Korea, and United Nations members “won one war against the North Koreans but lost another war against the Red Chinese.”¹⁹ Alexander uses documents from the National Archives concerning military, diplomatic, executive, and legislative information as well as memoirs and autobiographies of the major figures during this war. This book does mention POWs on both sides. Alexander examines instances of American soldiers taken as POWs and the death of others, as well as instances of atrocities on each side. Alexander also discusses the role that their release played in armistice negotiations. Alexander does not discuss what happened to the

¹⁸ Bevin Alexander, *Korea: The First War We Lost* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1986), ix.

¹⁹ Alexander, *Korea*, ix.

American POWs when they returned home, nor the fear that the North Koreans and Chinese brainwashed the POWs.

A year later, in 1987, Max Hastings published *The Korean War*. Hastings is a British journalist as well as a military historian. Similar to Alexander, Hastings uses a military methodology and chronologically discusses the military actions of the Korean War. Hastings argues that America was correct in its decision to fight in the Korean War.²⁰ He states that the events in the summer of 1950 “demonstrated that American fears for the peninsula were entirely well-founded, whatever the shortcomings of Washington’s political response to the situation.”²¹ Hastings does not just discuss the battles and events of the Korean War. He utilizes an extensive number of interviews of American and British soldiers, some of which he conducted and others from the collection of the U.S. Marine Corps Museum and the U.S. Army’s Military History Institute, to tell the stories of what happened and how the soldiers felt. Hastings also uses a large selection of secondary sources for his book. He does discuss American POWs and their experiences, examining the fact that the North Koreans and Chinese attempted to “convert prisoners to his own ideology.”²² He briefly mentions the experiences of American soldiers when they returned home and how others looked down upon them since they lost the war. He specifically mentions returning POWs when they discussed

²⁰ Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 344.

²¹ Hastings, *Korean War*, 45.

²² Hastings, *Korean War*, 288.

their experience of what Communism was like. He also notes how Americans accused them of being McCarthyites, implying a status of vehement anti-Communism.²³ This is contrary to the assertion that POWs came home as Communists, Hastings suggests the anti-Communist culture on the home front shaped their news. It is an interesting juxtaposition to other scholarly work that shows that Americans thought the opposite.

In 2000, Raymond Lech wrote *Broken Soldiers*. This book examined the court-martial cases that took place after the Korean War against American POWs for their actions while in POW camps. Lech looked at the experiences of American Korean War POWs during their time at the POW camps and their experiences when they arrived back in the United States. Lech states, “the war took something just as precious as their lives—their minds and their sacred honor.”²⁴ Lech argues that the experience of Korean War POWs is unique due to two factors. One is due to the large number of deaths at the POW camps and because of the indoctrination to Communism that the enemy pressed upon these men.²⁵ Lech examines the day-to-day life of American POWs in Korea and the inhumane treatment that many received. He also looks at POWs who returned home and had to answer for their actions while at the camps. Lech details the court-martials of American POWs. This was the first time that the American military tried POWs for collaboration with the enemy.²⁶ The different branches of the military handled the cases

²³ Hastings, *Korean War*, 330.

²⁴ Raymond Lech, *Broken Soldiers* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 1.

²⁵ Lech, *Broken Soldiers*, 2.

²⁶ Lech, *Broken Soldiers*, 231.

differently, with only the Army prosecuting soldiers. Lech also questions why the Army court-martialed some men, but not others who admitted to similar cooperation with their captors.

Historians subsequently began to focus more scholarly attention on the Korean POWs. Scholars utilized a variety of methodologies, not just military history. Susan Carruthers published *Cold War Captives: Imprisonment, Escape, and Brainwashing* in 2009. Carruthers uses the idea of captivity to show how it contributed “to the work of imagining the cold war contest between ‘slave world’ and ‘free’.”²⁷ Carruthers argues that “Confinement- of prisoners of war, forced laborers in the gulag, satellite populations, and isolated Americans behind the Iron Curtain-profoundly shaped both the early cold war’s international policies and its imaginative practices.”²⁸ She also uses the ideas of captivity and enslavement to show how the Soviet Union and the Chinese became enemies of the United States during this time. Carruthers does not solely focus on the POWs of the Korean War but looks at a Soviet teacher and Russian pilots wanting to be in the United States and not return to the Soviet Union. She also examines the Soviet Union and its gulag, which imprisoned Americans in the eastern bloc. Regarding Korean War POWs, she studies the attempts of brainwashing by the Chinese and North Koreans and addresses their reception of the returning POWs and the fear of brainwashing that had gripped the American public. She shows that at first that many people were

²⁷ Susan Carruthers, *Cold War Captives: Imprisonment, Escape, and Brainwashing* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 21.

²⁸ Carruthers, *Cold War Captives*, 6.

welcoming the returning POWs, throwing welcome home parades, but as information about what happened while in the camps came out, the mood changed, and people became more suspicious. She utilizes editorials in a variety of newspapers to show this change. Carruthers also looks at the individual experiences of POWs who told their stories of what happened to them during their incarceration. She also examines how American society handled the anxiety of the returning POWs and possible brainwashing by showing how television and film began to deal with these topics.

Bruce Cumings published *The Korean War: A History* in 2010. Cummings is a well-known historian who writes many books on the Korean War. Cummings organizes the book topically. He provides a discussion of the war but also looks at the history and memory of the Korean War. Cumings states that the major themes of the book are the origins of the war; early 1950s American culture that covered up the brutality and what was happening in the war, recovering the history of South Korea, and how the war affected America's position in the world.²⁹ This book essentially focuses on the history and memory of the Korean War. Cumings utilizes documents from the National Archives, the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, the British Foreign Office, and the Public Records Office in London. He also uses articles and editorials from the *New York Times*, as well as works from other scholars. There is a discussion of the American POWs and the efforts the North Koreans and Chinese made to brainwash the POWs. The book also discusses the American home front and how, in the 1950s, McCarthyism caused

²⁹ Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York: The Modern Library, 2010), xvii.

Americans to be afraid of Communism in America. There is nothing in the book about how McCarthyism affected the American POWs after the war due to the brainwashing and indoctrination that they endured while a prisoner but does provide insight into the mindset of Americans during this time.

Another study of history and memory concerning the Korean War is Judith Keene's article "Lost to Public Commemoration: American Veterans of the "Forgotten" Korean War," published in 2011 in the *Journal of Social History*. In this article, Keene examines the memory of the Korean War and why it has become a forgotten war.³⁰ Keene evaluates the reasons and factors that caused Americans to forget this war but not other wars. She argues that due to the treatment that the returning POWs endured, including interrogations and investigations, the veterans themselves wanted to be absent from the public commemoration of the war.³¹ Though this article is primarily about memory and history, Keene does discuss what happened to the Korean War POWs when they returned home. She traces the repatriation process, the twenty-three POWs that refused repatriation, and their trials. She also discusses how the media treated the returning POWs and the fear of brainwashing that was pervasive during this period. She describes the evaluations and interrogations that the returning POWs, and sometimes their families, endured. Even the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) became involved in investigating soldiers after the war, as these investigations lasted for years after the

³⁰ Judith Keene, "Lost to Public Commemoration: American Veterans of the "Forgotten" Korean War" *Journal of Social History* 44, no. 4 (Summer 2011): 1095. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41305425>.

³¹ Keene, "Lost to Public Commemoration," 1106.

soldiers returned home.³² So while studying memory, Keene also discusses how Americans treated the returning POWs.

One book that directly addresses American POWs and the political climate in the United States is William Clark Latham Jr.'s *Cold Days in Hell: American POWs in Korea* published in 2012. This book examines the experiences of American POWs during and after the Korean War. Latham argues that the experience of American POWs during the Korean War was different from other wars because it was the first time Americans experienced the “systemic enemy manipulation of POWs for propaganda purposes,” and due to the exaggerated reports of the manipulation by the media and POWs that “caused Pentagon leaders, particularly in the army, to react hastily and unwisely” after the men returned home.³³ Latham uses “memoirs, trial transcripts, declassified government reports, published analyses, and media coverage, as well as conversations, interviews, and correspondence with several dozen former prisoners.”³⁴ Latham considers the earlier work of Albert Biderman’s book, *March to Calumny* the “most important work in this field.”³⁵ This book deals directly with the experience that the American POWs had during the war and their treatment after the war. Latham explains that the Chinese implemented brainwashing, though it was “merely the modification of centuries-old interrogation

³² Keene, “Lost to Public Commemoration,” 1104-1105.

³³ William Clark Latham Jr., *Cold Days in Hell: American POWs in Korea* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2012), 4-5.

³⁴ Latham, *Cold Days in Hell*, 5.

³⁵ Latham, *Cold Days in Hell*, 5.

tactics mastered by Soviet intelligence agencies in their treatment of political prisoners and of German and Japanese prisoners of war and then adapted by Chinese communist forces during the Chinese civil war and the Korean War.”³⁶ Latham states that the goal was to obtain a “sincere confession by the prisoner” and to cause “long-lasting changes in the prisoner’s attitude and behavior.”³⁷ While most of the book concerns POWs during the war, only the final chapter deals with the lives of POWs after the war. Latham looks at how the different branches of the military handled the repatriated soldiers, with the army accusing 3,973 of the 4,435 former POWs, and follows the trials of those accused.³⁸ Latham argues that the method of indoctrination or brainwashing failed, partly due to the mistreatment of the POWs, basing the lectures on false assumptions of Americans, underestimating the education level of the POWs, and because of a lack of “time and leverage”³⁹ This book deals mainly with how the military and government treated the POWs, and not how society treated them. This thesis supports Latham’s argument that the returning POWs experienced a different welcome home than POWs of other wars due to the accusations of brainwashing by the Chinese and North Koreans and because of the anticommunist political climate in the United States.

Also in 2012, Melinda Pash published *In the Shadow of the Greatest Generation: The Americans Who Fought the Korean War*. Pash examines the American soldiers who

³⁶ Latham, *Cold Days in Hell*, 126-127.

³⁷ Latham, *Cold Days in Hell*, 127.

³⁸ Latham, *Cold Days in Hell*, 230.

³⁹ Latham, *Cold Days in Hell*, 197-198.

fought in the Korean War. Pash looks at the entire life of these soldiers and how it shaped them and their war experience. Pash notes that these soldiers grew up during the Great Depression and World War II and how those experiences shaped them.⁴⁰ Pash also details these soldiers' training and experiences during the Korean War. Pash devotes one chapter to the experience of the soldiers when they returned home, and one chapter looking at the recent history. Unlike many of the other scholars of the Korean War, Pash also devotes a chapter to women and African Americans who served and their experiences during the war, and the struggles they faced. Pash examines the experience of POWs during the Korean War and how they differed from those from other wars. Pash states that many "argued that coddling mothers, a broken educational system, weak characters, and an even weaker sense of national pride all made Korean War POWs overly susceptible to Chinese indoctrination."⁴¹ Pash's examination of the Korean War soldiers looks not only at their experiences during wartime but their entire life experiences and how this shaped each of them.

The following year, in 2013, Matthew Dunne published *A Cold War State of Mind: Brainwashing and Postwar American Society*. Dunne, a historian, uses the concept of brainwashing to examine the post-World War II and the early Cold War era and demonstrates how anxieties over the concept of brainwashing deeply affected American

⁴⁰ Pash, *In the Shadow of the Greatest Generation*, 3.

⁴¹ Pash, *In the Shadow of the Greatest Generation*, 143.

society.⁴² Dunne argues that using brainwashing as a lens to study American society in this period reveals new information about the Cold War and “illustrates how central the concept was to the rise of new models of behavior, new ideas about the mind and anxieties about the potential for domestic and foreign institutions to misuse psychology to manipulate human beings.”⁴³ He also reveals how the anxieties concerning brainwashing had a ripple effect and led to issues of Americans' distrust of politicians, a fading sense of community, and the rising importance of self-fulfillment.⁴⁴ Dunne utilizes government documents, congressional hearings, films, literature, and information from Dwight D. Eisenhower's Presidential Library to demonstrate how the government was attempting to shift public opinion. This book looks at how the concept of brainwashing was something that some POWs and American society latched onto to explain what was happening, especially after twenty-three soldiers decided not to return home. Dunne looks at the interviews and psychological evaluations that the returning POWs endured. He also looks at how American officials and Americans attempted to determine why the enemy was able to brainwash the POWs. Dunne shows how at first the American people were happy about the return of POWs, but then the suspicions began. He demonstrates how the government, especially President Eisenhower, dealt with the issue of the returning POWs.

⁴² Matthew W. Dunne, *A Cold War State of Mind: Brainwashing and Postwar American Society* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013), 2.

⁴³ Dunne, *Cold War State of Mind*, 3.

⁴⁴ Dunne, *Cold War State of Mind*, 3.

Dunne shows how anxieties in American society affected the treatment of POWs due to the fear of brainwashing during this period.

One book that does look closely at the experiences of Korean War POWs is *Name, Rank, and Serial Number: Exploiting Korean War POWs at Home and Abroad* published by Charles Young in 2014. Young, a historian, looks at how America exploited the POWs and discusses that the war could have ended earlier, but the issue of POWs held up the armistice negotiations. Young argues that the government used POWs in two ways. Young states “their captivity was prolonged and possibly cheapened by the partial repatriation of enemy prisoners of war” and “returning GIs were shamed by propaganda at home in a psychological warfare program that targeted the public.”⁴⁵ He looks at the experiences of the POWs during the war to the period of their return home. Young utilizes an extensive list of primary sources including archival papers and government documents from the National Archives, the Truman Presidential Library, and the Eisenhower Presidential Library. He also uses newspapers and periodicals to show what journalists wrote about the POWs. Young directly addresses the returning home of the POWs and the suspicions that they encountered. He discusses the interrogations, investigations, and prosecution of former POWs. He also shows that it was only the Army that court marshaled POWs, not other branches of the military.⁴⁶ Young also discusses the blame that officials put on mothers for making their sons too effeminate and

⁴⁵ Charles Young, *Name, Rank, and Serial Number: Exploiting Korean War POWs at Home and Abroad* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 7.

⁴⁶ Young, *Name, Rank, and Serial Number*, 146.

thus weak soldiers. Additionally, he examines why the Korean War was the “forgotten war” and how films and books dealt with the topics of brainwashing and POWs.

The most recent scholarship on POWs is by Monica Kim who writes about the interrogation rooms of the Korean War in her book, *The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold Story* published in 2019. Kim uses the interrogation rooms of both sides during the Korean War to demonstrate how this war was not just about territory, but political recognition. Kim states “if we want to understand how the act of recognition became the essential terrain of war, we must step away from the traditional landscape of warfare- the battlefield- and into the interrogation room.”⁴⁷ Kim argues that in the 1950s, war was no longer about geopolitical territory, but over human interiority.⁴⁸ She further argues that the Korean War became a war “waged over the violation of a human subject- the prisoner of war” and the images of POWs renouncing his or her state, “challenged the legitimacy of other states.”⁴⁹ Kim utilizes archival documents from the United States and Korea. She also uses interviews that she conducted, memoirs, and newspapers. Though most of the book deals with the interrogations on both sides during the war, the final two chapters discuss repatriation. Kim gives a detailed look at how the repatriation process worked for POWs on both sides, with each side agreeing that the POWs could decide for themselves which country they wanted to go to, even if it was not

⁴⁷ Monica Kim, *The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 5.

⁴⁸ Kim, *Interrogation Rooms*, 7.

⁴⁹ Kim, *Interrogation Rooms*, 7, 11.

their home country. Kim also discusses the interrogation and investigations by the United States on their returning POWs and the fear that the Chinese and North Koreans brainwashed the POWs. Kim shows the experience that some returning POWs and the suspicious attitudes of others and the investigations that they endured for years after they returned home. Kim's book is different from other works in that she looks at the interrogation rooms from all sides, not just the American viewpoint.

In studying the experiences of the returning Korean War POWs, it is important to understand the political climate in the world and in the United States during this time. The United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in the Cold War. The Cold War greatly shaped many facets of life in America at this time, including what happened to the Korean War POWs. Since the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union, once allies, began a conflict that lasted for decades. The reason that the United States entered into the Korean War in the first place was due to the Cold War. America feared the Soviet Union and Communism at this time. Thus, the potential for North Korea, a Communist country, to take over South Korea, drew the United States into the war to try to prevent this. An early work that discussed the anxiety in the United States over Communism was *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom* by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., first published in 1949. Schlesinger believed that America was in an age of anxiety, which America needed to avoid because this anxiety led people in other countries to the extremes of communism and fascism. Another scholar who wrote about the Cold War was William Appleman Williams. Williams first published his book, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* in 1959. This book examines American diplomacy

beginning in the 1890s and demonstrates how American diplomacy led to tensions during the Cold War. A book written after the end of the Cold War was John Lewis Gaddis. In his book, *The Cold War: A New History*, published in 2005, Gaddis covered events throughout the Cold War. Gaddis showed why the United States feared the Soviet Union, even though the Soviet Union turned out to be weaker than perceived during the Cold War, and demonstrated how the United States made it through the Cold War.⁵⁰ Gaddis accomplished this by explaining the politics and policies put in place to protect America.

One of the effects of the Cold War was the emergence of McCarthyism in the United States. Due to the Cold War, the fear of Communism gripped the country. The POWs returned during the height of McCarthyism. Ellen Schrecker has written several books concerning McCarthyism. In 1998, Schrecker wrote the book, *Many Are The Crimes: McCarthyism in America*. In this book, Schrecker examined certain events and institutions to demonstrate McCarthyism, but she notes it is not a book that looks at everything that happened during this time.⁵¹ Schrecker argues that McCarthyism involved far more than the career of Senator Joseph McCarthy but was the “most widespread and longest-lasting wave of political repression in American history.”⁵² She further argues that due to the recent opening of archival records, “much of what happened during the McCarthy era was the result of a concerted campaign by a loosely structured, but

⁵⁰ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), x.

⁵¹ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, xv.

⁵² Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, x.

surprisingly self-conscious, network of political activists who had been working for years to drive Communism out of American life.”⁵³ She also notes that though it had the support of ordinary Americans, it was “primarily a top-down phenomenon.”⁵⁴ Schrecker also explained that the outbreak Korean War help McCarthy and his crusade because at stake with the war was another country becoming Communist if North Korea successfully took over South Korea.⁵⁵ Schrecker also examines the impact that McCarthyism had on America during this time.

Also published in 1998, the first edition of *The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents*. This book is currently in its third edition, released in 2017. In part one of this book, Schrecker and Phillip Deery offer an overview of McCarthyism from its beginning until its end. They also discuss McCarthy himself, as well as the government’s anti-communism agenda, the atomic spy cases, red-baiting, investigations, and blacklists. The second part of the book contains actual documents about McCarthyism. Included in the documents is testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) from J. Edgar Hoover, Alger Hiss, and Whittaker Chambers. It also includes President Harry S. Truman’s executive order 9835, letters from Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Supreme Court opinions, speeches by McCarthy, and other documents. In part one of the book, Schrecker and Deery argue that

⁵³ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, xiii.

⁵⁴ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, xiii.

⁵⁵ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 249.

“anticommunism moved to the ideological center of American politics” and that the “cold war transformed domestic communism from a matter of political opinion to one of national security.”⁵⁶ This book does an excellent job demonstrating the political climate in America during this time and the fear that had swept the nation against anything or anyone that was Communist. Unfortunately, the POWs returning from the Korean War had been marked as potentially brainwashed by the Chinese and North Koreans and returned home to this unfriendly environment.

The first people to write about the Korean War and Korean War POWs were not historians, but journalists and sociologists. These scholars wrote within the first ten years of the war ending. The focus primarily questioned whether the Chinese and North Koreans brainwashed American POWs and why the experience of the POWs was different from other wars. Next historians began using a military methodology to examine the Korean War. Then historians in the twenty-first century began writing about the experience of POWs and what they endured in the camps and at home. For many historians, the return home process is just a small part of the story, with what happened in the camps receiving much more focus. Scholars study the Korean War and Korean War POWs using a variety of methodologies and viewpoints including cultural, memory, political, military, Cold War, and interrogation rooms, though most scholars write little about the experience once the POWs returned home. This thesis shows that although prisoners of war were a reality for other wars, the experience of American POWs from the Korean War returning home was different because of the suspicions they encountered

⁵⁶ Schrecker and Deery, *The Age of McCarthyism*, 16.

when they returned home due to McCarthyism, how the government and military treated them due to fears of brainwashing and Communism in the POW camps, and how the newspapers and magazines reported on the returning men. These books demonstrate the changes in the historiography of Korean War POWs.

This thesis starts in chapter one by examining the role that newspapers and magazines played in the experience that returning POWs. It also provides insight into the climate of the United States at the time of the POWs' return and the information that the general American public received concerning the returning men. Chapter two looks at each of the Valley Forge POWs, their background, and experiences and actions in POW camps. This chapter also looks at the evaluation process and scoring system the ad hoc committee used to rate the levels of indoctrination for each of the men. Chapter three explores the timeline of the movements of the Valley Forge POWs, and the information of what the government believed about the POWs. Finally, chapter four analyses the topic of germ warfare and how the Chinese and North Koreans, with the help of the Soviet Union, accused the United States of using this tactic for propaganda purposes. The chapter also follows the response by the United States regarding the men who confessed to germ warfare while in the POW camps, and the decisions that had to be made surrounding what, if any punishment, they should receive.

Chapter 1: Returning POWs and the Fear of Communism:

A Look at the Media's Coverage

On September 12, 1953, Staff Sergeant Jack Flanary returned to his home in Benham, Kentucky, after thirty-two months as a prisoner of war (POW) in North Korea to a big parade and welcome home ceremony. The joyous welcome home took a sudden turn when members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) and American Legion walked off stage and left the ceremony. A rumor circulated among the crowd that Flanary was a progressive, the name given to those who cooperated with the Chinese and North Koreans, while at the POW camp which prompted the VFW and American Legion members to leave the ceremony. The *Knoxville News Sentinel* wrote that Flanary told one of its reporters at the Knoxville Airport that he was a progressive. Flanary told the reporter that he wrote to an aunt about petitioning for peace and that he also read Communist material provided in the camp. He later denied being progressive but admitted that others saw him as one.¹ A fellow POW from Rockwood, Tennessee, Sergeant Oliver Boles, told the *Knoxville Journal* that he was in Camp Three with Flanary. Boles stated that Flanary was a progressive who would “do favors” for the North Koreans and Chinese and read a lot of red propaganda materials. Maxine Hall summed up the fears of the nation over possible Communist POWs. She reported in the *Knoxville News Sentinel* that “The worst casualty of the Korean War for people in this area was the hero they lost today when their first repatriated POW admitted falling for Communist

¹ “National Affairs: The Tough Prisoners,” *Time Magazine*, September 21, 1953.

propaganda.”² While most welcome-home ceremonies did not abruptly end like Flanary’s, his story demonstrates the anxiety that Americans felt about the return of POWs from Korea because of the accusations that some POWs had succumbed to brainwashing and now believed in Communism.

The fears of Communism were prominent in America during this period and Americans saw evidence of the stigma Communism created everywhere. In 1953, when the POWs returned home, America was at the height of what became known as McCarthyism. Senator Joseph McCarthy and others on the House Un-American Activities Committee accused and interviewed those they believed Communist sympathizers. Americans also feared the Soviet Union and viewed actions through the lens of the Cold War and Communist fears. Newspapers and magazines reported on the possibility that the Chinese and North Koreans brainwashed the returning POWs, which resulted in some POWs believing in Communism. The same day newspapers across the United States printed the story of Jack Flanary, there were also news stories about actress Lucille Ball and her alleged links to Communism. Also, after Operation Little Switch, but before Operation Big Switch and the signing of the armistice agreement, the American government executed two Americans for being spies for the Soviet Union, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. This demonstrates to anxiety Americans had toward potential Communists and unfortunately for the returning POWs, newspaper reports had already planted the idea that some of them had converted to Communism. The anti-Communist

² Maxine Hall, “POW Admits Belief in Red Propaganda; Homecoming Clouded,” *Knoxville News Sentinel*, September 13, 1953.

fervor in the United States and reports of brainwashed POWs caused the experience of American Korean War POWs to be different from the POWs who returned after previous wars. Instead of a big welcome home and celebrations, though there were some of those, many returned home to other Americans and family members being suspicious and fearful that they were now Communists. Charles Young summed up how the experience was different and stated, “The returnees had the misfortune of arriving home during McCarthyism, when anticommunist fears had fixated on spies and traitors within America.”³

On April 20, 1953, Operation Little Switch began. This operation saw 149 sick and injured American POWs repatriated. The remainder of the POWs returned during Operation Big Switch which began on August 5, 1953. Before the release of the first POWs, American newspapers printed stories on issues that could arise with the release of American POWs. The *Baltimore Sun* reported a warning that there may be American POWs who would refuse repatriation due to the Chinese using the Russian technique of brainwashing.⁴ Government and military officials gave several reasons why they were fearful that brainwashing occurred. One cause for concern was a Presbyterian minister, whom the Chinese arrested in 1951 and later released. The *Kansas City Times* reported he claimed the Chinese brainwashed him. The same articles also reported government

³ Charles S. Young, *Name, Rank, and Serial Number: Exploiting Korean War POWs at Home and Abroad* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 114.

⁴ Mark Watson, Sunpapers Military Correspondent, “Reds May Claim GI Captives in Korea Refuse Repatriation,” *Baltimore Sun*, April 4, 1953.

concerns about brainwashing since a propaganda film released by the Chinese and North Koreans surfaced in which three American airmen confessed to germ warfare.⁵ The *Philadelphia Inquirer* reported that the Army had a program in place to “reorient returning prisoners of war politically and psychologically to the American way of life.”⁶ The government created this program in response to a fact sheet released by the Department of Defense that detailed the enemy’s attempts to indoctrinate POWs. The *Chicago Tribune* reported that the eight-page fact sheet indicated that the Chinese and North Koreans tried to win over POWs through indoctrination. The DOD also stated that in the 29,000 letters that American POWs sent to their family members, a majority contained some kind of Communist propaganda, though the government admitted that this could also be because the enemy censored letters before they were mailed.⁷ Four days before the start of Operation Little Switch, the *Chicago Tribune* warned that returning POWs would probably only have nice things to say about the Chinese and North Koreans. The article also addressed the issues reporters would face if American POWs made pro-Communist statements and how best to report these statements, though the article did not give any advice on what the reporters should do. The article states that the POWs may need “months of kindness and psychiatric care before becoming normal

⁵ John Hightower, Associated Press, “Say GI’s May Say No,” *Kansas City Times*, April 4, 1953.

⁶ “Army Acts to Rid GIs of Red Taint,” *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 12, 1953.

⁷ “Reds May Have Won Over Some POWs, Say U.S.,” *Chicago Tribune*, April 13, 1953.

Americans again.” Part of the patience Americans needed to have with returning POWs included the fact that the POWs have only received news of world events from the enemy, so their versions of events may be untrue.⁸ On the first day of Operation Little Switch, the *Boston Globe* reported advice from an Army psychiatrist, Brigadier General Rawley Chambers, on how to treat returning POWs. Chambers’s advice was to treat returning POWs “as though they had just been around the corner at the drugstore.”⁹ Chambers warned families that he predicted that “a majority of the returning prisoners will have ‘some difficulties in mental readjustment’ to freedom.” Army officials believed that POWs returning to normal home life with patience and understanding family members would be best to counteract any indoctrination of America not being the best country, but warned families that the returning soldiers could have “an unconscious hostility toward their nation and family as a result of their long imprisonment.”¹⁰ All of these newspaper reports planted in the minds of Americans that there was something different about the returning POWs and that there was the possibility that the returning men may have been successfully brainwashed.

The POW exchange took place at a location called Freedom Village in the demilitarization zone. Per the armistice agreement, POWs on both sides chose if they

⁸ Walter Simmons, “Expect POWs to Say a Kind Word for Reds,” *Chicago Tribune*, April 17, 1953.

⁹ United Press International, “Army Advises: Treat P.O.W.’s Naturally,” *Boston Globe*, April 20, 1953.

¹⁰ United Press International, “Army Advises: Treat P.O.W.’s Naturally,” *Boston Globe*, April 20, 1953.

wanted to be repatriated or not. The press had the opportunity to interview some of the men at Freedom Village. Stories of indoctrination, torture, death marches, improper food, and improper medical care became a common theme among the men. The 1949 Geneva Convention contained rules regarding POWs and their treatment, though North Korea did not sign this agreement. North Korea stated that it would abide by the rules of the Geneva Convention at the start of the war, though they did not.¹¹ The Chinese also made similar claims when to became involved in the war.¹² The *Baltimore Sun* reported the story of Private William Prabucki who claimed that in a twenty-eight-day death march, approximately 200 of the 1,000 men died. Another private reported that approximately 400 out of 1,200 died in another death march.¹³ Another POW described a death march in the winter of 1950 when the North Koreans bayoneted, clubbed, or pushed off hills and cliffs any POW who could not keep up. Officials estimated that 1,500 Allied POWs died on the march and at the red stockades.¹⁴ The *Los Angeles Times* reported on POW interviews in which many told of forced indoctrination classes but later the classes

¹¹ “Both Sides’ No Atrocities Pledges in Korea Fighting Reported to U.N.,” *New York Times*, July 14, 1950.

¹² “U.S. Asks Soviet to Bid Reds Heed Geneva Pact in Korea,” *New York Times*, July 25, 1952.

¹³ Associated Press, “Returned GI Throws Away His Crutches,” *Baltimore Sun*, April 25, 1953.

¹⁴ Associated Press, “Repatriates Bare More Atrocities,” *New York Times*, April 23, 1953.

became optional.¹⁵ Some POWs told stories of fellow soldiers who succumbed to indoctrination and became Communists. The *Chicago Tribune* reported that Private First-Class Lester Todd claimed that there were seventeen American POWs in his group of 165 who became Communists.¹⁶ Another POW stated that to receive medical care to survive, the Chinese and North Koreans forced him into making pro-Communist statements.¹⁷ Stories of forced indoctrination added to the fear of Americans that the Chinese and North Koreans had successfully brainwashed some American POWs causing them to support Communism.

The Department of Defense further added to the fears of brainwashed POWs when it announced on April 28, 1953, that a small group of twenty repatriated POWs would be flown directly to Valley Forge Army Hospital because there were signs they had “succumbed to Communist indoctrination” and special treatment would be given to them at the hospital.¹⁸ The *Chicago Tribune* reported that the Army stated that the POWs “suffered ‘great privations’ and hardships that weakened their resistance to persistent Red propaganda.”¹⁹ An Associated Press (AP) article reported the first interview that ten of

¹⁵ United Press International, “Red Classes Forced on GIs, One Says,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 20, 1953.

¹⁶ Associated Press, “Yank Says 17 In Prison Camp Became Reds,” *Chicago Tribune*, April 27, 1953.

¹⁷ Associated Press, “Yank Says 17 In Prison Camp Became Reds,” *Chicago Tribune*, April 27, 1953.

¹⁸ “Defense Dept. Put Out Story About ‘Red’ G.I.’s,” *Boston Globe*, May 4, 1953.

¹⁹ “POWs Converted by Reds to Get Hospital Care,” *Chicago Tribune*, April 29, 1953.

the twenty POWs made. The POWs expressed bitterness because of the red label that the DOD put upon them by implying that they had succumbed to Communism and denied the fact that they became Communists.²⁰ *Life* magazine wrote a story on the twenty Valley Forge POWs and their experience. Master Sergeant Walter McCollum detailed his experience at Camp Five, which some POWs called the University of Pyuktong, and the indoctrination school that was set up there.²¹ The Chinese gave treats such as cigarettes or apples to those who participated and wrote essays pleasing to the Chinese. Corporal Kenyon Wagner stated that his illness and need to be in a hospital made him a target for the enemy. Wagner had tuberculosis and understood after a visit from one of his captors that to get treated he must go along with the teaching against America or else he would be sent back to the camp where he would die without treatment.²² The article explained, “The Communists selected for schooling those PWs they considered the best candidates on the grounds of impressionability, education, economic and racial background.”²³ Army psychiatrists stated that they believe that men from this camp were returned during Operation Little Switch to see how successful the indoctrination was. The article also detailed a story of one POW who told his parents when they visited him at Valley Forge

²⁰ Associated Press, “Ex-Prisoners Bitter Over ‘Red Label’,” *Baltimore Sun*, May 4, 1953.

²¹ William Brinkley, “Valley Forge GIs,” *Life Magazine*, May 25, 1953.

²² William Brinkley, “Valley Forge GIs,” *Life Magazine*, May 25, 1953, 116.

²³ William Brinkley, “Valley Forge GIs,” *Life Magazine*, May 25, 1953, 121.

Hospital that he was a progressive in the camps and attempted to persuade his parents toward Communism by telling them that the United States government told lies but he learned the truth from the Chinese.²⁴ Officials released this POW to his parents, and after being at home for a bit, he did not mention Communism much more nor try to indoctrinate his parents. The Army denied allegations that the Valley Forge men were now “Reds.” The *New York Times* reported that the Army was not sure how the statement from the DOD came about, though previously the Army themselves reported that they needed “intensive medical and spiritual treatment.”²⁵ The Army claimed that there were no plans to de-brainwashing the Valley Forge POWs and that they were only at the hospital to care for physical illnesses and wounds.²⁶ A spokesman for the Second Army stated that the POWs went to the hospital for physical injuries, such as frostbitten feet, not because the Chinese and North Koreans had brainwashed them and they required re-indoctrinating. An army spokesman summed up the feeling of the Valley Forge POWs and explained, “How would you feel if you fought for your country and were wounded and captured, then flew 10,000 miles to a hospital to find out you were being labeled as a Communist?”²⁷ The incident of the Valley Forge men shows how worried some in the government were over insinuations of brainwashing. Newspaper and magazine reporting

²⁴ William Brinkley, “Valley Forge GIs,” *Life Magazine*, May 25, 1953, 122.

²⁵ “POWs Converted by Reds to Get Hospital Care,” *Chicago Tribune*, April 29, 1953.

²⁶ “Ex-Captives Deny Disloyalty Taint,” *New York Times*, May 4, 1953.

²⁷ “Baltimorean is in Group at Valley Forge,” *Baltimore Sun*, May 3, 1953.

showed both why there could be concern about the men since many attended indoctrination classes. This story also demonstrates the disconnect between the military and government since there was an opposing statement made and no coordination on what information to release on these returning POWs. It is also easy to see why they were bitter over the red label, especially due to the prevalence of McCarthyism in America.

Beginning in August 1953, Operation Big Switch began in which both sides swapped the remainder of POWs. Each POW, on both sides, was able to decide if they wanted to return to their home country. This exchange brought renewed fears of brainwashed POWs and American POWs possibly choosing not to repatriate and going to live in China instead. One newspaper article that fueled the fear of returning POWs having become Communists was from the United Press International (UPI). This article stated that Allied sources believed that “the Communists are using the war prisoner exchange as a smoke screen for a grand-scale infiltration of Red agents into the western world.”²⁸ The accusation was that the enemy mixed in POWs who collaborated and were now Communists with the other POWs. There were also fears that American POWs would choose not to return home, which would be a devastating loss to the United States. Another UPI article reported that during a prisoner exchange, American POWs claimed that there were seven Americans who choose not to return home.²⁹ These fears became a

²⁸ United Press International, “Reds Loading Korea Prisoner Lists with Spies, U.N. Charges,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 10, 1953.

²⁹ United Press International, “How Some Yanks Fell for Red Line Told by Freed G.I.’s Who Resisted,” *Boston Globe*, August 7, 1953.

reality when twenty-three Americans, referred to as turncoats, refused repatriation to live in China. Newspapers reported on advice on how to treat returning POWs, just like before Operation Little Switch began. Army psychiatrist Major Henry Segal stated that these POWs have been “living in a fantasy” where they could not express their opinions and feeling nor always knew whom to trust, including fellow POWs. Segal also explained that he does not think that any POWs could be untouched by Communist influence.³⁰ He further claimed that families need to have patience and that will be the biggest factor in how the POWs readjust to life. Thus, aside from fears of POWs refusing repatriation, Operation Big Switch and Operation Little Switch had much in common.

Also, similar to Operation Little Switch, were horrific stories of atrocities, such as death marches, inadequate food and clothing, poor or no medical treatment, insufficient lodging, and physical violence that POWs told reporters. The interviews with POWs painted a picture of the atrocities committed by the North Korean and Chinese on United Nations POWs and the large number of POWs that died while in captivity. Injured POWs did not always receive medical care and the Chinese and North Koreans forced some POWs to make broadcasts or make confessions to receive medical treatment for such potentially deadly conditions as lice and dysentery. In addition, the enemy tried to starve POWs to gain information or extract confessions. This combined with a diet of millet, which are small-seeded grain, wreaked havoc on POWs’ digestive systems. Sergeant Junior Dunlap told reporters that he helped to bury around 2,000 Allied soldiers in

³⁰ Patrick Skene Catling, “Doctor Says Prisoners Lived in ‘Fantasy,’ Needs Patience,” *Baltimore Sun*, August 10, 1953.

shallow graves. He stated that “malnutrition, lice which sucked your blood out, dysentery, diarrhea, starvation, and very cold weather” was to blame for the high rate of deaths in the camps.³¹ A UPI article describes how in the Death Valley region of North Korea, five to seventeen men died daily in the winter of 1950 when temperatures reached twenty degrees below zero. Those that survived marched to another camp in which another 300 died.³²

Some articles reported not only the torture and atrocities but also the large death toll of POWs. The *Chicago Tribune* reported that the Army released an interim report that estimated, through photographic and eyewitness testimony approximately 23,702 people were victims of atrocities. The Army estimates that around 6,113 of those victims were American POWs.³³ This article quotes the report stating, “All of the sickening detail of horror and calculated brutality spells out of the fact that we cannot relax our defense efforts.”³⁴ The article also explained the North Koreans were responsible for ninety percent of the atrocities and the remainder the Chinese perpetrated.³⁵ This article painted

³¹ Associated Press, “Lice a Major Killer of Allied Prisoners in early Days of War,” *Iola Register*, August 7, 1953.

³² United Press International, “2,000 GI Captives Died in ’50 Winter,” *New York Times*, August 7, 1953.

³³ Lloyd Norman, “Army Report Tells Murder of 6,113 GIs,” *Chicago Tribune*, October 29, 1953.

³⁴ Lloyd Norman, “Army Report Tells Murder of 6,113 GIs,” *Chicago Tribune*, October 29, 1953.

³⁵ Lloyd Norman, “Army Report Tells Murder of 6,113 GIs,” *Chicago Tribune*, October 29, 1953.

a vivid and disturbing picture for readers by using the word “cold-blooded” repeatedly and including harsh statements such as there was a “cold-blooded program of torture and murder carried on by the Communist enemy in Korea.”³⁶ In November 1953, the *New York Herald Tribune* published excerpts from atrocity cases submitted to the United Nations. These excerpts contained stories of POWs being bound together and shot, with a few surviving the massacre to report on it, death marches, inadequate food, and even North Korean attacks killing South Korean civilians.³⁷ Newspaper interviews and case studies detailed to the American public the horrors that many of the POWs faced while prisoners. This allowed Americans to also get a sense of what happened that led some POWs to confess or cooperate as reports of those cases began to appear in print. It also took the hope of many families who had service members still missing from the war. Stories of atrocities and mass deaths and burials, with no records of who died, made some realize that this could be the fate of their family member. The Army also stated that they believe this is the reason for the discrepancies in the numbers of those repatriated and those known to be missing.³⁸ Families lost their final hope by the end of September 1953, when Chinese and North Korean authorities reported that they returned all the American POWs in captivity, except for the twenty-three Americans who refused repatriation. The

³⁶ Lloyd Norman, “Army Report Tells Murder of 6,113 GIs,” *Chicago Tribune*, October 29, 1953.

³⁷ “Excerpts From Atrocity Cases,” *New York Herald Tribune*, November 29, 1953.

³⁸ “Death by Thousands: Atrocity Tales Dim Hope for GIs,” *Washington Daily News*, August 7, 1953.

United States reported that there were approximately 3,404 missing POWs, not accounted for leaving the families to assume they had died in a march or camp and buried without anyone recording their names.³⁹

Another issue that POWs told reporters about was the progressives in the camps, those who collaborated with the enemy. These progressives not only collaborated with Chinese and North Koreans but also reported on fellow POWs, which in turn caused the captors to torture and mistreat other POWs. Some of the POWs interviewed discussed their bitterness and hate toward the progressives in their camps. It is interesting to note that while stories of progressives were frequently told to reporters by many of the POWs, these POWs also made it very clear that they were not collaborators. Some went a step further and discussed how they withstood torture and did not collaborate or sign confessions. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Harrison told an AP reporter that he endured starvation and torture, which included water torture and burning with cigarettes but he never gave in.⁴⁰ One group of POWs exchanged told reporters that the Chinese and North Koreans tortured them due to progressives who informed on their fellow captives and said they would retaliate against them if given the chance. Officials restrained one POW in Freedom Village because he saw a POW that was allegedly a progressive.⁴¹ One ship

³⁹ William Jordon, "23 U.S. Prisoners Refuse Repatriation, Red Reports," *New York Times*, September 22, 1953.

⁴⁰ Associated Press, "Colonel Tells of Tortures in Captivity," *Leavenworth Times*, August 6, 1953.

⁴¹ "Warns Anew of Possible War Actions," *Baltimore Sun*, August 12, 1953.

of American POWs who returned to the United States had POWs who talked about roughing up progressives on the ships. Private First Class Richard Schorr stated that he believed other POW passengers on the ship would have killed the progressives if the captain of the ship did not stop them.⁴² The *Saturday Evening Post* ran an article about POWs who collaborated. Sergeant James Pinkston claims that he knows there is an organized group of POWs in the United States because he was a progressive who was part of this group.⁴³ William Ulman interviewed sixty soldiers across America for a story of progressive POWs for the *Saturday Evening Post*. Ulman concluded from his interviews that the POWs felt like the military did not adequately train and that the reason that most collaborated was because of “vanity and self-indulgence on one hand: fear and hunger on the other.”⁴⁴ In the article, Pinkston incriminated another POW, Corporal Bob Hickox, who vehemently denied the allegations. It is understandable why it was important to make the distinction because POWs did not want to have the red label put on them. It was also a safety issue because so many POWs held grudges against those, they believed wronged them in camps and wanted revenge.

One story that appeared in several newspapers was that of Corporal “Slick.” Slick’s real name does not appear in any of the articles, but other POWs singled him out

⁴² “6 Progressives Beaten on Ship,” *Baltimore Sun*, August 20, 1953.

⁴³ William Ulman, “The GI’s Who Fell for the Reds,” *Saturday Evening Post*, March 6, 1954. 17.

⁴⁴ William Ulman, “The GI’s Who Fell for the Reds,” *Saturday Evening Post*, March 6, 1954. 18.

as a POW that is accused of collaborating with the enemy. The *Boston Globe* described him as “a boy scarcely out of his teens” who had shaky hands while talking with reporters.⁴⁵ A UPI article described Slick as “good-looking” with only a fourth-grade education.⁴⁶ Slick went absent without leave (AWOL) from a hospital in Tokyo for five days. The *New York Times* reported that the reason Slick was AWOL was that other POWs threatened to kill him due to his collaboration with the enemy.⁴⁷ A UPI article claimed that when Slick arrived in Inchon, he found a noose in his cot and asked a chaplain to take his name off the passenger list for the boat and instead send him to Tokyo to the hospital.⁴⁸ At Freedom Village, POWs who stated they were victims of Slick’s cooperation with the Chinese and North Koreans called him the “worst rat in Korea” though explained he was not a Progressive who believed in Communism, he just told on fellow POWs to get rewards and better work assignments.⁴⁹ Slick told a reporter in Hawaii, on a stop on the flight to California, that this story was not true. Slick claims that he went AWOL because officials gave him a four-hour pass and went out and got drunk. He stated that he missed his flight, so he decided to stay out and continue drinking

⁴⁵ Roy Essoyan, “‘Slick’ Denies He ‘Ratted’ On Fellow P.W.s,” *Boston Globe*, September 5, 1953.

⁴⁶ Associated Press, “Corp. Slick Arrives in U.S.—Trying to Explain Nickname,” *Tucson Citizen*, September 7, 1953.

⁴⁷ United Press International, “Slick Surrenders in Toyoko,” September 3, 1953.

⁴⁸ United Press International, “Slick the Stool Pigeon, Quizzed by Toyoko M.P.s,” *Boston Globe*, September 3, 1953.

⁴⁹ United Press International, “Slick the Stool Pigeon, Quizzed by Toyoko M.P.s,” *Boston Globe*, September 3, 1953.

for the next four days and that the story of him being afraid for his life was untrue.⁵⁰ Slick acknowledged that others may have thought he collaborated because he told the captors about an escape plan that fellow POWs had created, but did not tell the Chinese and North Koreans any information on the escape that they did not already know. He also asserts he received no special treatment or food and ate the same as fellow POWs. Interestingly, the article stated that “the interview was broken up at that point by a military intelligence man in plain-clothed who ordered Slick to return to the other members of the group.”⁵¹ Though the Army never pressed charges on Slick for cooperation though others insisted he told on his fellow POWs. The story of Slick demonstrates the tension between fellow POWs and those that allegedly cooperated. It is also interesting that though this was a widely reported story, none of the articles contain Slick’s real name. The army withheld his name to spare his family, but also Slick refused to give reporters any real information about himself. The only other mention of Slick was in the *Saturday Evening Post* article by William Ulman in March 1954. Ulman interviewed him but he also kept Slick’s name confidential. There was no other information found about the real identity of Slick. It is easy to see why Slick would not want to give information about himself to protect himself and his family.

⁵⁰ Roy Essoyan, “‘Slick’ Denies He ‘Ratted’ On Fellow P.W.s,” *Boston Globe*, September 5, 1953.

⁵¹ United Press International, “Slick Denies He is in Trouble on POW Record,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 6, 1953.

Not only were there issues with those who collaborated, but several returning POWs were on the military and government radar because they had confessed different things to the enemy. The most common confession that the Chinese and North Koreans used for propaganda was that the United Nations forces, especially the United States military forces, used germ warfare against the North Korean military and civilians. In 1952, the Soviet Union charged the United States with using bacteriological warfare, or germ warfare, against North Koreans in the United Nations, though a vote stopped the Soviets from furthering these claims. Soviets alleged that the United States dropped germ-infested “crackers, pork, spiders, crows, ants, yellow leaves, crickets, canned fleas, fleas, and goose feathers” over North Korea.⁵² If the Chinese and North Koreans could get anyone to confess, then this would be great propaganda for them against the United States and the war. The *New York Times* stated that in 1952, Peiping Radio, a Communist radio station, broadcasted almost daily about alleged germ warfare bombings against soldiers and civilians.⁵³ Airmen became a target for the enemy so that they could extract confessions from these men to prove the germ warfare claims that they had made on the radio and to the United Nations. In 1953, newspapers reported that Peiping Radio broadcasted confessions made by two Marine Corps Officers. The radio broadcast used alleged statements made by Colonel Frank Schwable and Major Roy Bley in which both

⁵² A.M. Rosenthal, “U.N. Silences Soviet on Germ Warfare,” *New York Times*, March 29, 1952.

⁵³ “Red China Renews Cry of ‘Germ Warfare’,” *New York Times*, February 21, 1953.

men claim that the United States dropped germ bombs in North Korea.⁵⁴ Alleged confessions like those of Schwable and Bley provided the enemy with great propaganda to use against the United States. The *New York Times* reported that General Clark did not believe that either of these officers gave these statements to the Chinese and North Koreans.⁵⁵ During repatriation, newspapers printed the stories of what flyers endured during captivity. Some of the flyers told reporters of the torture they endured, but how they did not give in and confess. Airman Lieutenant Charles Maultsby told reporters that he spent nine days in a freezing cold hole to try to persuade him to sign a germ warfare confession, but he still resisted.⁵⁶ Another lieutenant, Ward Tuttle, stated that the Chinese captors woke him at 2 a.m. and held a gun to his head to get him to confess, though he too did not give in.⁵⁷ While they lived through their ordeal others were not so lucky. In an interview during Operation Big Switch, Corporal Irvin Edwards told reporters that one airman refused to confess. The captors gagged and chained this unidentified airman to a pole. The guards left him there without food and water in the hot sun until he died.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ “Red China Steps Up Germ Warfare Charges,” *New York Times*, February 25, 1953.

⁵⁵ “Red China Steps Up Germ Warfare Charges,” *New York Times*, February 25, 1953.

⁵⁶ “Freed Flyers Report Torture to Get Germ Confessions,” *Baltimore Sun*, September 1, 1953.

⁵⁷ “Freed Flyers Report Torture to Get Germ Confessions,” *Baltimore Sun*, September 1, 1953.

⁵⁸ Lindesay Parrott, “Torture of Fliers Related by P.O.W.s,” *New York Times*, August 21, 1953.

Some airmen confessed. Airman Lieutenant Richard Voss confessed to germ warfare after doctors refused to do anything for maggots in his wounds.⁵⁹ More information came out about Schwable and his experience that led to the confession that aired on Peiping Radio. The day after the Chinese and North Koreans released Schwable, he said, "I could either die from their mental treatment or serve my country better by giving the Communist fantastic information they wanted."⁶⁰ Lieutenant Floyd O'Neal, who the enemy released at the same time as Schwable explained, "The Chinese gave me a choice of life or death ... they put words in my mouth and I said them."⁶¹ Schwable indicated that he and others endured physical and mental torture until they confessed to the enemy. He and others also reported that the Chinese and North Koreans would make them rewrite the confessions until it was acceptable.⁶² The Marine Corps opened a formal inquiry to determine if it should charge Schwable for his false confession. Schwable stated at the inquiry that he eventually signed the confession to live so that he could bring testimony back to the United States about the treatment POWs received by the enemy.⁶³

⁵⁹ "Flyers Tell How Reds Kept Torturing Them," *Baltimore Sun*, September 7, 1953.

⁶⁰ Associated Press, "Arlington Flyer Had to Sign Germ 'Confession' or Die," *Evening Star*, September 7, 1953.

⁶¹ Associated Press, "Arlington Flyer Had to Sign Germ 'Confession' or Die," *Evening Star*, September 7, 1953.

⁶² Associated Press, "Arlington Flyer Had to Sign Germ 'Confession' or Die," *Evening Star*, September 7, 1953.

⁶³ "Formal Marine Inquiry Planned in Colonel's Germ War Confession." *Philadelphia Inquirer*, November 2, 1953.

The Marine Corps nor Air Force did not file any charges against the POWs who confessed to germ warfare.

Even those POWs who were not flyers knew of the attempts by the Chinese and North Koreans to get confessions of germ warfare. Sergeant First Class Edward Hewlett told reporters that the enemy forced him and other POWs to sit in indoctrination classes and one of the topics was germ warfare. The captors showed pictures of the alleged infected insects used for germ warfare and one day even brought in a bug in a jar. Hewlett stated that a fellow POW reached into the jar and ate the bug. The guards took away this POW to the hospital to die, they claimed. There were weekly reports given by the captors that he was about to die, but after two months that POW returned to camp and had been fine all along though the guards told the bug-eating POW that if he told anyone that he did not get sick at all, they would starve him to death.⁶⁴

Another big fear with the release of POWs who the Chinese and North Koreans might have brainwashed was the possibility that they could set up a Communist cell in the United States. There was an accusation of a fifth-column cell in America reported in the newspapers and magazines. The *Chicago Tribune* reported on the statement by Corporal Leslie Scales, who was in Camp Five, that thirty POWs planned to meet up with a former American soldier, discharged a year earlier from the Army, to start a Communist cell called Ex-POWs for Peace, though there is no proof this cell came to fruition.⁶⁵ In

⁶⁴ Greg MacGregor, "Reds' Germ Propaganda Backfired When G.I. Captive Ate the Evidence," *New York Times*, August 7, 1953.

⁶⁵ Walter Simmons, "Returnee Says Ex-POWs Plan Red Cell in U.S.," *Chicago Tribune*, August 11, 1953.

January 1954, during the court-martial of the turncoat Corporal Claude Batchelor, an Army intelligence agent read a statement that Batchelor told them that the Chinese wanted him to head this same organization. The organization was to help other POWs “who might be subjected to prosecution by the United States Government.”⁶⁶ In a *Saturday Evening Post* article about POWs who collaborated, Sergeant James Pinkston makes similar claims about a Communist organization. Pinkston reiterated the same story that there was to be a group of ex-progressive POWs starting a Communist cell and that he was part of the group that was to start it.⁶⁷

Another issue that appeared in newspapers and magazines concerning the returning POWs, is what to do about those that collaborated or confessed. The question raised was if any of the returning POWs who allegedly cooperated or confessed violated the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) concerning their actions while in the POW camps. Additionally, there was the question of whether brainwashing was an excuse for their actions. The DOD stated that it would be looking into pressing charges against any POW who collaborated. *U.S. News and World Report* published an article that questioned if the military should prosecute POWs for their actions in a POW camp if they only collaborated under duress, if those who succumbed to mental pressure should be able to stay in the military, if enlisted men who told on their fellow POWs should be

⁶⁶ Associated Press, “Reds Wanted Batchelor to Head U.S. Unit,” *Baltimore Sun*, September 4, 1954.

⁶⁷ William Ulman, “The GI’s Who Fell for the Reds,” *Saturday Evening Post*, March 6, 1954. 17.

punished, and what does that mean for the memory of those that died refusing to cooperate.⁶⁸ The article does not come to a conclusion but raised important questions that the military and government had to answer and would have an impact on how Americans treated POWs that had returned home. This and other articles point out that the Korean War brought up new issues that the military had never faced before with a Communist country working to torture, brainwash, and use POWs to further their agenda. But the number of POWs that these questions relate to is relatively low. *U.S. News and World Report* stated that the military investigated fewer than 160 out of the 3,746 former American POWs for their actions.⁶⁹ Different branches of the military took various avenues to explore these questions. The Army ended up court martialing and convicting several former POWs. The Marines opened official inquiries, starting with Colonel Schwable and the Air Force set up a board of five generals to review the cases. Neither branch brought formal charges for any of their personnel.

The Army investigated and prosecuted several former POWs for their actions in POW camps in Korea. Newspapers and magazines closely followed the official inquiries and court-martial proceedings for the years following the war. The Army was the only branch of the military that tried cases of treason and collaboration against former POWs. In September 1953, the *Chicago Tribune* stated that Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson announced that Army would prosecute POWs who betrayed their country, told on other

⁶⁸ “Is It a Crime to Crack Up,?” *U.S. News and World Report*, February 26, 1954.

⁶⁹ “Is It a Crime to Crack Up,?” *U.S. News and World Report*, February 26, 1954.

POWs, gave false confessions, or violated any other federal or military laws.⁷⁰ Wilson said that Army would look at each case individually and take into account the circumstances at the time. The Army court-martialed and tried several Army officers and enlisted men for their actions as a POW. The first officer the Army court-martialed for collaboration was Lieutenant Colonel Harry Fleming. The Army alleged that Fleming made broadcasts against the United States and United Nations and that he informed on other POWs to their detriment.⁷¹ Newspapers detailed Fleming's trial throughout the entire process. This included witness testimony like that of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Von Santen who testified for Fleming and stated that the enemy threatened Fleming with death if he did not sign appeals for them.⁷² Dr. Glen Bacon, a psychiatrist and former Army Medical Corps captain, also testified that the Chinese and North Koreans had used tactics to "soften his resistance" and had brainwashed him.⁷³ An Army tribunal convicted Fleming and discharged him from the Army. Another officer that the Army prosecuted with a different outcome was Major Ambrose Nugent. Reporters interviewed Nugent at Freedom Village when the enemy released him. The AP released an article about his

⁷⁰ "U.S. to Punish POW Traitors, Wilson Says," *Chicago Tribune*, September 25, 1953.

⁷¹ John Thompson, "POW Faces Army Court at Sheridan," *Chicago Tribune*, August 20, 1954.

⁷² John Thompson, "Witness Tells of Red Threat on Fleming's Life," *Chicago Tribune*, September 14, 1954.

⁷³ Associated Press, "Doctor Backs Col. Fleming," *Baltimore Sun*, September 18, 1953.

experience at that time. Nugent claimed that the Chinese and North Koreans forced him to give a recording that they broadcasted on the radio because they told him and others if they did not, they would kill seventy-two American POWs. The North Koreans and Chinese even marched the seventy-two men past a window. Nugent said he only recorded broadcasts to save lives.⁷⁴ When Nugent arrived back in the United States, the *Chicago Tribune* again wrote his story about broadcasting just to save lives and also stated that Nugent returned home to “cheering townsfolk and paraded thru the city.”⁷⁵ A year later, Nugent’s life looked very different. Instead of a cheering crowd, the Army court-martialed and charged him with thirteen counts of collaborating with the enemy.⁷⁶ The press closely followed Nugent’s trial in early 1955 with articles describing testimony presented each day at the court-martial. The Army eventually acquitted Nugent after his trial which lasted seven weeks with forty-seven witnesses.⁷⁷

One of the more extreme cases was the court-martial of Sergeant James Gallagher. The Army charged Gallagher with the murder of three fellow POWs as well as collaboration with the enemy. The Army accused Gallagher of the murder of Corporal

⁷⁴ Associated Press, “Major Makes Broadcast to Save 72 POWs,” *Chicago Tribune*, September 5, 1953.

⁷⁵ “POW Tells How Reds Got Him to Assail U.S.,” *Chicago Tribune*, September 24, 1953.

⁷⁶ “Court Martial Ordered for POW Officer,” *Chicago Tribune*, November 30, 1954.

⁷⁷ Associated Press, “Court Martial Acquits Major on All Charges,” *Chicago Tribune*, March 8, 1955.

Donald Thomas Baxter and Corporal John William Johns. The charges alleged that on different occasions Gallagher forcibly removed the men from a building which caused death due to extremely cold temperatures. The third alleged death was that of an unidentified American POW by beating, hanging him from a hook, then throwing him out in the cold weather to die.⁷⁸ As with the court-martial of Fleming and Nugent, the press closely followed the proceedings and reported on the testimony given throughout the trial. The Army found him guilty of two of the murders and collaboration and he received a life sentence. In 1965, the Secretary of the Army, Stanley Resor, reduced Gallagher's sentence to not exceed thirty-three years and officials granted him parole in 1966.⁷⁹ The Army also arrested Corporal Harold Dunn at the same time as Gallagher. Dunn and Gallagher were both from Brooklyn, New York. When Dunn returned home, it was a joyous occasion at first. The town crowned Dunn as "king" of the New York State Fair. The article pointed out that Dunn arrived home at a time families and other Americans gave most POWs a public and sympathetic welcome home.⁸⁰ The Army charged him with collaboration and he pled guilty and received eight years of hard labor, which the convening authority, Lieutenant General Thomas Herren, reduced to two and a

⁷⁸ "G.I. Goes on Trial for 3 Korea Deaths," *New York Times*, August 2, 1955.

⁷⁹ Raymond B. Lech, *Broken Soldiers* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 272.

⁸⁰ George Barrett, "2 G.I.'s Here Seized for P.O.W. Crimes," *New York Times*, May 12, 1955.

half years.⁸¹ The court sentenced Dunn on June 29, 1955, and authorities released him from jail at Fort Leavenworth on July 1, 1957.⁸² Several other trials kept the issues of POWs' actions in the news with newspapers detailing each of the trials.

Stories about the turncoats who refused repatriation also kept the news about the Korean War POWs relevant for many years to come as several of them chose to return to the United States. In August 1953, a UPI article reported on an American POW refusing repatriation. Two American soldiers told reporters that six Americans and one British POW elected to stay with the enemy.⁸³ By the end of September, a Communist correspondent told Allied reporters that twenty-three Americans had in fact chosen to stay behind and not return to America.⁸⁴ Though in comparison, as of September 1953, 14,711 Chinese and 7,916 North Korean POWs refused repatriation.⁸⁵ Newspapers printed stories of the families of these turncoats and other Americans requesting to go to Korea to speak with the men. Mothers and other family members wanted to travel to Korea to be able to speak with their sons, though the Army denied this request because it

⁸¹ "Sentence of Ex-P.O.W. Reduced to 2 ½ Years," *New York Times*, August 21, 1955.

⁸² Raymond B. Lech, *Broken Soldiers* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 271.

⁸³ United Press International, "Two Tell of P.O.W.'s Staying With Enemy," *New York Times*, August 7, 1953.

⁸⁴ William Jordon, "23 U.S. Prisoners Refuse Repatriation, Reds Report," *New York Times*, September 22, 1953.

⁸⁵ Robert Alden, "Anti-Communist Prisoners Await Their Fate Uneasily," *New York Times*, September 13, 1953.

was “neither practical nor advisable.”⁸⁶ Private First Class Richard Tenneson’s mother, Portia Howe, traveled to Japan in December 1953 to attempt to talk with her son, though the Army refused her request to fly from Japan into Korea.⁸⁷ The POWs refusing repatriation dealt a big blow to the United States and its fight against Communism. It also provided the Communists with excellent propoganda to use against the United States.

Soon after refusing repatriation, Corporal Edward Dickenson decided to return home. In October 1953, newspapers reported that Dickenson feigned illness to go to the hospital where he told an Indian non-commissioned officer that he requested to be repatriated.⁸⁸ When Dickenson arrived back in the United States, he told reporters that the enemy “forced” him to refuse repatriation under threats of death and that there are a few other turncoats who also would like to return home.⁸⁹ On January 1, 1954, the *New York Times* reported that another turncoat had declared that he would also like to return to the United States. Corporal Claude Batchelor admitted in one interview that, “I was a pro” and got along with his captors, but they were deceitful.⁹⁰ Batchelor made an interesting

⁸⁶ United Press International, “Army Bars Korea Trip For 23 G.I.’s Mothers,” *New York Times*, October 1, 1953.

⁸⁷ Associated Press, “Mother May Quit Effort to See Red Son in Korea,” *New York Times*, December 12, 1953.

⁸⁸ Associated Press, “One of the 23 GIs Now Wants to Return Home,” *Baltimore Sun*, October 21, 1953.

⁸⁹ Associated Press, “GI Claims Reds Forced Him to Stay Behind,” *Chicago Tribune*, November 19, 1953.

⁹⁰ Associated Press, “Batchelor Explains His Actions,” *Baltimore Sun*, January 10, 1954.

observation. When the POWs first refused repatriation, Americans begged them to return home, later many Americans were angry he came home. The same day the *Baltimore Sun* ran the article on Batchelor's statements, there was another article from a former POW that was in camp with him. Eugene Tumbleston told the *Charleston News and Courier* that he was angry about the attention Americans gave Batchelor on his return home. He stated that he was "bitter" toward Batchelor and that other POWs hated Batchelor because he was a progressive who received special treatment, accommodations, and food from his captors.⁹¹ These negative feelings toward the returning turncoats continued when the Army decided to court-martial these men. The AP announced that the Army was court martialing Dickenson for "holding unlawful 'intercourse with the enemy' and currying favors with his captors 'to the detriment' of fellow prisoners" under articles 104 and 105 of the UMCJ.⁹² The AP also released an article on March 6, 1954, that the Army arrested Batchelor for collaborating with the enemy and would be held for a pre-trial investigation.⁹³ Then on June 22, it was announced that he would be court-martialed and tried for "charges that he had consulted with the enemy concerning a subversive organization to be established in the United States after the Korean armistice" and "making speeches and writing articles in an attempt to persuade fellow prisoners in North

⁹¹ Associated Press, "Boys Hated Batchelor at Prison Camp," *Baltimore Sun*, January 10, 1954.

⁹² Associated Press, "U.S. Arrests Balky GI Who Left Reds," *Los Angeles Times*, January 23, 1954.

⁹³ Associated Press, "Second Ex-P.O.W. Arrested by Army," *New York Times*, March 6, 1954.

Korea to believe the enemy propaganda and accept Communist doctrine.”⁹⁴ The newspapers closely followed these testimonies and arguments in the trials. The issue of brainwashing came to the forefront with these cases. Batchelor tried to use brainwashing as a defense against the charges, but the court-martial ruled that it was not a defense but he could use it “only for the purpose of showing character traits.”⁹⁵ The Army sentenced Batchelor to life in prison, though shortly after the court sentence, Fourth Army commander, Lieutenant General I.D. White, reduced the twenty years in prison. Batchelor ended up serving four and a half years as a prisoner before his release on January 29, 1959.⁹⁶ The court sentenced Dickenson to ten years in prison, then reduced it to five years. With good behavior, he ended up serving three and a half years before his release on parole on November 23, 1957.⁹⁷

The turncoats also made the news when the Army decided to officially discharge all the turncoats from the Army with a dishonorable discharge in January 1954 by order of Defense Secretary Charles Wilson. News of the turncoats again made headlines in 1955, when three more men decided to return home, though they knew court-martials were likely. Otho Bell, William Cowart, and Lewis Griggs returned together in July

⁹⁴ Associated Press, “Ex-POW To Be Tried,” *New York Times*, June 22, 1954.

⁹⁵ United Press International, “Brainwash Plea Lost By Ex-P.O.W.,” *New York Times*, September 16, 1954.

⁹⁶ Associated Press, “Batchelor Hopes for ‘New Life,’” *Kilgore News Herald*, February 12, 1959.

⁹⁷ Press Dispatches, “Resentful Dickenson Leaves for Home,” *Knoxville News Sentinel*, November 24, 1957.

1955. The reporting was a bit different than with Dickenson and Batchelor because many assumed that the Army would court-martial them. One AP article stated that these three men received a “coldly correct reception.”⁹⁸ A UPI article detailed the homecoming of the three men in San Francisco as they departed the USS *President Cleveland*. The article first explained that the families of the men were there to greet them, but a line of military policemen “dampened” the reunion and when the men stepped off the boat, they were immediately arrested by the military police.⁹⁹ Though things ended up differently for these three men. The Army dropped the charges for all three men due to a Supreme Court ruling on a different case. The Supreme Court ruled the Justice Department, not the military under UCMJ, must prosecute former service members who the military had already discharged. The Army applied this ruling to the three men and did not prosecute them or any turncoats who came back.¹⁰⁰ Newspaper reporting shows the interesting arc of the stories of the twenty-three turncoats. The first report showed a devastating loss to the United States when the turncoats decided to not return home and instead go to China. Then as some of the turncoats changed their minds and decided to return to the United States, the attitudes of the military and American public shifted. Instead of welcoming the turncoats back, the Army court-martialed the first two returning turncoats and convicted

⁹⁸ Associated Press, “Cold Reception for Turncoats in Hong Kong,” *Boston Globe*, July 5, 1955.

⁹⁹ United Press International, “Three Ex-GIs Return Home to Face Trials,” *Wichita Eagle*, July 30, 1955.

¹⁰⁰ United Press International, “Army Won’t Try 3 G.I. Turncoats,” *New York Times*, September 17, 1955.

them of collaborating with the enemy. This showed the American people that the POWs were criminals and should not pity them. It also was a sign to the other turncoats of what their fate might be if they returned home. Though because of an earlier decision to dishonorably discharge the remaining turncoats, the following men escaped the fate of the Army court-martialing them.

Newspapers did not just report on brainwashing, atrocities, and collaborators. At the time of Operation Little Switch and Operation Big Switch, the newspapers routinely listed the names of those who crossed through Freedom Village that day, and also stories of families reuniting with their loved ones. Some POWs returned home to big crowds, parades, and special home-cooked meals. A crowd of 10,000 people greeted Sergeant Alfred Laurent and Representative Nourse Rogers presented him with a golden key and the mayor, Henry Beaudry gave him a key to the city of Lowell, Massachusetts. Others quietly tried to slip back into their lives such as Private Edward Robbins who got off the plane and went to his aunt's house in Fall River, Massachusetts without any fanfare.¹⁰¹ There were also stories of families hearing the good news that their soldier was returning home. An AP article wrote about Odie Lawley, who the military reported her husband as killed in Korea, but got word that he was alive and released during Operation Little Switch.¹⁰² Though not all reports were joyous. Corporal Ralph Meier returned home to

¹⁰¹ "4 Freed P.W.s Returned Home to Celebrations," *Boston Globe*, September 11, 1953.

¹⁰² Associated Press, "Exchange Confirms Joyous News," *Kansas City Star*, April 20, 1953.

South Dakota. A reporter told him his wife had remarried last year, believing he was dead.¹⁰³ The most publicized welcome home was that of Major General William Dean, the highest-ranking Allied POW. Dean told reporters about his ordeal, the hours of questioning, and how at one point he tried to kill himself because he was afraid of giving up information. Dean stole a gun from one of his guards when the guard accidentally fell asleep. Dean attempted to use the gun to kill himself, but the gun jammed and guards overpowered him and took the gun back.¹⁰⁴ Dean did not undergo the horrific torture and other atrocities that other POWs received. While newspapers flashed stories of progressives and atrocities, there were also many articles relating to joyful reunions between family members and soldiers.

The return home for the Korean War POWs was different than those in other previous wars since some of the POWs had to prove their loyalty to the United States because of allegations of brainwashing and collaboration. Lewis Carlson states, “But for the American public, caught in the throes of Cold War and McCarthy paranoia, the massive Chinese effort to indoctrinate and ‘brainwash’ their captives became the indelible legacy of the Korean War POWs.”¹⁰⁵ Newspaper and magazine articles published during this time made Americans feel sympathy for the POWs and the horrible

¹⁰³ Associated Press, “Returned POW Gets News of Wife’s Remarriage,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 14, 1953.

¹⁰⁴ Robert Ruth, “Tried to Kill Self of P.W., Dean Reveals,” *Baltimore Sun*, October 31, 1953.

¹⁰⁵ Lewis H. Carlson, *Remembered Prisoners of a Forgotten War: An Oral History of Korean War POWs* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002), 193.

treatment that they endured, but also made a point to talk about those who collaborated and helped the enemy. The newspapers and magazines, for the most part, printed information provided by military and government officials. Military and government officials wanted the American people to know only their side of the story and what was happening. But through interviews, other sides of the story came out, and in the case of the Valley Forge POWs, caused the military to go back on their initial statement and claim that they never believed that these men had succumbed to brainwashing. This provided Americans with a confusing view and concern over these returning men. Should the American people be fearful of the men and treat them like criminals or have pity and understanding for them and their experience? Unfortunately, many Americans lumped POWs together in groups and it was not until the investigations and court-martials began that the American people could see that it was just a small number of POWs that collaborated. The Army charged and convicted several POWs for their actions in the camps. The Air Force and Marines opened inquiries but never prosecuted anyone. The actual number of those investigated or prosecuted was small compared to the number of American POWs that the enemy held. Most of the returning POWs told reporters of horrific stories of atrocities that they faced while a prisoner and that most POWs had stories of torture and mistreatment. These newspaper and magazine accounts of the returning POWs provide an interesting look into what information Americans received about their experiences.

Chapter 2: The Valley Forge POWs: Case Studies of the Returning Men

Operation Little Switch took place at the end of April 1953 in which both sides repatriated sick and wounded prisoners of war (POWs). The idea behind Operation Little Switch was to exchange sick and injured POWs while the armistice negotiations continued for the release of the remaining POWs. Before the release of the first American POW, newspapers reported that the Chinese and North Koreans could have brainwashed some of the POWs, thus creating fear in America that indoctrinated POWs would be coming home. Before Operation Little Switch, in February 1953, the secretary of defense tasked the US Army with developing a screening process to determine if the enemy had successfully indoctrinated any returning POWs and to develop a method to reverse indoctrination.¹ During the exchange, the Army identified a group of POWs from the rest and treated this group differently than the other repatriates. The first report about the men that would become known as the Valley Forge POWs was a Department of Defense (DOD) statement on April 28, 1953, that “a ‘small group’ of exchanged American soldiers had shown indications of ‘having succumbed to Communist indoctrination’ while they were captive in North Korea, and would be given medical and mental treatment.”² After newspapers printed this statement, a lot of attention and focus was on these men and the mystery around these POWs heightened. The Army flew them from

¹ Robert Stevens, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 10 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

² “Some U.S. Captives Converted by Reds,” *New York Times*, April 29, 1953.

Tokyo to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania for treatment instead of returning to their homes. The Valley Forge POWs, garnered a lot of press attention because newspapers and magazines previously reported on stories that the enemy brainwashed POWs and there was great fear in the United States of Communism in general. Reports that the men might have succumbed to Communism seemed like the fears Americans felt had come true. The Valley Forge POWs were angry and bitter about the label of Communist that the newspapers and government had put upon them. The government created and tasked a special ad hoc committee with determining if the Chinese and North Koreans successfully brainwashed them. The committee members observed and spoke with twenty POWs during their stay at Valley Forge General Hospital. One of the POWs that was originally part of this group, Private First Class Paul Schnur Jr. did not make it to Valley Forge General Hospital. Instead, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) pulled him from the plane when it landed to refuel at Travis Air Force Base. A government report stated that of the 149 American POWs released during Operation Little Switch, the Chinese and North Koreans brainwashed 66 percent of them. Of the 66 percent, 20 percent of those came from Camp Five, known to be “post-graduate level of political indoctrination,” and 12 percent from Camp One, known to be a “college level in the hierarchy of indoctrination centers.”³ Several of the Valley Forge POWs were at these two camps and experienced indoctrination by the enemy. The Valley Forge

³ Horace Craig, Memorandum for Record POW Exchange, 21 April 1953, Jackson, C.D.: Records, 1953-54, Box 5, Folder Prisoner Exchange, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

POWs were a diverse group of men from various backgrounds, singled out by the US military for succumbing to Communism, but the ad hoc committee only found a few of them that actually believe in Communism.

The government created a special ad hoc committee to observe the POWs during their time at Valley Forge General Hospital. Case histories that the committee wrote and interviews the men themselves gave after they left the hospital provided details on these men's lives and their experiences. Several government officials noted that the Valley Forge POWs represented a diverse cross-section of men and they suspected the Chinese and North Koreans did this on purpose.⁴ They ranged in age from twenty to forty-four, though the majority, seventeen of the men, were in their twenties. The committee labeled thirteen of the men as white, though one was a Spanish American, and the remaining men were African American, officially listed as "negro." The range of service time among the men ranged from two years and three months to twelve years and six months. Only three of the men were married, which were the three oldest POWs, though three did not have a marital status listed. They came from rural and urban environments and poor to middle-class socioeconomic backgrounds. They represented a variety of religions including one Jewish POW, three Catholics, nine Protestants, one Agnostic, one Atheist, and four with no religious information provided. The government drafted some of the POWs and others enlisted. These statistics show that there was indeed much diversity among them.

⁴ Colonel Henry Rogers to Assistant Chief of Staff, memorandum, 8 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

The case histories also reported the men's Army General Classification Test scores (AGCT).⁵ The Army created this test to determine the learning ability of soldiers. The higher the score meant the person was a faster learner. The Army listed those with a score of 130 or higher in the top category as fast learners and those with a score of sixty-nine or lower in the bottom category, which signified slow learners.⁶ Five of the Valley Forge POWs did not have a score listed. Of the scores listed, the range was from fifty-seven to one hundred twenty-nine. A comparison of these scores with the education history of the men, there is not much correlation.

The medical diagnosis portion is interesting taking into consideration that the idea behind Operation Little Switch was that each side would exchange sick and wounded POWs. Officials speculated that the enemy did not return them because they were sick or wounded but because some of them were progressives.⁷ Progressive was the term used to describe POWs who collaborated with the enemy and seemed to have succumbed to propaganda and now believed in Communism. Only five of the twenty Valley Forge POWs were sick enough to require them to stay in the hospital. Of the five that stayed behind, four of them stayed due to tuberculosis. The remaining one that stayed behind

⁵ The report lists the scores as AGTC, but the official acronym of the Army is AGCT. Possible typo.

⁶ Ulysses Lee, *United States Army in WWII: The Employment of Negro Troops*, (Washington, D.C., Center of Military History United States Army, 1966), chap. 9, sect. 241, <https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/11-4/chapter9.htm>

⁷ Colonel Henry Rogers to Assistant Chief of Staff, memorandum, 8 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

was due to a right inguinal hernia which required surgery. Most of the men had more than one medical diagnosis. The most common medical diagnosis was frostbite, which ten of the men had and two others had missing toes but the report did not give a reason for the missing toes. Five of the men had missing toes or arms. This is not surprising due to stories POWs told of the harsh winters in Korea and their captors not providing adequate clothing or shelter for the men. Three of the men had mental health diagnoses of schizoid personality, anxiety, and depression. Only one POW had a gunshot wound. One POW, Corporal William Hinkle, had only one diagnosis which was an anxiety reaction with no other physical injuries listed. It is unclear the actual reason that the Chinese and North Koreans released him with the sick and injured POWs because, after the release of POWs during Operation Big Switch, many POWs were much sicker or injured than he was.

One of the duties of the ad hoc committee was to rate each of the POWs on their level of indoctrination. Level one meant that they succumbed to Communism and officials believe there is no chance of rehabilitation. Level two meant that though the Chinese and North Koreans indoctrinated them, there is a chance for rehabilitation. Level three meant they did not succumb to indoctrination attempts by the enemy.⁸ The committee rated two of the men as a one, three men as a one/two rating, four men received a rating of two, and the remaining four men all received a rating of three.

⁸ Colonel Henry Rogers, memorandum, Addenda to Ad Hoc Committee Report, 12 May 1953 in Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

Corporal James Pinkston was the exact type of POW that so many in America were fearful of coming home. He was a twenty-four-year-old, white, unmarried male from an urban environment and a middle-class family. He completed high school and had a stable employment record and no criminal record. When he enlisted in the Army, he scored 129 on his AGCT test. He served in the Army for five years and ten months. He listed his religion as an Atheist. The report claimed there was suspicious circumstance surrounding his capture by the enemy, but did not provide additional information.⁹ Pinkston recounted his capture and said that he played dead in a foxhole and a Chinese soldier nudged him with his foot and told him “Get up and lay down your arms and you can take my hand in friendship and peace.”¹⁰ The report listed him as a “key progressive leader” in Camp Five.¹¹ He voluntarily collaborated with his captors and helped them plan and attempt to indoctrinate other POWs. Pinkston told the committee that he denounced US foreign policy and that he knew one and a half years ago that repatriation

⁹ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹⁰ William Ulman, “The GIs Who Fell for the Reds,” *Saturday Evening Post*, March 6, 1954.

¹¹ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

would take place at this time because the Chinese and North Koreans told him.¹² Furthermore, he showed his allegiance to his captors by trying to get *Life* magazine to print Communist propaganda while he was in the hospital.¹³ The committee rated him as a one and lists his treasonable acts as the collaboration with the enemy and preparation of Communist propaganda. He also told the committee that he would like to pursue journalism after he leaves the Army. The Army granted him thirty days' leave to visit his family in Jacksonville, North Carolina, and then report to the hospital at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.¹⁴ Interestingly, the report did not specify anything about FBI surveillance, even though the committee rated him as a one and he showed strong Communist beliefs. Pinkston gave an interview in which he stated that he had been part of a Communist cell in the United States until recently and he was attempting to leave the group. He provided the names of those still involved and the activities planned by the group.¹⁵ The journalist pointed out that he conducted the interview on December 2, 1953,

¹² Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹³ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹⁴ Reported stated that he was granted leave to Jacksonville, Florida. Though newspaper reports stated that he was going to Jacksonville, North Carolina.

¹⁵ William Ulman, "The GIs Who Fell for the Reds," *Saturday Evening Post*, March 6, 1954.

and that same day, during a United Nations debate, K.V. Kiselev, a Soviet Union delegate, used Pinkston's name and others stating that these men told them that they were treated well by the enemy and that the Chinese and North Koreans did not break international laws regarding the treatment of POWs.¹⁶ The United Nations' statement about Pinkston does not support his claim that he had now separated himself from Communists. Pinkston said at the time of capture he realized that the North Koreans and Chinese did not want war and that the United States was the aggressor.¹⁷ Pinkston claimed to have had a romantic relationship with a North Korean officer. He claimed in a later interview that he changed his political views and he named Paul Schur Jr. as the leader of the group in the United States with Claude Batchelor as second in command.

Another of the Valley Forge POWs the committee identified as succumbing to Communism but was actually sick enough to remain at the hospital was Corporal Kenyon Wagner. Wagner was the only other POW besides Pinkston that the committee rated as a one. He was a twenty-three-year-old, unmarried, white from an urban, middle-class family, who was Agnostic. He completed high school and did not have a criminal record. He enlisted in the Army impulsively and scored 103 on his AFTC. He has served for four

¹⁶ William Ulman, "The GIs Who Fell for the Reds," *Saturday Evening Post*, March 6, 1954.

¹⁷ William Ulman, "The GIs Who Fell for the Reds," *Saturday Evening Post*, March 6, 1954.

years and six months. The report stated he is “quiet, shy, and cooperative.”¹⁸ The enemy captured him in May 1951 and he was a progressive while in the POW camp. He collaborated with his captors, signed peace petitions, and wrote Communist articles. Due to his collaboration, the Chinese and North Koreans gave Wagner special treatment. He explained that he was now “pink” and not a full Communist, but does still believe that the United States was the military aggressor in this war.¹⁹ The committee classified Wagner as one with the treasonable acts of voluntarily indoctrinating POWs, creating Communist propaganda, and discussing Communism even if their captors were not present. The Army transferred him to the tuberculosis ward at Valley Forge General Hospital. Wagner gave an interview in which he discussed why he collaborated with the enemy. He stated that he had tuberculosis and a Chinese instructor visited him. This man made it clear that if he did not write articles and listen to Communist propaganda, he would not receive treatment for his tuberculosis. Wagner explained that the more favorably he spoke about the Chinese, the better his care got, so that is what he did to get medical treatment. He said, “People don’t understand the pressure they put on you- especially about getting medicine. After a while you say things you don’t know you are saying.”²⁰

¹⁸ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹⁹ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²⁰ William Brinkley, “Valley Forge GIs,” *Saturday Evening Post*, May 25, 1953.

The next group of POWs received a one/two rating indicating that the committee thought there was a strong chance that the Chinese and North Koreans successfully indoctrinated them. The committee's concern over Private First-Class Robert Hickox resulted in the committee giving information on him to the FBI. He was a twenty-three-year-old, white, unmarried male. He grew up in an urban area. The report stated he was from a "good middle-class family, home not broken."²¹ Though the report explained he was "habitually independent" and did not have a close relationship with his family.²² Hickox completed high school but did not go on to college. Before he enlisted, he had a criminal record for stealing and he drank heavily. Included in the report, was a statement from his mother in which she said that he sought "recreation from the wrong side of the tracks," and was an "underdog" who did not hold grudges.²³ The report also proclaimed that "he always resented coercion" which made him disagreeable to be around and he

²¹ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²² Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²³ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

appeared to be immature emotionally.²⁴ He enlisted impulsively into the Army and scored 113 on the AGCT. He served in the Army for four years and four months. During his time in camp, he stated that he considered himself pro-Communism, but not a Communist himself. The report said that his file showed he was a “confirmed Communist” even if he denied it now.²⁵ He wrote propaganda for the enemy, collaborated, and was a member of a Russian study group. One of his diagnoses was a schizoid personality. The committee rated him as a one/two with the possible treasonable offenses being voluntarily collaborating with the enemy to indoctrinate other POWs. The Army granted him thirty days' leave to his hometown of Syracuse, New York, and then report back to Valley Forge General Hospital. In an interview with Pinkston, another Valley Forge POW, he named Hickox as a Communist leader doing work inside the United States. Hickox vehemently denied these allegations.²⁶

Private First Class Carl Kirchhausen was the first American POW to cross into Freedom Village when Operation Little Switch began and was the only Valley Forge POW that was not a native-born American. The committee rated him as a one/two, but

²⁴ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²⁵ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²⁶ William Ulman, “The GIs Who Fell for the Reds,” *Saturday Evening Post*, March 6, 1954.

the section on treasonable acts is not in his case history. He was a German, twenty-eight-year-old, white from a middle-class family. When he was twelve years old, his family, who was Jewish, fled the Nazis. They went to England and then to the United States. The report stated that he is from a broken home and that he had eleven years of school. He had difficulty finding work in New York. The Army drafted him but he did not want to serve and attempted to void his draft notice. He argued that he was a non-citizen and thus the Army cannot draft him. This argument did not work. The report specified that his AGCT score is not accurate due to the language barrier. The report did not list how long he has been in the Army. The Chinese and North Koreans captured him only twenty-three days into his tour of Korea. During his time in the POW camp, he wrote letters to friends in the United States, Germany, and England that were Communists. He also read Communist propaganda. He told the committee that he believed the United States participated in germ warfare and tortured Korean POWs on Koje. Psychologists explained that he has a “many facet personality.”²⁷ The Army granted him thirty days' leave to Atlantic City, New Jersey, and then report back to Valley Forge General Hospital. The committee recommended that the FBI should conduct surveillance on him. Since Kirchhausen was the first POW released by the enemy, initially many newspapers carried articles about him and how he and his family fled Germany from Hitler and the

²⁷ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

Nazis.²⁸ After his time at Valley Forge General Hospital, there was not much more written about him.

The final Valley Forge POW with a one/two rating was Corporal James Ball. Like Wagner, Ball had a diagnosis of tuberculosis and was sick enough to require him to stay in the hospital and not granted leave. He was a twenty-one-year-old, unmarried, white, from a poor economic background with an eighth-grade education. His AGCT score was on the lower end at eighty-nine and served for four years and three months. Ball admitted to believing in Communism and asserted that he “believes it is a world solution and that the U.S. is now corrupt.”²⁹ He collaborated with the Chinese and North Koreans and also voluntarily took advanced classes offered. The committee rated him as a one/two and listed the treasonable acts as making recordings and attempting to indoctrinate other POWs.

The next group of Valley Forge POWs had a rating of two indicating the enemy indoctrinated them but there is a chance for rehabilitation. Private First-Class William Camden is one of the Valley Forge POWs who admitted to working with the Chinese and North Koreans but stated that it was only to collect information for the military. At the time of repatriation, he was a twenty-two-year-old, unmarried, white male. Before his

²⁸ “2 Homes in New York Made Happy by News from Korea,” *Daily News*, April 30, 1953.

²⁹ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

time in the Army, Camden completed half a year of college. He stated that he enlisted impulsively and served in the Army for four years and eight months. His AGCT score was 113 when he enlisted. Camden grew up in a rural area of Maine in a lower-middle-class family. Camden listed his religion as Catholic but explained that he was not a practicing Catholic. Before his time in the Army, he had a stable employment record and no criminal record. Camden was in Camp Five and then later transferred to Camp Three. During his time as a POW, he made a broadcast, wrote articles for *Truth and Peace*, authored peace petitions, and helped rewrite propaganda into better English. Camden also specified that the Chinese and North Koreans “compelled” him to be the monitor for his company. The committee rated Camden as a two in terms of indoctrination. Interestingly, on his case history, under possible acts of treason, someone marked out the information and wrote none indicated in blue ink. Though in the brief sections, these acts are all still listed and not marked out. Also, under the rating category, the committee rated him as a two, with “accepted but recoverable” listed next to the rating, but a person crossed it out in the same blue pen. It is unclear if the committee changed their minds about Camden and his participation in Communism and marked out the information or if it was an error in the report that someone corrected. The report stated that Camden claimed he only wrote materials and made broadcasts so that he could later be able to tell the G-2, Chief Intelligence Officer, what the Chinese and North Koreans were doing after he returned home. Camden told the committee that he believes in democracy and he now believes that Communism in practice is different than how the enemy described it. The Army

granted Camden thirty days of leave to Burton, Maine where his family lived and then he had to return to Valley Forge General Hospital.³⁰

Insinuations that the Chinese and North Koreans may have brainwashed or influenced Camden into believing in Communism did not stop his hometown in Maine from celebrating his return home. When Camden returned home for his thirty days of leave, hundreds of people were on hand to welcome him at his parent's house.³¹ A week after he returned home, his hometown of Bar Mills held a parade in his honor and friends gifted him a car.³² Gorham State Teaching College invited Camden to speak at the college and discussed his experience as a captive of the Chinese and North Koreans. He stated that POWs gave "lip service" to his captors but very few believed in Communism.³³ Though the committee rated Camden as a two, he did not speak of any Communist beliefs after he returned home.

An example that the Chinese and North Koreans selectively returned POWs shows in the case of Corporal William Hinkle. He was a twenty-two-year-old, white,

³⁰ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³¹ Associated Press, "Bar Mills Shouts Welcome to Repatriate Billy Camden," *Portland Evening Express*, May 9, 1953.

³² Associated Press, "Camden Given Car in Welcome at Bar Mills," *Lewiston Daily Sun*, May 18, 1953.

³³ Associated Press, "Cpl. William Camden Speaker at Gorham," *Lewiston Daily Sun*, May 20, 1953.

unmarried male who grew up in a middle-class family. The report stated that his education was five years with unstable employment after he left school. The report also disclosed that he is a heavy drinker, but did not have a criminal record. His AGCT score was on the low end at seventy-two and he served for four years and five months. His brief began by stating he was cooperative during his interrogation, but had “average intelligence, with a vacillating character.”³⁴ Hinkle told the committee that he was “two-faced” at the POW camp.³⁵ He admitted he signed propaganda leaflets prepared by fellow POWs, Hickox, Pinkston, and Schnur. Other POWs considered him a progressive and he even encouraged other POWs to learn about Communism because “there was good in it.”³⁶ Hinkle wrote articles for the enemy and was friends with Schnur, another POW who possessed strong Communist beliefs. Because of his progressive status, he received special treats such as candy and cigarettes from their captors. The committee rated him as a two with the possible treasonable act of advocating for prisoners to study Communism. His only listed diagnosis was an anxiety reaction, which seemed a bit odd since it was

³⁴ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³⁵ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³⁶ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

sick and injured POWs that each side exchanged. The report does not specify how bad his anxiety was or any issues arising from his anxiety. Because he did not have any physical injuries and others considered him a Progressive, this lends itself to the possibility that the Chinese and North Koreans were selective in whom they returned home to see how the United States would react to having POWs return who succumbed to Communism. The Army granted him thirty days of leave and then have him report to Walter Reed Army Hospital.³⁷

Private First-Class Paul Clements survived a death march in December 1950 in which 400 out of approximately 1200 died only to return home and have the government and military label him as a Communist. He was a twenty-four-year-old, unmarried, white, from an urban, middle-class background. The report stated he was from a “normal” family.³⁸ He had a ninth-grade education and enlisted in the Army. His AGCT was 129 and he served for six years and five months. He explained that he signed leaflets, participated in camp activities, and worked on a committee that wrote contemptuous material about the president. He asserted that though he did all this, he did not accept Communism or any Communist philosophy. The committee ranked him as a category

³⁷ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³⁸ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

two and did not put any treasonable offenses down. Clements stayed at Valley Forge General Hospital for hernia surgery and he stated he would like to leave the Army by the end of May.

Though the Army flagged Private First-Class Almond Nolan as a possible collaborator with a two rating, there were no treasonable offenses like with so many other POWs who received a lower rating. He was a twenty-two-year-old, unmarried, white from a rural, lower-middle-class family. The report specified he was from a “normal” family.³⁹ He had a seventh-grade education. He enlisted in the Army but there is not an AGCT score listed. He has served for four years and eight months. The report explained that he was immature.⁴⁰ While in the POW camp, he read articles concerning germ warfare and peace. He stated he heard lectures from Lieutenant O’Neal regarding germ warfare. He received thirty days' leave to his home in Rexville, New York, and reported back to Valley Forge General Hospital.

The following group received a two/three rating which meant that there was a smaller chance that the enemy indoctrinated them, but if indoctrinated they would respond positively to rehabilitation. Private First-Class Marvin Brown did admit to

³⁹ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴⁰ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

signing affidavits, but the committee did not believe that he succumbed to Communism. He was a twenty-one-year-old, unmarried, African-American from an urban, lower-middle-class family. The report stated he was from a broken home and completed high school. The Army drafted Brown and his AGCT score was unknown. He served in the Army for two years and three months. Brown explained that he signed affidavits and made broadcasts for the Chinese and North Koreans, but only under duress. Several other POWs claim he was a “flagrant collaborator.”⁴¹ The report asserted that Brown needs follow-up psychiatric care, but there is no mental health diagnosis listed for him. The committee rated Brown as a two/three because of the signed affidavits and broadcasts about the United States participating in germ warfare. The Army gave him thirty days' leave to his home in Oklahoma City, OK, and then to report to Brooke Army Hospital at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. When he returned home, his hometown held a ceremony in Brown's honor.⁴²

Another POW who was sick enough to remain in the hospital was Corporal Vernon Warren. He was a twenty-two-year-old, African American who grew up in an urban environment in a lower-middle-class family. He was from a broken home and completed ten years of school. He enlisted and served five years. His AGCT score was on

⁴¹ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴² “Throngs Line Streets to See Armed Services Parade High-Pointed by Returned Hero,” *Black Dispatch*, May 23, 1953.

the low end of the scale at seventy-seven. The North Koreans captured Warren in November 1950 and he spent the entire time at Camp Five. Other POWs considered him a progressive leader. He sent letters home with Communist propaganda, though he claimed that this was the only way to get a letter mailed home. The committee rated him as a two/three and the report specified that there was no evidence of treasonable acts. The Army did not grant him leave because he had to stay at Valley Forge General Hospital for tuberculosis treatment.⁴³

Private First-Class Paul Blanton considered himself a progressive while in the POW camp, but later his religious beliefs changed his mind. Blanton came from a rural, lower-middle-class background and attended school through tenth grade. Until he enlisted, he had stable employment and no criminal record. When he enlisted, his AGCT score was ninety-five, which was below average. He was a twenty-three-year-old, unmarried, white man who served in the Army for three years and eleven months. During his time at the POW camp, he asserted he voluntarily accepted Communism, however, Blanton was a Protestant and because of his religious beliefs, he questioned the compatibility of Communist doctrine with these beliefs. He specified he eventually rejected Communism due to it not aligning with his religion. The committee rated him as a two/three and listed possible treasonous acts as making broadcasts for the enemy. He told the committee that he wished to pursue journalism one day. Blanton was one of the

⁴³ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

men not granted leave because he was under observation for tuberculosis at Valley Forge General Hospital.⁴⁴

Another of the highest-ranking Valley Forge POWs was Master Sergeant John Porter. He was a thirty-five-year-old married, African American from an urban, lower-middle-class environment. He was from a broken home and had six years of education. His AGCT score before entering the Army was eighty-four and he served for twelve years and six months. The other men liked Porter and he seemed to be the spokesman for the group. Porter was cooperative, especially with whoever is in power. While at camp he suffered from severe frostbite and spent time in the hospital. He stated that he signed leaflets, but they were prepared by others. In regards to having succumbed to Communism, Porter explained that he “rather be in prison in the U.S. than a Communist.”⁴⁵ The committee classified him as a two/three and did not list any treasonable acts. The Army transferred him to a treatment ward at Valley Forge General Hospital but the report asserted he will receive a pass when he requests one because his family is close by in Philadelphia.

⁴⁴ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴⁵ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

Corporal Richard Morrison admitted to having Communist beliefs while in camp, but later began to question them. He was a twenty-two-year-old, unmarried, white, from an urban, middle-class background. The report stated he is from a “normal” family.⁴⁶ Morrison graduated high school. He enlisted in the Army and scored 118 on his AGCT score and served for four years and six months. The report explained that he is “intelligent but confused.”⁴⁷ Morrison accepted Communist doctrine but now is not sure if he still believed in it. The report asserted that though he has been cooperative with the staff, they believed he may be withholding information. The committee gave him a rating of two/three and listed possible treasonable acts as recording broadcasts and writing Communist propaganda. He received thirty days of leave en route to Percy Jones Army Hospital.

Corporal Rogers Herndon lived in fear about the possible future actions of the Chinese and North Koreans due to the amount of information the enemy obtained from him while in camp. He gave the names and addresses of relatives and friends in the United States. He was afraid that a Communist would try to force him to start peace and truth campaigns now that he was home. He was a twenty-year-old, unmarried, African

⁴⁶ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴⁷ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

American from an urban, middle-class background. The report specifically stated he is not from a broken home. He completed eleven years of school and enlisted in the Army. His AGCT score was unknown and he served for three years. The Chinese and North Koreans wounded and captured Herndon in November 1950.⁴⁸ The report explained he is an “opportunist.”⁴⁹ Herndon maintained he was a progressive and wrote petitions. Many of the petitions were about a national organization for colored people. He also sent letters home that contained Communist propaganda. He stated that he no longer believed in Communism. The committee rated him as a two/three but listed no treasonable offenses. The Army gave him thirty days' leave to his home in Jacksonville, Florida en route to Brooke Army Hospital in Sam Houston, Texas. In an interview, after he left Valley Forge General Hospital, he said that his captors made him write an autobiography in which he answered questions from a two-page list provided to him. The Chinese and North Koreans required him to put down the names and addresses of relatives and friends in the United States. Herndon also explained that he lived in fear of Communists in America coming to him and trying to force him to do things like start a peace and truth campaign now that he was home.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ William Brinkley, “Valley Forge GIs,” *Saturday Evening Post*, May 25, 1953.

⁴⁹Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵⁰ William Brinkley, “Valley Forge GIs,” *Saturday Evening Post*, May 25, 1953.

Corporal Robert Stell received the only three/two rating, though the FBI kept an eye on him due to reports of someone named Stell being a collaborator. He was a twenty-four-year-old, unmarried, African American from an urban, poor environment and a broken home. He had a sixth-grade education and unstable employment history. He stated he enlisted in the Army to escape his social environment. Stell scored a ninety-two on the AGCT and served for four years and six months. The report described Stell as an “aggressive reactionary” and “extremely demanding and belligerent.”⁵¹ It further specified that he has a “returning hero complex.”⁵² Stell maintained he would like to go to college, return to the Army, and also be a journalist. Stell admitted to cooperating with his captors but claimed he only did so to get treatment for a leg wound and that he did not believe in Communism. An FBI report specified that returning POWs claimed that Stell was “one of the most active over there,” but the FBI did not have confirmation that the man the POWs were talking about was the same man as Stell who was at Valley Forge General Hospital.⁵³ The committee rated him as a three/two and listed his treasonable

⁵¹ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵² Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵³ J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, 25 April 1953, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61 FBI Series, Box 3, Folder FBI S (1), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

offenses as writing Communist propaganda and signing peace petitions. The Army granted him thirty days' leave en route to Walter Reed Army Hospital.

The remaining Valley Forge POWs received a rating of three, meaning that they did not succumb to indoctrination. The highest-ranking, African American POW among the group was Master Sergeant Walter McCollum who provided insight into what it was like to be at an indoctrination camp. He was a thirty-four-year-old, African American, married man. McCollum grew up in Lake Charles, Louisiana under poor economic conditions and only went to school through sixth grade. Before his time in the Army, he had stable employment and no criminal or disciplinary record. His AGCT score was 104 when he entered the Army and he served for eleven years and nine months. The other POWs elected McCollum squad leader in the POW camp and the Chinese and North Koreans appointed him school monitor. McCollum admitted he signed peace petitions but asserted that did not make any broadcasts and shunned the progressive POWs. Interestingly, the report stated that McCollum received “unusual privileges in the camp.”⁵⁴ The report does not state what those privileges were, but usually, only those who cooperated and collaborated with the enemy received special treatment. The committee rated him as a three and listed no evidence of any treasonable acts. McCollum explained that he planned on staying in the Army. The Army granted him thirty days of leave to Oakdale, Louisiana, and then he had to report back to Valley Forge General

⁵⁴ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

Hospital.⁵⁵ By the end of May, McCollum gave an interview regarding his time in the POW camp.

McCollum gave detailed information about his time at Camp Five, which the POWs referred to as the “University of Pyuktong.”⁵⁶ McCollum discussed his role as a monitor at the camp. For example, Comrade Tse, a Chinese instructor, would have each monitor ask his group of men questions after they attended lectures. It was the monitor’s responsibility to write down the answers and present them to Tse. McCollum stated the “curriculum was based on the principle of incessant bombardment.”⁵⁷ He also told how the Chinese and North Koreans used prizes of apples, candy, and cigarettes for those who won essay contests or attended extra lectures by Comrade Tse. This prompted some men to write what the enemy wanted to get a prize. One point of interest in McCollum’s interview was that the Chinese and North Koreans did not require POWs to attend the lectures, instead, POWs had the option to perform other jobs. These options required performing undesirable jobs like “cleaning latrines and digging ditches” or standing at attention for hours in the snow.⁵⁸ While these jobs were undesirable, some men, known

⁵⁵ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS. The document stated that he was granted leave to Oakdale, Pennsylvania though newspaper reports state that he returned to Oakdale, Louisiana. McCollum was from Lake Charles, Louisiana and his wife was teaching in Oakdale, Louisiana at the time of his release.

⁵⁶ William Brinkley, “Valley Forge GIs,” *Saturday Evening Post*, May 25, 1953.

⁵⁷ William Brinkley, “Valley Forge GIs,” *Saturday Evening Post*, May 25, 1953.

⁵⁸ William Brinkley, “Valley Forge GIs,” *Saturday Evening Post*, May 25, 1953.

as Reactionaries, chose the jobs over attending classes. According to McCollum, the Chinese upped the punishments for the Reactionaries by not giving them all their mail from home and denying medical treatment which changed some of the Reactionaries' minds.⁵⁹ The fact that at a camp known for the indoctrination of POWs, it is striking that the Chinese and North Koreans gave options to the POWs regarding the lectures and did not force attendance.

Corporal Fred Muldrow wrote a letter to his sister and included a part about wishing for peace and asked her to read it to the church, though the committee determined that even though he did this, there was no proof that he had collaborated or that the enemy successfully indoctrinated him. He was an unmarried, twenty-eight-year-old African American from a rural, lower-class family. He completed twelve years of school, but it does not say that he graduated. He had an unstable employment history and a criminal record. The police arrested him numerous times for minor crimes and he served two years in the Indiana State Prison. After his release, he violated parole and served an additional eight months in prison. He enlisted into the Army rashly and scored 103 on his AGCT test. He served in the Army for three years. He asserted other than the letter, he did not collaborate with the enemy or go to any meetings. He says he is anti-Communist and tried to rebel against his captors. The report stated that he is anti-social. He made an interesting statement to the investigators that he saw two Russian soldiers

⁵⁹ William Brinkley, "Valley Forge GIs," *Saturday Evening Post*, May 25, 1953.

take POWs away from camp.⁶⁰ The committee rated Muldrow as a three with no treasonable acts. He received thirty days' leave to his home in Prescott, Arkansas, and then return to Valley Forge General Hospital.

The oldest of the Valley Forge POW was Master Sergeant Robert Shaw whom the committee gave a rating of a three even though he did participate in broadcasts. He was a forty-four-year-old, married, white, with a lower middle-class background. He finished two years of high school and served for twelve years in a variety of military duties including the Army and Coast Guard. His AGCT score was unknown. The Chinese captured Shaw at a roadblock and sent him to Camp Five to the school.⁶¹ Shaw admitted he made two broadcasts for the Chinese and North Koreans. He also claimed he only wrote articles about athletics, not any Communist material. He stated he was not a Communist. The report explained that staff at the hospital had the opinion that he “appeared a little touched by Communist propaganda.”⁶² The committee classified him as a three and listed a treasonable offense as making broadcasts. After his stay at Valley Forge, Shaw gave interviews and discussed some of his experiences in the camp. He

⁶⁰ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁶¹ William Brinkley, “Valley Forge GIs,” *Saturday Evening Post*, May 25, 1953.

⁶² Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

remembered the instructors at the camp giving quizzes. Shaw detailed a hot day in which the instructors gave a quiz on germ warfare. Shaw asserted that there was no free will to give answers that you believed were correct. Instead, the instructors looked at the quiz and each man could not leave until he gave all the correct answers in the opinion of the instructors.⁶³

Corporal Elias Villegas unsuccessfully tried to escape from the Chinese and North Koreans but the Army flagged him as a possible collaborator. The committee found no evidence of indoctrination. He was a twenty-four-year-old, unmarried, Spanish American from an urban, lower-middle-class background. The report stated he was from a “normal” family. He had a sixth-grade education and an unstable employment record. While at the POW camp, Villegas attempted to escape but the guards caught and punished him. He explained he had to go to a progressive school and that he made recordings but said he rejected Communism. The committee rated him a category three with no possible treasonable offenses. The army granted him thirty days' leave to his home in Jasper, Michigan, and reported to Percy Jones Army Hospital.⁶⁴

Private First Class Paul Schnur Jr. was not technically one of the Valley Forge POWs. The Army originally grouped him with the other men and he flew in secrecy with them to the United States, but the FBI took him off the plane at Travis Air Force Base.

⁶³ William Brinkley, “Valley Forge GIs,” *Saturday Evening Post*, May 25, 1953.

⁶⁴ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

Because the committee did not evaluate him, there is no case history on him. The FBI had a write-up concerning him and his father Paul Schnur Sr. Schnur attended a private school, Lick Wilmerding Private School and Continuation School, but he did not graduate. He also had a police record. The police arrested him in 1944 for petty theft and in 1945 for tampering with a car. He enlisted into the Army as a private “a day or two before his draft date.”⁶⁵ Before his capture in November 1950, Schnur went AWOL several times. The Army also tried and punished him for “misappropriation of government property” when he stole blankets from the Supply Sergeant while in the Philippines. He served six months for this crime.⁶⁶ The Chinese and North Koreans captured Schnur “almost immediately” when his unit entered the combat zone.⁶⁷ There is no evidence if he voluntarily crossed enemy lines or if the enemy actually captured him. During Schnur’s time in the POW camp, a West Coast Communist newspaper, *Daily People’s World*, printed information given to them from Schnur Sr. that came from letters Schnur Jr. sent home to his parents. In an article from December 22, 1950, Schnur Sr. stated that his son told him that there was a high causality rate among the United States

⁶⁵ Horace Craig, Memorandum for Record POW Exchange, 21 April 1953, Jackson, C.D.: Records, 1953-54, Box 5, Folder Prisoner Exchange, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁶⁶ Horace Craig, Memorandum for Record POW Exchange, 21 April 1953, Jackson, C.D.: Records, 1953-54, Box 5, Folder Prisoner Exchange, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁶⁷ Horace Craig, Memorandum for Record POW Exchange, 21 April 1953, Jackson, C.D.: Records, 1953-54, Box 5, Folder Prisoner Exchange, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

troops. He explained that the stories were “horrifying—forty percent lost from his company” and also talked about the plight of the Korean people.⁶⁸ The article asserted that Schnur Sr. and his wife believed that the United Nations should pull out of Korea and let the Korean people decide on their own government, a suggestion that the Chinese had put forth. On August 10, 1951, the *Daily People’s World*, printed two letters from Schnur Jr. These letters specified that he was “sympathetic with the Korean people and disgusted with the way we (United States) have made them suffer” and called the Korean War “senseless.”⁶⁹ In March 1952 and January 1953, letters and petitions calling for the end of the war included Schnur Jr.’s signature. Schnur was a lead progressive in the camps and indoctrinated other POWs. There are reports that he was able to get more mail sent to America from the camp than other POWs.⁷⁰ He also was extremely “surly” to interrogators after the Chinese and North Koreans released him during Operation Little Switch.⁷¹

⁶⁸ George Morgan, Memorandum for Record POW Exchange, 21 April 1953, Jackson, C.D.: Records, 1953-54, Box 5, Folder Prisoner Exchange, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁶⁹ J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, 25 April 1953, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61 FBI Series, Box 3, Folder FBI S (1), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁷⁰ Horace Craig, Memorandum for Record POW Exchange, 21 April 1953, Jackson, C.D.: Records, 1953-54, Box 5, Folder Prisoner Exchange, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁷¹ Horace Craig, Memorandum for Record POW Exchange, 21 April 1953, Jackson, C.D.: Records, 1953-54, Box 5, Folder Prisoner Exchange, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

The FBI became interested in Schnur Jr. because of his father and upbringing. Schnur Sr. had previously been the executive secretary of the San Francisco Congress of Industrial Organizations Council. There were newspaper reports that the president of the CIO council drove Schnur Sr. out because of his pro-Communist leanings.⁷² Schnur Sr. was also friends with Harry Bridges, a known Communist. In 1947, there was testimony given in the California Joint Committee on Un-American Activities that named Schnur Sr. as a known Communist himself.⁷³ Schnur Sr. was also the chairman of the San Francisco defense committee for the Rosenbergs, a husband and wife charged with being spies for the Russians.⁷⁴ The FBI actually had an investigation open on Schnur Sr. since 1941.⁷⁵ The FBI report also specified that another governmental agency, that conducts security investigations, stated that Schnur Sr. is “a very enthusiastic Communist who advocated to overthrow our present form of government by violence.”⁷⁶ Both of Schnur’s parents wrote their own letters to the president and first lady regarding ending the war.

⁷² Victor Riesel, “Commies Exploit S.F. Former POW,” *Oakland Tribune*, April 22, 1953.

⁷³ Victor Riesel, “Commies Exploit S.F. Former POW,” *Oakland Tribune*, April 22, 1953.

⁷⁴ Victor Riesel, “Army Has Brass Curtain Over Atrocities to P.O.W.,” *Charlotte Observer*, May 30, 1953.

⁷⁵ George Morgan, Memorandum for Record POW Exchange, 21 April 1953, Jackson, C.D.: Records, 1953-54, Box 5, Folder Prisoner Exchange, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁷⁶ J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, 25 April 1953, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61 FBI Series, Box 3, Folder FBI S (1), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

Thus, it is easy to see why the FBI pulled Schnur Jr. from the plane at Travis Air Force Base because of his ties to Communism through his father and because of the information he told interrogators.

The case history reports on the Valley Forge POWs provide insight into what information the committee believed was important. For example, several POWs were from a broken home, which the committee specifically listed. When looking at the ethnicity of those from a broken home, only the African American men and Kirchhausen, who was white and from Germany, actually had it listed. The reports showed that nine of the thirteen white men came from “normal” families, though no African American had that listed. For the African American men, it either stated “broken home” or does not mention the family background at all. Though for the two African American men with nothing listed, they also were two of the men with a rating of three, which meant that there are no Communist beliefs. The rating system and possible acts of treason are also interesting points. Several POWs received either a one/two or a two/three rating, which is a bit ambiguous. Also, for some that had a rating of three, the committee wrote in possible acts of treason. But for some of the men that had a two or a two/three rating, there were no acts indicated on the report. One would assume that those with a two rating would have made some type of broadcast or written an article since a two meant that the Chinese and North Koreans had indoctrinated them. Some of the men with no possible treasonable offenses made broadcasts, attended classes, wrote articles, or signed propaganda, though the committee did not list these offenses as possible treason, even

though those same acts appeared on other POWs reports as a possible treasonable offense.⁷⁷

The Valley Forge POWs represent a diverse class of men from different backgrounds and experiences. Some of them had been in the Army for many years and some just a few. Some of the men enlisted on their own, while some the Army drafted. What they had in common was that they were all enlisted men the military singled out as possibly succumbing to Communism. This led the military to decide to fly them in secrecy to the United States for evaluation. The Valley Forge POWs became the first test for the government and military on what to do with POWs that possibly succumbed to Communist indoctrination.

⁷⁷ Gerald Epley, Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee, 15 June 1953, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1953-61, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, Box 26, Folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

Chapter 3: Valley Forge Fiasco: Analyzing Mistakes and Drawing Lessons

The possibility of returning brainwashed prisoners of war (POWs) was on the radar for the government and military and they expected at least some of the POWs to return indoctrinated. Operation Little Switch and the Valley Forge POWs provided the first opportunity for the military and government to figure out how to handle potentially brainwashed POWs. Behind the scenes in the military and government, a drama played out concerning the Valley Forge POWs. Accounts of the men given by different offices in the military and government gave conflicting information about the men and their level of indoctrination. This played out in the press with stories that stated the Valley Forge POWs had succumbed to brainwashing and a retraction that the men had not and the military only flew them to Valley Forge General Hospital for treatment for physical injuries. In truth, some of the men had Communist tendencies. There were discussions in the military and government concerning the POWs, their experiences, and what to do with them. The Valley Forge POWs offer insight into the behind the scenes discussions and attempts to deal with brainwashed POWs. The mistakes made with these POWs provided the military and government a path forward on how to deal with other returning POWs when Operation Big Switch began.

The government began to work on and adopted policies and procedures in January 1953 for when an eventual POW exchange would take place. The government knew that there were American POWs who had already broadcast anti-American statements and accusations of America's participation in germ warfare. It was unknown how many POWs could return home as Communists. On January 19, 1953, Frank Pace, Secretary of

the Army, identified the three problems he foresaw regarding issues when POWs return home. The first issue concerned the fact that newspapers had reported on Communist brainwashing POWs and that due to this, it might “arouse public concern to such an extent to jeopardize the US position with respect to non-forcible repatriation.”¹ The second issue was that POWs that succumbed to brainwashing could be a “security and publicity problem upon their eventual return.”² The third issue was that the United States could possibly use the issue of brainwashing for a “worldwide propaganda campaign by charging the Communists with a new form of war crime.”³

In February 1953, the secretary of defense assigned the Department of the Army to be the “executive agent” of the first and second issues and the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) to look into the third issue. There was not much concrete or valid intelligence on the effectiveness of brainwashing. So, the secretary of defense ordered the Army to form a team of scientific, medical, and psychological personnel to determine a way to screen POWs for having succumbed to brainwashing and a possible way to

¹ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

² William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

reverse their indoctrination. The secretary of defense added the government would interview those prisoners who the Chinese and North Koreans had released or prisoners who escaped Chinese captivity to determine if there was a long effect of the brainwashing. Initially, the North Koreans ran the POW camps, but the Chinese took over when they entered the war. While conditions were harsh in the POW camps throughout the war, there was an improvement when the Chinese took over.⁴ The Chinese used “reeducation of prisoners” and “catch and release” of indoctrinated prisoners during the Chinese civil war successfully.⁵ The Chinese used these same policies during the Korean War. Historian Charles Young states, “One of the buried little secrets of the war, more than 500 American captives were let go after hurried political instruction.”⁶ The government also obtained information from John Hayes, who was a Chinese-born, American missionary whom the Chinese held for some time, brainwashed, and then released.⁷ His information provided the government with information on how the Chinese attempted to brainwash people and the lasting effects of brainwashing. The government also decided to release information to the American public explaining brainwashing, and

⁴ Charles Young, *Name, Rank and Serial Number: Exploiting Korean War POWS at Home and Abroad* (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2014), 25, 28.

⁵ Young, *Name, Rank and Serial Number*, 46, 48.

⁶ Young, *Name, Rank and Serial Number*, 48.

⁷ John Hayes, March 18, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 702.5 (2) Brainwashing During Korean War, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 702.5 (2) Brainwashing During Korean War, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

present information to the United Nations demanding that they turn over those POWs who confessed to germ warfare so a neutral nation could determine if they were real confessions. The Army put Lieutenant General Anthony McAuliffe, the assistant chief of staff for personnel, the G-1, in charge of developing the screening process for POWs. The Army formed a committee to investigate the “nature and extent of Communist brainwashing techniques.”⁸

When Operation Little Switch began, officials had to decide on how to physically get the men back to the United States, the options were airplane or boat. The secretary of defense wanted at a minimum the indoctrinated POWs to return to the US by ship, not plane, so that interrogators could interview them during the time it took to get home. The dispatch with the advice of the secretary of defense did not reach General Clark in time. Clark had been “forced by the imminence of the exchange program to announce that all returned prisoners would be flown to the U.S.”⁹ Clark’s decision stood and the military flew the POWs home. Since interrogators could not interview the POWs during a long boat ride, Clark stated he would have officials separate those POWs who had

⁸ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁹ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

questionable actions while in the POW camps. Then these men would fly to Valley Forge General Hospital.¹⁰

Captain Bailey and Lieutenant Kelly, who each accompanied the Valley Forge POWs from Tokyo to the United States, each gave a summary of the movements of the Valley Forge POWs. Lieutenant Kelly discussed how the Army handled some RP (returned prisoners) including the Valley Forge POWs. Kelly stated when the men arrived from Korea, the military put them through a process to delouse them, give them clothes, and then sent them to Tokyo. In Tokyo, the men had medical exams followed by admission to the hospital. Then intelligence interrogators began to question them. He described the interrogators as a “very general group of intelligence officers from different command groups.”¹¹ He further specified that “two men worked with one RP (returned prisoner): an interrogator and a witness” to ensure protection for the Army from “claims of duress.”¹² Kelly said that the process after the interrogations was for the AFFE Intelligence Clearance Panel to review the reports and give a decision to the Joint

¹⁰ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹¹ Robert Beezer, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-5 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹² Robert Beezer, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-5 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

Classification Board. This board would approve or reject the panel's decision. This is also the group that granted or deny permission for the press to talk to POWs. The panel placed all of the POWs in one of three lists. The "Black" group was "those whose names had come through on the radio, on numerous petitions, and in the mail," the "Grey" group was "those who had signed on only an occasional petition," and the final group was the "White" group which was "those for whom there was no evidence regarding collaboration."¹³

Bailey gave his statement that pertained more to the movements of just the Valley Forge POWs. Though Bailey claimed that General Clark ordered personnel to form a Clearance Panel to speak to each POW and assess them, this did not happen. Instead, they only read the dossiers on the men and it was arbitrary if a POW was on the watch list. This caused the Clearance Board members to be "afraid of the implications that might arise from a man's being placed in the doubtful group."¹⁴ He also indicated that Clark said that "he did not want any stigma placed on these men."¹⁵ Bailey acknowledged that

¹³ Robert Beezer, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-5 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹⁴ Robert Beezer, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-5 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹⁵ Robert Beezer, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-5 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

before this particular group left Tokyo, they found out about an article in *Stars and Stripes* concerning the press release about them. Bailey verified that all of the Valley Forge POWs saw the story and expressed their anger. He claimed that one of the men actually went AWOL and to his knowledge was still in Tokyo. The plane made a stop in Hickman Field, Honolulu for the men to transfer to another plane, which had no other passengers on it but them. The plane then went to Travis Air Force Base, California where the plane again was at the end of the airstrip, cordoned off by police and an armored car patrolling near the plane. Next, the plane went to Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland where the military police once again blocked the area. The POWs then got on two planes that went from Andrews Air Force Base to Willow Grove and then escorted to Valley Forge General Hospital.¹⁶

The DOD released a statement “concerning the so-called special group” on April 28, 1953.¹⁷ The DOD indicated that the military took a small group to Valley Forge Hospital who the Chinese and North Koreans might have indoctrinated. The release “specifically stated that they were being so returned because the Department of the Army considered that it was obligated to these men and their families; that they were entitled to

¹⁶ Robert Beezer, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-5 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹⁷ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

medical and psychological treatment for rehabilitation” and that these POWs had been “subjected to intensive Communist indoctrination required special consideration as well as medical treatment.”¹⁸ One issue that the military had kept this segregated group of POWs separate was the fact that press from all over the world met planes with POWs at Travis Air Force Base in the hope of getting interviews with the men. This posed an issue because the military did not want the Valley Forge men interviewed. The plane had to make the stop because the military transferred one member of the group, Private Paul Schnur Jr., to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) custody. The FBI knew that Schnur was one of the more “hardcore communists and had committed treason” so they wanted to try to use him for an “operation against the Communist labor organizations on the West Coast.”¹⁹ This was likely due to the fact his father was a known Communist at the time. Because the military did not grant the press access to the men, the press inferred that this particular plane must contain the brainwashed POWs. The press “implied that they were either psychiatric cases or were Communists; none of which was alleged or supported by any of the releases or announcements of the local public information

¹⁸ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹⁹ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

officer- in fact it was specifically denied.”²⁰ One reporter was able to sneak past the police and snapped a picture of the men.²¹ The Army then transferred the POWs to a hospital plane that had barred windows. The public information officer at Travis Air Force Base told the press that there were no charges against these men, the military would not release their names to protect them, and that they “had shown symptoms of having succumbed under duress and were entitled to special consideration for this reason.”²² This caused more speculation, fear, and articles about the enemy indoctrinating American POWs.

When the men arrived at Valley Forge General Hospital, hospital workers fed the men and officials told them that they had the same status as other POWs. The POWs had free rein in the hospital and staff allowed them to use all the military facilities such as the Post Exchange, libraries, and movie theaters.²³ The POWs also had access to family visits

²⁰ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²¹ Robert Beezer, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-5 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²² William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²³ Robert Stevens, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 10 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

and to speak with reporters. Several POWs went to the surgeon and told him that “they were afraid to go home because of the publicity and wanted to re-enlist.”²⁴ Officials gave the POWs three options. The first was to stay and receive treatment at the military hospital and receive payment. The second option was to discharge themselves from the military hospital and go to a V.A. hospital for treatment, but they would not receive pay. The final option was to discharge themselves from the military hospital and receive care from a private doctor at their own expense. Twenty-two of the men “signed a voluntary certificate indicating they would remain in the Army as long as necessary for treatment.”²⁵

Many government officials visited Valley Forge Hospital to see first-hand what the condition was of the men and how the hospital was handling them. On May 1 and 2, 1953, Carleton Scofield, assistant director for psychological warfare research, and Dr. Robert Beezer traveled to Valley Forge General Hospital to observe the ad hoc committee charged with monitoring the POWs. Beezer stayed an additional three days and left on May 5 to observe the committee for longer. Scofield was not pleased with what he observed at the hospital. He asserted that the hospital conducted the observation

²⁴ Robert Beezer, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-5 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²⁵ Robert Beezer, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-5 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

of these POWs with “gross incompetence.”²⁶ On the first day of the trip, Scofield spoke with Colonel Henry Rogers, chairman of the ad hoc committee. Scofield described the speech that Rogers gave to him as a “flag-waving tirade on Communism and Communists.”²⁷ Scofield believed that Rogers had already marked all these men as guilty. Rogers made comments to the effect that many collaborated with the enemy voluntarily and that some were card-carrying members of the Communist Party even before the war. His most disturbing statement, after just a short time of observing them, was, “We’ll probably hang those,” referring to those that voluntarily helped the enemy.²⁸ Scofield stated that Major Fulmer of the OCPW Board agreed with his assessment of the situation at Valley Forge. Scofield summarized his feelings on the conduct of the observation of the Valley Forge POWs and the situation in general. He declared that this situation has become “incredible” due to the press coverage which has stigmatized the

²⁶ Carleton Scofield trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-2 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²⁷ Carleton Scofield, Report, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-2 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²⁸ Carleton Scofield, Report, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-2 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

men and their families.²⁹ He further claimed that he does not believe the G-1, who is in charge of personnel, wants to take responsibility for this situation so they treated it “lightly.”³⁰ The purpose of the committee was to observe and decide what to do with the Valley Forge POWs and to make plans for what to do with other brainwashed POWs when the remainder of the POWs returned to the United States. Scofield concluded that the committee does not have a clear understanding of its purpose. He also asserted that the chairman, Rogers, is “incompetent” and has not studied the files for each of the POWs, but believes that “they are all guilty, had been guilty since birth, that many of them are traitors, some of them may merit a court martial.”³¹ Scofield claimed that not only has the chairman not studied or seemed interested in studying the files on the men but only the G-2, in charge of intel, has looked at them. Furthermore, Scofield criticized

²⁹ Carleton Scofield, Report, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-2 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³⁰ Carleton Scofield, Report, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-2 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³¹ Carleton Scofield, Report, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-2 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

the fact that this board does not have a psychiatrist to interpret the interrogation and psychiatric reports.³²

Horace Craig visited Valley Forge General Hospital on May 5 and 6, 1953 right after Beezer ended his trip. Craig's reason for going to Valley Forge was a bit different from that of Scofield and Beezer. This visit was a result of a conversation among Craig, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, C.D. Jackson, Abbott Washburn, and George Morgan. During the meeting, they discussed the return of POWs. Lodge proposed that Craig go to Valley Forge General Hospital to meet with the Valley Forge POWs. Lodge was interested in any of the Valley Forge POWs who were "well-spoken and personable" whom he could bring to New York and hold a reception with United Nations officials.³³ The POW could then tell the UN officials about the Chinese and North Koreans' indoctrination project. When he arrived, Craig spoke with Colonel Brewer, Commanding Officer of Valley Forge General Hospital, and Rogers.³⁴ During the first day of Craig's visit, Brewer and Rogers, whom Scofield and Beezer criticized, told him that there was "indecision and confusion in the program as a result of their having been recipients for

³² Carleton Scofield, Report, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-2 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³³ Horace Craig, memorandum of conversation, 4 May, 1953, C.D. Jackson Files, box 4, folder Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³⁴ Horace Craig, memorandum, 12 May 1953, Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 702.5 (2) Brainwashing During Korean War, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

several days of contradictory orders.”³⁵ Brewer and Rogers stated that they received orders from the Office of the Surgeon General, Army G-1, Army Public Relations Office, Army Public Information Office, and Army G-4. They also stressed concern about the men that were not hard-core Communists because the Army brought them back to the United States under great secrecy and articles labeled them as Communists. They claimed many of the men are not only bitter but afraid they will never be able to get employment because of the stain of others believing they were Communists. Craig specified that the POWs claimed that Chinese and North Koreans told them that “they would be segregated and isolated from normal contact with the US people because they would be accused of betraying their country by attending communist indoctrination schools in order to truly learn why the US imperialists had sent them to fight in a remote foreign country.”³⁶ The Army had done just what the Chinese and North Koreans had warned them about since they flew them in secrecy, the airfields where the planes landed were surrounded by military police and one plane even had bars on the windows. Craig also commented on the hard-core Communist POWs at the hospital. He stated that they “aggravated the situation” and the doctors were scared they would have major “emotional upsets.”³⁷ He

³⁵ Horace Craig, memorandum, 12 May 1953, Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 702.5 (2) Brainwashing During Korean War, Eisenhower Presidential Library.

³⁶ Horace Craig, memorandum, 12 May 1953, Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 702.5 (2) Brainwashing During Korean War, Eisenhower Presidential Library.

³⁷ Horace Craig, memorandum, 12 May 1953, Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 702.5 (2) Brainwashing During Korean War, Eisenhower Presidential Library.

did not clarify how they aggravated the situation but said after three days the doctors had the situation handled. Craig also discussed the confusion and finger-pointing by various departments surrounding the Valley Forge POWs and the release to the press stating that they were victims of indoctrination. Craig asserted, "It is my belief that there was a need for this program in order to find out what they have found out concerning this particular group."³⁸ Craig believed the real issue is that no one group in the Department of Defense was in "complete command" of dealing with the POWs and that the segregation of these POWs should not have happened.³⁹ Instead, the POWs should have received treatment at local hospitals. Craig also reported that the "hardcore communists" POW claimed that Chinese and North Koreans told them eighteen months ago that repatriations of POWs would begin at the time it did begin.⁴⁰ He also noted that several of the POWs asserted they only signed the peace petitions to receive medical attention for wounds and other illnesses or because of physical violence against them such as pistol whipping or beating

³⁸ Horace Craig, memorandum, 12 May 1953, Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 702.5 (2) Brainwashing During Korean War, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS. Words are underlined in the original document.

³⁹ Horace Craig, memorandum, 12 May 1953, Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 702.5 (2) Brainwashing During Korean War, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴⁰ Horace Craig, memorandum, 12 May 1953, Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 702.5 (2) Brainwashing During Korean War, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

with a rubber hose.⁴¹ Craig stated that the POWs said that the British POWs that were in their camp blamed the United States for the war. The POWs also stated that the British were willing to participate in learning about Communist doctrine. Craig said he wanted to follow up on this to see if those particular British soldiers were already Communists before the war.⁴² The POWs claimed that the Turkish POWs were in a separate camp that was under Russian control. The POWs thought the Turkish were “untrustworthy” because the Turks “disliked everyone including each other and would steal anything that was not nailed down.”⁴³ Craig concluded that none of the Valley Forge POWs met the requirements that Ambassador Lodge needed for his reception.

The ad hoc committee created to observe the Valley Forge POWs consisted of “Medical, Psychological Warfare, Intelligence, Information, and Chaplains” as well as

⁴¹ Horace Craig, memorandum, 12 May 1953, Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 702.5 (2) Brainwashing During Korean War, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴² Horace Craig, memorandum, 12 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS. The Eisenhower Presidential Library had several copies of this memo in its collection in various file series. All but one of them had a section of his report redacted. The redacted paragraph had to do with a “passing interest in fact that all the soldiers at Valley Forge seemed to be violently anti-British.”

⁴³ Horace Craig, memorandum, 12 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS. The Eisenhower Presidential Library had several copies of this memo in its collection in various file series. All but one of them had a section of his report redacted.

one Army psychiatrist and one Air Force psychiatrist.⁴⁴ There were also two civilian psychiatrists available for consultation, Dr. Lauren Smith and Dr. Calvin Drayer, both from Philadelphia.⁴⁵ Still, Beezer did not list any psychiatrist, military or civilian when he visited the hospital.⁴⁶ The committee noted that it is against military and civil law to “hold any members of this group under duress.”⁴⁷ They also determined that secrecy surrounding this group was impossible to maintain and that there were “serious and embarrassing public relations problems to the Service.”⁴⁸ They stated that “medical ethics and principles prohibit the enforced treatment of any individuals of such a group as

⁴⁴ Robert Stevens, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 10 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴⁵ Robert Stevens, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 10 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴⁶ Robert Beezer, trip report to Valley Forge General Hospital in Phoenixville, PA, 1-5 May 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴⁷ Colonel Henry Rogers to Assistant Chief of Staff, memorandum, 8 May 1953, in Gerald Epley Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee 15 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴⁸ Colonel Henry Rogers to Assistant Chief of Staff, memorandum, 8 May 1953, in Gerald Epley Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee 15 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

mentally ill if the mental illness is not apparent, or if it is based solely on his acceptance of a particular political philosophy.”⁴⁹ The committee observed twenty POWs from May 3 to May 6. The men cooperated and answered questions that members of the committee asked. The committee concluded that all of them had collaborated with their captors, but some of the POWs only did so under duress. The ad hoc committee found three vulnerabilities that each of the men had in varying degrees which the Chinese and North Koreans exploited. They were “lack of strong family ties or support,” “lack of strong religious convictions,” and “lack of group identification.”⁵⁰ This group felt like the enemy chose these men because they were progressives, not because they were sick and wounded. Progressive was the name given to those who collaborated with the Chinese and North Koreans. They speculated the enemy chose these particular men because they represented a diverse religious, socio-economic, racial, and geographic group. The theory was that the Chinese and North Koreans also chose this group so they could see how the United States handled returning progressive POWs and use that information for POWs still in their custody. Some of them committed treason and warranted a court martial.

⁴⁹ Colonel Henry Rogers to Assistant Chief of Staff, memorandum, 8 May 1953, in Gerald Epley Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee 15 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵⁰ Colonel Henry Rogers to Assistant Chief of Staff, memorandum, 8 May 1953, in Gerald Epley Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee 15 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

This committee suggests that it is a mistake to “treat returning captured personnel as conquering heroes merely because they were POWs and that treatment as a VIP is not conducive to either his mental outlook or physical condition.”⁵¹ They did not think there is any way to measure the level of brainwashing that occurred in a person or a way to quickly reverse indoctrination. The committee classified the group into different categories. The committee classified five men as “convinced and confirmed Communists, considered irreclaimable and constituting a security risk,” classified another five as “very slightly indoctrinated and would require very little if any reorientation,” and the remaining POWs as “considered to be thoroughly indoctrinated but that reorientation was a possibility with the proper combination of social factors and environmental influences.”⁵² The recommendation was to return them to their families and normal lives as the best course of action. Another recommendation was that the military or government should not label any returning POW as “deserters, traitors, or any source of weakness, which would in effect lend creditability to the enemy attempts to

⁵¹ Colonel Henry Rogers to Assistant Chief of Staff, memorandum, 8 May 1953, in Gerald Epley Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee 15 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵² Robert Stevens, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 10 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

indoctrinate.”⁵³ They also stated that they only underwent brainwashing in the sense that the enemy gave them continuous propaganda, but they did not use any medical or other psychological methods, like hypnosis. The use of medical or other means of indoctrination was a concern in the government. For future returning POWs, they suggested to not separate any other POWS as they did with the Valley Forge POWs.⁵⁴

The press labeled the Valley Forge POWs as indoctrinated Communists. When the Valley Forge POWs learned of their new label, many expressed outrage and bitterness at the accusation that they were now Communists. In the press, the original statement concerning the Valley Forge POWs came from the DOD. Later the Army denied that they ever considered them to be Communists. Behind the scenes though this was not the case. Government officials had planned on the possibility of POWs returning as brainwashed Communists and interrogators had specifically flagged them. When the men arrived at Valley Forge General Hospital, they learned the full extent of the press coverage concerning them and then they began to give their own statements and interviews expressing their anger toward the label. Godel stated that this “became a

⁵³ Colonel Henry Rogers to Assistant Chief of Staff, memorandum, 8 May 1953, in Gerald Epley Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee 15 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵⁴ Colonel Henry Rogers to Assistant Chief of Staff, memorandum, 8 May 1953, in Gerald Epley Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee 15 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

matter of massive public criticism aimed at the Department of Defense.”⁵⁵ The Army Public Information Office responded to inquiries from the press by stating that the “Department of Defense ‘or higher’ had ordered this operation” and to ask them for information instead.⁵⁶ Godel indicated that this response was an “unacceptable procedure” because it was the Army Public Information Office that put out the original public statement.⁵⁷ Godel claimed that many major news outlets, such as *Time*, *Life*, and *Newsweek* determined that some of them were Communists, but did not want to retract their earlier articles.⁵⁸ Though by June 1953, some articles in *Looks*, *Life*, and *US News*

⁵⁵ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵⁶ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵⁷ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵⁸ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

and World Report implied that some of these men were Communists and that the original statement of the DOD was correct.⁵⁹

The accounts of the Valley Forge POWs differed among government officials. Most versions indicated that there were twenty-three POWs, though the committee observed and reported on just twenty POWs. There is no mention of who the other three POWs were and why the committee did not observe them. Another difference between accounts is the timing of when the Valley Forge POWs found out about the newspaper articles that stated that they all had succumbed to brainwashing and that was the reason the Army flew them to Valley Forge General Hospital. Captain Bailey stated that the men heard the news while still in Tokyo and that one POW went AWOL, but William Godel claimed that the men heard about the news at the stop at Travis Air Force Base. The only mention of the AWOL POW was by Bailey, and he was with the POWs in Tokyo and gave his statement days later. This was unlike Godel's which was a month later. Beezer's report was the only one that asserted that officials gave the POWs options when they arrived on if they wanted to receive treatment at Valley Forge General Hospital, though with these choices, only if the POW chose to stay at Valley Forge General Hospital would they continue to get paid. Beezer declared that Rogers said this himself, though it is not in Rogers's report.

⁵⁹ William Godel to Deputy Secretary of Defense, memorandum, 2 June 1953, in a memorandum from William Godel to Wallace Irwin, 23 July 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61: OCB Central File Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

The figure of Colonel Rogers, Chairman of the ad hoc committee for Captured US Personnel, varied among the accounts of the different visitors to Valley Forge General Hospital. Scofield was critical of Rogers and called him incompetent and accused him of prejudging the POWs. Craig, who met with Rogers several days later was much more favorable of Rogers. He felt that the committee just needed clearer instructions and that only one department should have the authority to give those instructions. Colonel Rogers had a similar stance as Craig and stated that one department should have authority over this matter. Also in Colonel Rogers's report, he was different from the prejudging person that Scofield described. It was Rogers that affirmed that it is actually illegal by military or civilian law to hold POWs under duress and that the hospital cannot treat the men as mentally ill for having accepted a certain philosophy.⁶⁰ Scofield painted the picture that Rogers was ready to hang some of them for treason from the beginning. Though Rogers only indicated that some of the POWs committed offenses that warranted a court martial. Scofield also criticized the fact that there was not any psychiatrist on the committee observing the men. Beezer also listed all the committee members and there were no psychiatrists on the committee. In Rogers's own report and that of Robert Stevens, the Secretary of the Army, there are two psychiatrists listed that the committee consulted.

⁶⁰ Colonel Henry Rogers to Assistant Chief of Staff, memorandum, 8 May 1953, in Gerald Epley Report of Special Ad Hoc Committee 15 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

Since Scofield's visit was before the other two, officials may have taken this complaint seriously and added consultants.

Many government officials all came to a similar conclusion, that what happened to the Valley Forge POWs should not happen again. Both Godel and Stevens stated that the military should not separate any POW, even those considered hardcore Communists, or send them all to one hospital for treatment. Qualified interrogators should determine if there is a POW that needs closer observation or treatment. Those individuals would still return to their homes and their commanders will coordinate any closer observation or treatment for the men. If there were POWs deemed to be a security risk and no longer in the military, then the military would notify the FBI.⁶¹ The best thing to do with these POWs was to quickly return them to their normal American lives with their families.⁶² There were also discussions concerning how the POWs should return home, with many officials believing that they should return by ship in order to have more time to interrogate them. This was the original plan for Operation Little Switch and is exactly what happened during Operation Big Switch, except for those that needed to go by plane due to medical reasons.

⁶¹ Robert Stevens, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 10 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁶² Robert Stevens, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 10 June 1953, White House Office National Security Council Staff Papers 1953-61: Psychological Strategy Board Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

While trip reports, memos, and other official accounts all tell slightly different versions of the story of the Valley Forge POWs, they all agree on the fact that officials separated these POWs from the other returning POWs due to claims of brainwashing. While an official press release from the DOD gave them information, the Army later claimed in news articles that this was the case and that they do not know why the DOD gave that statement. From official reports, it is clear that the military believed they had succumbed to brainwashing on various levels. The committee listed five of the Valley Forge POWs as hardcore Communists. The military and government played directly into the hand of the Chinese and North Koreans by segregating this group. Several of the POWs stated that the enemy warned them this would happen. No other prior group of POWs received the same treatment as Valley Forge POWs. The military and government learned lessons from this experience that they used when the remainder of the POWs returned during Operation Big Switch. POWs, even those labeled as progressives, returned home with the other POWs.

Chapter 4: Germ Warfare: Accusations During the Korean War: Confessions, Propaganda, and Investigations

During the Korean War, the Chinese and North Koreans accused the United Nations forces of biological warfare, also called bacteriological warfare (BW) or germ warfare as it is more commonly known. The United States and the Soviet Union both raised accusations in front of the United Nations. US Air Force and Marine Corps pilots captured by the enemy confessed to using germ warfare, and the Chinese and North Koreans used this information in their propaganda campaign against the United States. After the war ended and the pilots that confessed returned home, however, they recanted their statements and said that the enemy forced them to confess. The US military looked into court-martial proceedings against the pilots who made false confessions. Also, after the war, government officials through the POW Working Group began to work on a plan to exploit the germ warfare hoax. The charges and confessions that came from the germ warfare accusations provide a look into several issues that arose during and after the Korean War, including confessions, brainwashing, atrocities, and what to do with POWs that committed treasonable offenses while in a POW camp.

The North Koreans first charged the United States of using germ warfare in May 1951, though not much came from this accusation, even from other Communist countries.¹ In February 1952, all this changed, and the idea that UN forces, particularly

¹ Charles W. Mayo, Press Release No. 1786: part one, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

the Americans, engaged in germ warfare became an issue used for propaganda throughout other Communist countries, namely the Soviet Union. Shortly after, the Soviet Union brought the charges of germ warfare to the UN. The US secretary of state, secretary of defense, secretary general of the United Nations, and the commander in chief of the United Nations Command in Korea all denied these allegations over the next several months. In March 1952, The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) offered to investigate these charges, which the United States accepted, but the Chinese and North Koreans refused. In June 1952, the ICRC stated to the UN Security Council that it would investigate the claims of germ warfare and use international scientists, but the Soviet Union used its veto to stop this from happening. Then in October 1952, the United States and countries proposed to the UN General Assembly that a “5 Member Impartial Investigatory Commission consisting of Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, Sweden and Uruguay” investigate the claims and that each side give access to records and personnel to this commission to conduct their investigation.² Though the UN approved this resolution six months later on April 23, 1953, the Soviet bloc nations voted against the measure. The Chinese and North Koreans refused to accept the terms of the resolution

² Charles W. Mayo, Press Release No. 1786: part one, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

and the commission then there was never an investigation.³ Also in October 1952, the Soviet Union presented a document to the UN delegates entitled “Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China.”⁴ This report contained the confessions of Lieutenants John Quinn, Floyd O’Neal, Kenneth Enoch, and Paul Kniss. Then in March 1953, the Soviets added the confessions of Colonel Frank Schwable and Major Roy Bley. Dr. Charles Mayo, the United States UN delegate, pointed out in a speech at the UN that, in the confessions of Schwable and Bley, they both stated that the enemy accepted their finished confessions at the end of February 1953, which was convenient timing because it was right before the General Assembly convened.⁵

During the Korean War, the Chinese and North Koreans disseminated confessions of POWs through Radio Pyongyang that UN forces used germ warfare not only against

³ Charles W. Mayo, Press Release No. 1786: part one, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴ Charles W. Mayo, Press Release No. 1786: part one, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵ Charles W. Mayo, Press Release No. 1786: part one, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

the North Korean and Chinese military troops but also against North Korean civilians. The United States vehemently denied this claim. In February 1952, an Associated Press (AP) article reported on the “new and violent accusations that the United States was using germ warfare in North Korea.”⁶ The enemy stated that the pilots dropped insects infested with diseases into the country. The Chinese and North Koreans then used confessions from POWs, that admitted the United States participated in germ warfare and broadcasted these confessions. American newspapers reported on these broadcasts and government officials also closely watched the claims. On May 5, 1952, the *New York Times* reported on a broadcast made on Radio Pyongyang by two US Air Force lieutenants, Enoch and Crane, whom each confessed to participating in germ warfare.⁷ The article also specified that the Chinese and North Koreans broadcasted other earlier confessions. Enoch was one of the American POWs who later recanted his confession made to their captors. In February 1953, Charles Wilson, the secretary of defense, discussed the need to make an official statement on these accusations since the American press continued to report on them.⁸ Around this same time, Radio Pyongyang began to release broadcasts featuring higher-ranking Marine Corps officers, Colonel Frank Schwable and Major Roy Bley, and

⁶ Associated Press, “Reds Charge Germ Warfare to U.S.,” *New York Times*, February 25, 1952.

⁷ George Barrett, “Stepped-Up Red Propaganda Saps Hope for Korea Truce,” *New York Times*, May 5, 1952.

⁸ C.E. Wilson to Dulles, “Brainwashing,” February 19, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 702.5 (1) Brainwashing During Korean War, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

their germ warfare confession. While newspaper reports used the words alleged next to the confessions, the articles noted that Schwable's confession contained much better English than previous propaganda statements put out, thus there was a good chance it was a confession he wrote.⁹ This provided more authenticity to the germ warfare claims.

The confessions that the enemy claimed they had from American pilots deeply concerned American government officials, as well as allegations of brainwashing in general. Officials performed analyses of the confessions to determine their validity or to try to determine if there were any hidden messages inside. One analysis was to determine whether the purported author actually wrote the confession. Neilson Carel Debevoise looked at confessions printed in *Peoples China* on March 16, 1953. The confessions belonged to Colonel Frank Schwable, who was the chief of staff of the First Marine Aircraft Wing, and Major Roy Bley, the ordinance officer of the same unit. The analysis report stated that the deposition allegedly written by Schwable showed that whoever wrote it was intelligent, a pilot, and was a general staff officer at some point due to the detailed knowledge he had about air operations. Debevoise determined that the person was an American because there were no British spellings included. The report observed that there were sections that seemed to have a different author or that others told Schwable what to write because the word style was different. The report also explained that the writer knew nothing of germ warfare. Typically, the term "biological warfare" (or BW) was used, but this deposition used "bacteriological warfare" each time. Also, there is detailed information on flying and aircraft, but the writer did not have specific

⁹ "Red Germ Charges Cite 2 U.S. Marines," *New York Times*, February 23, 1953.

information about germ warfare. The report argued that the sections that Schwable did not seem to write, he could have written if Chinese and North Koreans had successfully brainwashed him.¹⁰ At this time there was a rampant fear in the United States that the enemy brainwashed American POWs. Thus, to the author of the report, it was not a far-fetched conclusion to believe that the Chinese and North Koreans brainwashed a POW into believing in germ warfare.

When the enemy used the confessions, officials in the United States began to plan ways to combat these allegations and look for ways to exploit the information. In February 1953, Allen Dulles called a series of meetings with Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) staff, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Army's Psywar Office, the Air Force's PW office, and the CIA to discuss the issue of brainwashing. The group decided that a committee of doctors, psychiatrists, and psychologists would study brainwashing and look at the video evidence and statements that they have of the pilots and their confessions.¹¹ This committee created a group to study brainwashing, though it was short-lived.¹²

¹⁰ N.C Debevoise to Horace Craig, "Analysis of Certain 'Germ Warfare Confessions' of U.S. Military Personnel," June 11, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (1) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹¹ Dulles, "Brainwashing," February 28, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 702.5 (1) Brainwashing During Korean War, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹² Memorandum of Conversation, "State Department Exploitation of Communist BW Charges," July 6, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers 1948-61- OCB Central Files Series, box 124, folder OCB 729.2 Biological Warfare, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

This group and other government officials also discussed the need to continue to publicly refute these claims. Though since the war was ongoing, the enemy still had these men in their custody. Roy McNair cautioned if the government specifically referenced and denied the confessions made by POWs, this could cause the Chinese and North Koreans to not repatriate them and hold them to give more statements at a later date. He instead believed officials should refute germ warfare without discussing the men and their confessions, while others believed there should be a line-by-line refutation of all the claims made in these confessions.¹³

Another group that dealt with POW issues including germ warfare was the POW Working Group. In June 1951, President Harry Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) which was part of the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate activities between various government departments as part of their psychological warfare program. When Dwight Eisenhower became president, he formed the Jackson Committee which studied the PSB and its effectiveness. The Jackson Committee recommended abolishing the PSB and creating a new organization. In September 1953, Eisenhower replaced the PSB with the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB).¹⁴ The OCB's task was to oversee and coordinate information and activities with

¹³ Roy McNair to Horace Craig, "U.S. Refutation of BW Claims," May 27, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (1) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹⁴ Finding Aid for the C.D. Jackson's Records, "Scope and Content," Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS, <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/research/finding-aids/jackson-c-d-0>.

all the various departments.¹⁵ A group created under the OCB was the POW Working Group, which held its first meeting on September 9, 1953. Charles Norberg, acting deputy assistant director, was the chairman of the group. The first meeting had officials from the Department of State, Department of Defense (DOD), CIA, Foreign Operations Agency, and US Information Agency.¹⁶ This POW working group met regularly and discussed many issues. One plan that the POW Working Group had worked on was the “National Plan to Exploit Communist BW Hoax, Mistreatment of POWs and Other Atrocities Perpetrated by the Communist Forces During the Korean War.” On October 14, 1953, the final version received approval. The objective of the plan was “to develop an integrated national program which will effectively expose the nature of Communist motives, character, methods and ambitions by coordinated exploitation of all available materials on the Soviet fabrication of bacteriological warfare propaganda, the character of Communist exploitation and mistreatment of prisoners of war and other atrocities

¹⁵ William Godel, memorandum, September 4, 1953, “Plan of Exploiting Communist Mistreatment of U.S. Prisoners of War,” White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (4), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹⁶ Charles Norberg, memorandum, September 9, 1953, “Plan for Exploiting Communist Mistreatment of U.S. Prisoners of War,” White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War (4), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

perpetrated by the Communists during the Korean War.”¹⁷ This plan set out to refute the charges of germ warfare, while not giving the Chinese and North Koreans any further propaganda to use against the United States, to stop the bad publicity of how the United States was treating its own returned POWs, to show that the United States did not excuse American POWs who were guilty of treasonable acts or cowardice, to praise those POWs who did not succumb to enemy pressure, to protect and give medical treatment to POWs who succumbed to pressure under duress, to expose atrocities, mistreatment, and violations of rules of war that the Chinese and North Koreans carried out against POWs.¹⁸ The plan also created a new interdepartmental working group and the old OCB group disbanded. Under this plan, there was a specific plan entitled “Basic Plan for U.S. Action to Discredit the Soviet Bacteriological Warfare Campaign.” The objective of this plan was to use all the evidence that the United States government had to prove that the Chinese and North Koreans’ fabricated the story of the use of germ warfare and a “demonstration of the insidious nature of Communist propaganda and the brutal and

¹⁷ National Operations Plan to Exploit Communist Bacteriological Warfare Hoax, Mistreatment of Prisoners of War, and Other Atrocities Petrated (misspelled in title) by Communist Forces During the Korean War, Approved Paper, October 14, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (4), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

¹⁸ National Operations Plan to Exploit Communist Bacteriological Warfare Hoax, Mistreatment of Prisoners of War, and Other Atrocities Petrated (misspelled in title) by Communist Forces During the Korean War, Tab A, Approved Paper, October 14, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (4), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

destructive character of Communist methods.”¹⁹ One of the goals outlined in this plan was to not punish POWs that the Chinese and North Koreans exploited in the germ warfare campaign to avoid the enemy using their persecution as propaganda. The plan noted that if there is a need for disciplinary action, it should be the minimum required by law.²⁰ This goal was one that the government officials in various departments had to tread carefully on and there was much disagreement about it.

After the war ended, the POWs returned home and began to recant their confessions. Many of the POWs that confessed, returned with stories of mental and physical torture that caused them to give in and say that the United States participated in germ warfare. The main confessions that the Chinese and North Koreans used and the American government officials discussed were those of Colonel Charles Schwable, Major Roy Bley, Lieutenant John Quinn, Lieutenant Floyd O’Neal, Lieutenant Paul Kniss, and Lieutenant Kenneth Enoch. Each of the men gave statements to the military concerning their experience and why they confessed to germ warfare. There were many

¹⁹ National Operations Plan to Exploit Communist Bacteriological Warfare Hoax, Mistreatment of Prisoners of War, and Other Atrocities Petrated (misspelled in title) by Communist Forces During the Korean War, Tab A, Approved Paper, October 14, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (4), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²⁰ National Operations Plan to Exploit Communist Bacteriological Warfare Hoax, Mistreatment of Prisoners of War, and Other Atrocities Petrated (misspelled in title) by Communist Forces During the Korean War, Tab A, Approved Paper, October 14, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (4), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

similarities between the confessions, primarily that the enemy tortured and threatened them until they provided a forced confession. Another similarity was a statement that preceded each account that acknowledged the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UMCJ), article thirty-one. The article stated that the person was aware that the military could use any statements they made at a court-martial, which was an option the military discussed. Thus, they knowingly provided statements that the military could potentially use to court-martial them.

Colonel Charles Schwable provided a statement dated September 25, 1953, in which he detailed his experience under Chinese and North Korean control. The enemy shot down the plane that Schwable and Bley were in on July 8, 1952. Schwable said that he was in solitary confinement for almost his entire stay at the POW camps, except for when his captors moved him from one camp to another. He explained that he knew after two months that the enemy was going to try to use him as propaganda by obtaining a confession concerning germ warfare from him. Schwable asserted that the “Chinese Communists were almost frantic to obtain this ‘confession’ and that they would stop at nothing to secure it; it was equally apparent that they had already established a general line of propaganda and a schedule of bogus operations to which my ‘confession’ must conform in order that it could be used to corroborate false testimony previously extracted from other POWs.”²¹ Schwable also maintained that since he was one of the highest-

²¹ Frank Schwable, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

ranked POWs they had in custody that flew planes, his confession was important because the enemy said that the information given was from a “high authority.”²² The Chinese and North Koreans made Schwable sign his name several times to have his signature, which caused him to believe that the enemy had already written a confession and used his signature on it. He stated that the Chinese and North Koreans used “all manner of means to break me down mentally, morally and physically, to confuse me, and to convince me that there was no alternative in the matter.”²³ Schwable explained that the pressure to provide these confessions did not start right after capture. Schwable discussed how his captors took him to a small “little stick and mud lean to” where he “squatted cross-legged on the floor of my 3 by 7-foot hovel for weeks and weeks.”²⁴ He called this time the “preparatory period” in which he had to live in filth and was alone except for a guard. He explained the guard would wake him every hour during the night, and that the guard forced him to sit in a manner that caused his back hurt, which he considered to be physical torture. He specified the next phase was the “exhaustion phase” in which the

²² Frank Schwable, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²³ Frank Schwable, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²⁴ Frank Schwable, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

interrogators forced him to write all day, every day, for three weeks while “under the pressure of two interrogators working simultaneously.”²⁵ He stated that he “deteriorated physically and became dull of mind.”²⁶ During the next phase, the Chinese and North Koreans forced him to read political propaganda. He said there were threats of violence and the guards told him they would be lenient toward him if he cooperated. Another threat used was that winter was approaching, but the enemy had him in a small hovel with little protection from the cold. Schwable had already experienced frostbite on his right hand, so the threat of further frostbite was real to him. The only way to move to what his captors called a main camp was to give them the information that they wanted. The Chinese and North Koreans also told him that he was a war criminal because he participated in germ warfare, thus not protected by the Geneva Convention, and that they did not have to repatriate him when the time came. Schwable explained that the enemy gave him provisions stipulated by the Geneva Convention, such as housing, food, and clothing, though they were not adequate. Schwable admitted to verbally succumbing to the Chinese and North Koreans in November 1952, and then in February 1953, he rewrote his statements, made recordings, and was photographed for propaganda pictures

²⁵ Frank Schwable, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²⁶ Frank Schwable, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

and a movie, even though he did not want to. Schwable explained that his statement underwent several rewrites because the Chinese and North Koreans were not satisfied with the information he provided. Thus, he wrote until he had all the information in the statement that they wanted. He explained that he felt no choice in the matter and was fearful of being a POW for life if he did not cooperate. Schwable insisted that he did not participate or have any knowledge of the United States participating in germ warfare and only confessed because of the treatment he received from the enemy.²⁷

Major Roy Bley, who served as an ordinance officer, was in the plane with Schwable when the enemy shot it down. He was another higher-ranking POW pilot, who as an ordinance officer would know about the United States' participation in germ warfare, whom the Chinese and North Koreans wanted a confession. Unlike Schwable, Bley sustained injuries from the crash and had to go to a Chinese hospital in North Korea due to his wounds. Bley was better by September 1952, but his captors told him that they would interrogate him before he could go to the main camp. Bley explained that next came the "softening up" time when a Chinese officer tried to have a relationship with him.²⁸ The Chinese and North Koreans housed him in a "small cell in a Korean mud

²⁷ Frank Schwable, Statement, September 25, 1953, in "Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated," press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

²⁸ Roy H. Bley, Statement, September 25, 1953, in "Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated," press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

hovel” during this time.²⁹ Bley stated that the enemy allowed him to walk with a Chinese officer, which he believed was to “impress me with their so-called ‘lenient treatment policy’ toward POWs.”³⁰ After this period, Bley asserted that the Chinese officer told him all the nice things he would have at the main camp, like other POW friends, including books and letters from home. In order for the Chinese and North Koreans to transfer him, Bley had to answer just one question, which was the role he played in germ warfare. When Bley denied the use of germ warfare, the Chinese officer told him that they had “concrete proof that Biological Warfare was employed by the U.S. Forces—many pilots had already confessed and he, the interrogator, had seen one of the First Marine Air Wing’s aircraft spraying insects over an inhabited area in North Korea—insects infested with deadly diseases such as Plague, Malaria and Yellow Fever, etc.”³¹ Bley said that since he refused to confess, the Chinese officer made him sit at attention with his legs crossed until that officer returned. A guard would be present to make sure that Bley complied with the order. After a couple of days and another refusal by Bley,

²⁹ Roy H. Bley, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³⁰ Roy H. Bley, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³¹ Roy H. Bley, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

guards took him to a cave that he described as “filthy.”³² Here he again sat at attention but could sleep at night, though he had to lay in the mud. When Bley still did not confess after his time in the cave, he went back to the cell he had previously been in and then had to stand at attention for six to seven hours a day. When Bley continued to not confess, the guards placed him in a cell “four feet wide, six feet in length and with a ceiling about four feet high.”³³ Here guards forced him to hunch down and had a gun with a bayonet up against his back. When this treatment still did not work, he went to an interrogation center, placed him in a rat-infested cell, and had his food rations cut. The guards gave him only “one cup of rice, one cup of cabbage or turnips, and one cup of water twice daily.”³⁴ Next was a “thinking period” in which the Chinese and North Koreans left him in solitary confinement with one guard for five weeks. After this period a new interrogator came to him, hit him with a closed fist, tied him up with his hands behind his back, and told him to kneel on the floor. Bley explained for about ten days, the interrogator and guards repeatedly hit him in the face, yet Bley asserted that he did not

³² Roy H. Bley, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³³ Roy H. Bley, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³⁴ Roy H. Bley, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

confess. In January 1953, the enemy once again moved Bley to a mud hut that did not have heat and he only had a “light POW uniform.” The guards required him to stand at attention during the day but he had to move around at night to keep from freezing in the below-zero temperature, which caused him to go without sleep for days. Bley said that this period wore him down physically and mentally.³⁵ Then one night the guards took him to an office and told him that he had forty-eight hours to confess or the Chinese and North Koreans would classify him as a war criminal and send him to China for a trial because they had proof that he participated in germ warfare. He said after the ultimatum, he returned to his cell for the next forty-eight hours and the guards did not permit him to eat or sleep. This finally broke Bley and he decided to confess. Bley stated that each time during this entire period of interrogations, the Chinese kept asking if he would like to “clear his conscious.”³⁶ Like Schwable, the interrogators required him to rewrite his confession several times. The Chinese and North Koreans also forced him to record it for radio and a movie. Even though Bley did exactly what they wanted, the enemy continued to keep him in solitary confinement. He explained that until March 1953 he had only one bath. Bley ended up having a “painful nervous condition originating at the base of my

³⁵ Roy H. Bley, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³⁶ Roy H. Bley, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

spine and extending down to my feet.”³⁷ The guards took him to the hospital but did not give him any treatment to cure it. In September 1953, the Chinese and North Koreans pardoned him from being a war criminal and they repatriated him back to the United States.³⁸

First Lieutenant John S. Quinn, First Lieutenant Floyd B. O’Neal, and First Lieutenant Paul R. Kniss were Air Force pilots that officials interviewed after returning to the United States. The Chinese and North Koreans used their confessions for a report on germ warfare that the Soviets presented to the United Nations on October 1, 1952. The enemy also used them for propaganda, broadcasts, and a film.³⁹ When they returned, they wrote official statements and appeared in a film to refute their confessions. In the film, they spoke about their experience with the Chinese and North Koreans and germ warfare

³⁷ Roy H. Bley, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³⁸ Roy H. Bley, Statement, September 25, 1953, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

³⁹ Three Air Force Officers Who Confessed, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

confessions. The report stated that these men's confessions had "especially heavy propaganda exploitation to the 'confessions' of these officers."⁴⁰

Lieutenant John Quinn explained that after his capture the Chinese and North Koreans had three interrogators who had the task to get him to confess to germ warfare. Quinn began his sworn statement by asserting "that I was coerced by diabolical mental torture, which it would take a poet like Poe to justly describe, into writing Communist propaganda."⁴¹ Quinn stated that the interrogators broke him down mentally until he agreed to write a confession.⁴² He said that the interrogators threatened his pregnant wife and children and that he suffered from malnutrition and lack of sleep when he confessed.⁴³ Quinn asserted that the interrogators dictated much of his confession to

⁴⁰ Three Air Force Officers Who Confessed, in "Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated," press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴¹ John Quinn, Texts of Sworn Statements by 10 U.S. Fliers Concerning Germ Warfare Confession, Press Release No. 1786: part two, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴² John Quinn, interview, in "Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated," press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴³ John Quinn, Texts of Sworn Statements by 10 U.S. Fliers Concerning Germ Warfare Confession, Press Release No. 1786: part two, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

him and that for the part he wrote himself, he put in false information. His example was that he put that he dropped bombs from a B-29 going 110 mph, though it is not possible for that plane to go that fast while loaded.⁴⁴ Quinn maintained that he felt that the Chinese and North Koreans did not treat him humanely and that they did not follow the Geneva Convention.⁴⁵ The guards put Quinn in a freezing, cold cave in the winter, along with another POW. They were in the cave for approximately two weeks without adequate cold-weather clothes. He stated that the cave ceiling was too low for them to be able to stand up. Quinn said that he and the other prisoner used straw that was on the floor to put in their boots to try to prevent frostbite on their feet. He also said that the enemy only gave them rice and seaweed in “old rusty tin cans” and dirty water to drink, which neither POW drank for fear of the water making them sicker. After this, his captors separated him from all other POWs for the next eight months. His only contact was with an interrogator that asked him questions. The only news he had was from Communist newspapers that were several months old. Quinn explained that he never participated in

⁴⁴ John Quinn, Texts of Sworn Statements by 10 U.S. Fliers Concerning Germ Warfare Confession, Press Release No. 1786: part two, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴⁵ John Quinn, interview, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

or knew about germ warfare even though there was a confession.⁴⁶ At the end of his sworn statement, Quinn wrote of his experience, “The result is living dead men, controlled human robots, which willingly, as long as they are under the spell, do their master’s bidding.”⁴⁷

Similar to the other POWs, Lieutenant Floyd O’Neal explained in an interview that he only confessed to germ warfare under duress and that his confession was entirely false. O’Neal also said that the Chinese and North Koreans told him what to put in his confession. O’Neal asserted he endured physical and mental torture at the hands of the enemy. He said this included physical violence, confinement to a small area, denial of bathing or sanitation, inadequate food and water, and refusal of medical treatment.⁴⁸

O’Neal explained that the Chinese and North Koreans forced him to discuss germ warfare in front of the “International Science Commission,” though he only did it under

⁴⁶ John Quinn, Texts of Sworn Statements by 10 U.S. Fliers Concerning Germ Warfare Confession, Press Release No. 1786: part two, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴⁷ John Quinn, Texts of Sworn Statements by 10 U.S. Fliers Concerning Germ Warfare Confession, Press Release No. 1786: part two, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁴⁸ Floyd O’Neal, interview, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

duress. He maintained that in his written confession and his account to this commission, he put in “many ridiculous and false facts.”⁴⁹ O’Neal maintained that he also does not think that his treatment by the enemy complied with the Geneva Convention. He said, “I was generally treated in a manner which I wouldn’t even treat a dog.”⁵⁰ O’Neal vehemently denied participating in germ warfare or knowing anything about germ warfare.⁵¹

Lieutenant Paul Kniss began his sworn statement by explaining, “As a result of threats, torture, starvation, brutality, and barbaric treatment given me by my Communist captors, I was coerced into taking part in the Hate America campaign.”⁵² Kniss explained

⁴⁹ Floyd O’Neal, Texts of Sworn Statements by 10 U.S. Fliers Concerning Germ Warfare Confession, Press Release No. 1786: part two, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵⁰ Floyd O’Neal, interview, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵¹ Floyd O’Neal, interview, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵² Paul Kniss, Texts of Sworn Statements by 10 U.S. Fliers Concerning Germ Warfare Confession, Press Release No. 1786: part two, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

that he only confessed and made recordings and broadcasts after suffering mental and physical torture. He said that the Chinese and North Koreans specifically told him what to write in his confession or what to say in the recording and threatened death if he did not follow what the interrogators told him to say.⁵³ Kniss maintained that for the part that the interrogators did not dictate he made up inaccurate missions and dates to put in there. Kniss asserted that interrogators once questioned him for twenty hours straight sitting at attention on the floor with nothing to support his back.⁵⁴ He also believed that the enemy caused him to get sick on one occasion. Kniss explained that the guards always gave them boiled water, but one day they gave him cold water and after he drank it, he then became sick. The guards denied him medical attention until he became extremely sick. He said that when the Chinese and North Koreans allowed a doctor to examine him, the doctor treated him without talking to him and he assumed the doctor already knew exactly what was wrong with him.⁵⁵ Kniss specified that the Chinese and North Koreans

⁵³ Paul Kniss, interview, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵⁴ Paul Kniss, Texts of Sworn Statements by 10 U.S. Fliers Concerning Germ Warfare Confession, Press Release No. 1786: part two, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵⁵ Paul Kniss, interview, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

did not follow the Geneva Convention and said he believed that they “seemed to go out of their way to ignore it.”⁵⁶ Kniss also denied participating in or having knowledge of germ warfare used by the United States military.⁵⁷

Lieutenant Kenneth Enoch, who did not appear in the American film refuting germ warfare, stated in his sworn statement that he only confessed to germ warfare under “extreme duress.”⁵⁸ He maintained that he understood the threats that the enemy made when he wrote his confession and when the Chinese and North Koreans made him record broadcasts, to mean that they would kill him if he did not comply. Enoch confessed to writing a statement, being part of a radio broadcast and movie, as well as writing an article for the Vienna People’s Conference and the camp newspaper. Like the other men who confessed to germ warfare, Enoch said that the Chinese and North Koreans did not follow the Geneva Convention. He went as far as to say that the enemy had an “utter

⁵⁶ Paul Kniss, interview, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵⁷ Paul Kniss, interview, in “Germ Warfare Confessions Repudiated,” press release document, October 6, 1953, Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 29, folder PSB 729.2 (2) Biological Warfare Propaganda, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁵⁸ Kenneth Enoch, Texts of Sworn Statements by 10 U.S. Fliers Concerning Germ Warfare Confession, Press Release No. 1786: part two, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

disregard for human values and human rights.”⁵⁹ Enoch stated that his captors kept him in solitary confinement for thirteen months and housed him at two different camps. He also explained that one of the camps did not have a POW camp label, which opened it up for the United Nations forces to bomb it. Also, as other POWs reported, Enoch said the food did not constitute a proper diet. Enoch explained that he frequently became sick due to the food which contributed to his overall weakness. He denied participating in germ warfare or knowing about it.⁶⁰

After the POWs returned home and made sworn statements that refuted that the United States participated in germ warfare, the POW Working Group explored other avenues to exploit the actions of the Chinese and North Koreans. In November 1953, the POW Working Committee discussed the possibility of having Air Force pilots, who confessed to the Chinese and North Koreans concerning the United States participating in germ warfare, bring a libel suit against the Communist publications, such as the *Daily*

⁵⁹ Kenneth Enoch, Texts of Sworn Statements by 10 U.S. Fliers Concerning Germ Warfare Confession, Press Release No. 1786: part two, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁶⁰ Kenneth Enoch, Texts of Sworn Statements by 10 U.S. Fliers Concerning Germ Warfare Confession, Press Release No. 1786: part two, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

Worker, Humanite, and Unita.⁶¹ The idea was that the enemy forced pilots to confess to germ warfare. The Chinese and North Koreans knew there was no validity to the claims, yet the Communist newspapers, like the *Daily Worker* in the United States, printed the names of these pilots. Because the newspaper printed the name of these men, the public viewed them as “war criminals in the minds of millions of people throughout the world” and endured “hatred, contempt, and ridicule of the people of the United States.”⁶² The goal of the libel suit was twofold. First, if successful, the pilots receive punitive damages for the suffering they endured. Second, this lawsuit would bring attention to the issue and be another method of exploiting the mistreatment of the POWs and work as anti-Communist propaganda. Though by December 1953, the POW Working Group decided to drop this idea because of “insufficient grounds for such action.”⁶³ This is an interesting idea considering that the United States, itself, had put the names of the men out in the

⁶¹ Charles Norberg, memorandum, November 2, 1953, “Agenda Items for Meeting of POW Working Group, Tuesday, November 3, 1953,” White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-61: OCB Central Files Series, box 117, folder OCB 383.6 Prisoners of War- Korea War-File #1 (1) (October 1953-January 1954), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁶² Charles Norberg, memorandum, October 27, 1953, “Libel Actions to Secure Punitive Damages for U.S. Airmen,” White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (4), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁶³ Charles Norberg, memorandum, October 27, 1953, “Libel Actions to Secure Punitive Damages for U.S. Airmen,” White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-61: OCB Central Files Series, box 117, folder OCB 383.6 Prisoners of War- Korea War-File #1 (4) (October 1953-January 1954), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

newspapers and conducted investigations as if they would face charges for their confessions. If the government was so concerned with their well-being and reputation, then government officials should have kept their names out of the newspapers because it was not just Communist newspapers that printed the names and stories of the men.

Dr. Charles Mayo, a surgeon, and a member of the United States delegation at the Eighth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations presented the experiences of American POWs during the Korean War to the UN. The POW Working Group participated in reviewing the speech that Mayo gave. Mayo's October 26, 1953, UN speech focused more on the issues of atrocities than germ warfare, though germ warfare was still an important part since the Chinese and North Koreans tortured so many of those that confessed. He said that germ warfare "received the full fury of the propaganda machine, from Moscow Radio down to the lowliest Communist front organization in the free world."⁶⁴ Mayo presented the history of the germ warfare charges from the Soviet Union against the United States⁶⁵ He said that the UN General Assembly had heard in the past about the six most used confessions by the Chinese and North Koreans, those of

⁶⁴ Charles W. Mayo, Press Release No. 1786: part one, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁶⁵ Charles W. Mayo, Press Release No. 1786: part one, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

Schwable, Bley, Quinn, O'Neal, Kniss, and Enoch, and noted each had provided a sworn statement refuting germ warfare. He specified that the Chinese and North Koreans accused 107 captured pilots of germ warfare. Forty of them refused to sign confessions, but fifty-six of those that did sign did so under varying degrees of duress. The remaining thirty-one POWs have not returned to the United States, but fourteen of those are known to be dead and seventeen are missing.⁶⁶ While Mayo discussed Schwable and Bley, he decided to use the experience of six different POWs and their experience with the enemy and germ warfare to demonstrate how this was a larger problem than just those six men. These men were Colonel Walker Mahurin, First Lieutenant James Stanley, First Lieutenant Francis Strieby, First Lieutenant Robert Lurie, First Lieutenant Joseph Moreland, and Second Lieutenant Edward Izbicky. Of these six men only one, Colonel Walker Mahurin, confessed. The Chinese and North Koreans physically assaulted, starved, threatened, and committed other horrid atrocities against all the men though. This was an interesting idea to include the statements of men who withstood the actions of the enemy to obtain a confession. Even though these five men did not confess, they experienced similar torture to those that did. Because each person and experience is different, one cannot say if they were stronger or if they had less pressure and physical or mental torture done to them. Mayo submitted the sworn statements of these six men as

⁶⁶ Charles W. Mayo, Press Release No. 1786: part one, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

well as others to the general assembly. He also went into more detail about how the Chinese and North Koreans extracted confessions and the methods that they used. Mayo summed up the plans and methods of the enemy and asserted, “this whole campaign of falsehood was a key phase of a still larger political and propaganda campaign mounted by the Communists as an integral part of their aggression in Korea.”⁶⁷

Also in November 1953, the POW Working Group meeting discussed an announcement by Radio Peking that the Chinese and North Koreans began a new germ warfare campaign with the release of depositions from nineteen US Air Force pilots who confessed to germ warfare. At that time, the United States had only released six rebuttals to the germ warfare confessions and they needed to release affidavits for these nineteen men to refute the confessions that they made while in POW camps.⁶⁸ At the meeting, the issue of the publicity of the POWs that confessed to germ warfare was brought up. Because the DOD was looking into court martialing charges, the POW Working Group felt that this was undermining the efforts at the UN. The department of state requested that the DOD give it a report on the “timing, policies and publicity concerning

⁶⁷ Charles W. Mayo, Press Release No. 1786: part one, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, October 26, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1953-61- Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) Central Files Series, box 26, folder PSB 383.6 Prisoners of War File 2 (5), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁶⁸ Charles Norberg, Meeting of the POW Working Group November 13, 1953, November 16, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-61: OCB Central Files Series, box 116, folder OCB 383.6 Prisoners of War- Korea War- File #1 (2) (October 1953-January 1954), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

disciplinary action on the flyers.”⁶⁹ The representative of the CIA also noted that the Chinese and North Koreans made use of this fact to use as propaganda.⁷⁰ The CIA representative stated that the Chinese and North Koreans were “making extensive use out of the theme that apparently court-martials proceedings had made our POWs deny their former confessions and we should not be giving the communists propaganda ammunition.”⁷¹ At the next meeting, Major Kelleher of the DOD specified that there was an Armed Forces Policy Council paper that explained how each confessor was to be treated, but that this policy had not always been followed. The POW Working Group decided that the DOD would look into this and decide on a policy for handling the confessors.⁷² In the end, the Army prosecuted POWs for confessions, but the Marine Corps and Air Force did not court-martial any of the men who confessed to germ warfare. After December 8, 1953, there were no more regular meetings of the POW Working

⁶⁹ Charles Norberg, Meeting of the POW Working Group November 13, 1953, November 16, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-61: OCB Central Files Series, box 116, folder OCB 383.6 Prisoners of War- Korea War- File #1 (2) (October 1953-January 1954), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁷⁰ In all the POW Working Group reports, the CIA representative’s name is redacted.

⁷¹ Charles Norberg, Meeting of the POW Working Group November 13, 1953, November 16, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-61: OCB Central Files Series, box 116, folder OCB 383.6 Prisoners of War- Korea War- File #1 (2) (October 1953-January 1954), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁷² Charles Norberg, Meeting of the POW Working Group November 17, 1953, November 18, 1953, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-61: OCB Central Files Series, box 117, folder OCB 383.6 Prisoners of War- Korea War- File #1 (4) (October 1953-January 1954), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

Group, though the committee held meetings on occasion to discuss matters that popped up.

The issue of what disciplinary actions to pursue against those POWs who collaborated or confessed was a difficult one. The discussion of the POW Working Group showed that many in the government thought it was a bad idea because of the propaganda opportunity it created for the Chinese and North Koreans. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps each independently looked at what they wanted to do and there was no cohesion across the military or government on how to handle the situation. Author Raymond Lech noted that “The three services should have adopted a uniform policy on actions to be taken against returning POWs but they did not.”⁷³ The Army decided to pursue court martials under the United Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and both the Marine Corps and Air Force decided to move forward and open a formal inquiry into the fate of those that confessed.

On January 23, 1954, American newspapers reported that the Marine Corps had opened a formal inquiry on Colonel Frank Schwable for his confession of participating in germ warfare to the enemy. Schwable was the highest-ranking Marine captured during the war. Interestingly, the AP article noted that the news of the inquiry into Schwable came shortly after the news that the Army arrested Corporal Edward Dickenson, one of the prisoners who initially refused repatriation and then decided to come back. The article stated that it was a “major snafu” because the DOD considered the arrest of Dickenson

⁷³ Raymond B. Lech, *Broken Soldiers* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 222.

“unwise from a psychological warfare viewpoint.”⁷⁴ Because the news of Dickenson’s arrest was already out, however, the DOD decided to go ahead and announce that the Marine Corps formed a court of inquiry to investigate possible disciplinary actions against Schwable. The POW Working Group was concerned about how the public and enemy would react to the information of court martials and the effect it would have on their efforts to refute germ warfare. The POW Working Group made a proposal that recommended a press release to explain that the Marine Corps did not investigate Schwable for germ warfare but for military misconduct in an attempt to distance this proceeding from germ warfare.⁷⁵ When the Army made its move, the DOD decided there was no use in keeping the Marine Corps information out of the public eye. General Lemuel Shepherd, the commandant of the Marine Corps, asserted that the board of inquiry was “given special instructions to give full consideration to the unique psychological and mental factors incident to the Communist device of physical torture accompanied by mental cruelty and psychological assault against those who were unfortunate enough to become their prisoners.”⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Associated Press, “Court Martial of Dickenson Called Unwise,” *Boston Globe*, January 24, 1954.

⁷⁵ Charles Norberg, “POWs,” memorandum, January 27, 1954, White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-61: OCB Central Files Series, box 118, folder OCB 383.6 Prisoners of War- Korea War-File #1 (7) (January-June 1954), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

⁷⁶ Associated Press, “Court Martial of Dickenson Called Unwise,” *Boston Globe*, January 24, 1954.

On February 16, 1954, the board met to determine the fate of Schwable. The board consisted of three Marine generals and one Navy admiral.⁷⁷ Schwable was the first Marine to have an inquiry done concerning actions while in a POW camp.⁷⁸ During this inquiry, three POWs testified for Schwable and stated that he was not “in his right mind.”⁷⁹ The men maintained that on different occasions Schwable was commenting on things being there that were not, throwing his arms around like he was fighting, and had a worn-down physical appearance. Schwable also testified during this inquiry. He explained he was “morally broken” by the tactics used by the enemy and that a person put in his position would be “like an animal in the zoo” and “so tormented by fears and doubts that he feels as if ‘the devil is whispering’ in his ear.”⁸⁰ Major General William Dean, who was the highest-ranking military officer captured during the Korean War, also testified in front of the board of inquiry. Dean asserted, “he would take poison rather than be captured again.”⁸¹ Dean also admitted he wrote documents for the Chinese and North Koreans himself, though they never appeared to use the documents. On March 20, 1954,

⁷⁷ Peter Kumpa, “Board Hears Evidence on Statement,” *Baltimore Sun*, February 17, 1954.

⁷⁸ Elie Abel, “Court Opens Case of P.O.W. Colonel,” *New York Times*, February 17, 1954.

⁷⁹ Elie Abel, “3 Testify Germ War ‘Confessor’ Seemed Not To Be Not In Right Mind,” *New York Times*, February 20, 1954.

⁸⁰ Associated Press, “Ex-P.O.W. Explains Red Brain Washing,” *New York Times*, February 26, 1954.

⁸¹ “Dean Bulwarks Schwable’s Case,” *New York Times*, March 9, 1954.

the inquiry board gave its recommendation on what should happen to Schwable. General Shepherd then made the final decision on what should happen. On April 27, 1954, the ruling released stated that there would be no disciplinary actions taken against Schwable for his confession to germ warfare he gave the Chinese and North Koreans, though General Shepherd explained that Schwable had done damage for this country, willingly or unwillingly. Secretary of the Navy Robert Anderson asserted that Schwable's "usefulness to the Marine Corps had been 'seriously impaired' by this conduct as a prisoner of the Communists."⁸²

The Air Force opened up a board of review to determine if they should charge any of their men. General Kenney asserted that those who confessed: "deserve the full understanding of both Government and public and the opportunity to resume normal military or civilian careers."⁸³ The Air Force board consisted of five generals and began to meet on February 8, 1954. The board looked into eighty-three men who made confessions to the Chinese and North Koreans, many regarding germ warfare. On May 4, 1954, the Air Force announced that there would be no court martials for any of their personnel. Of the eight-three, the board completely cleared sixty-nine and the remaining fourteen had to show why the Air Force should allow them to remain on active duty. The

⁸² "Schwable Freed, But Is Criticized," *New York Times*, April 28, 1954.

⁸³ Charles Norberg, memorandum, November 2, 1953, "Agenda Items for Meeting of POW Working Group, Tuesday, November 3, 1953," White House Office: National Security Council Staff Papers, 1948-61: OCB Central Files Series, box 117, folder OCB 383.6 Prisoners of War- Korea War-File #1 (1) (October 1953-January 1954), Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.

Air Force specified that twelve of these fourteen men were officers. The board stated there was “inadequate and confusing” information given to airmen on what to do if the enemy captured them during the war.⁸⁴ They further maintained that there was a “lack of direction and even appreciation of the problem throughout all the levels of command even after these confessions were public knowledge.”⁸⁵

The issue of germ warfare was a hot-button topic during and after the Korean War. The Chinese and North Koreans made numerous allegations against the United States but the enemy never delivered any proof and thwarted attempts to investigate. The Chinese and North Koreans did have confessions from several Air Force and Marine Corps pilots that they used to prove germ warfare. Though after repatriation, these men all recanted their confessions and stated that they only confessed under duress. Though not every pilot succumbed to the enemy and confessed to germ warfare. The United States government worked diligently to counteract these charges and did so. The military looked into court martialing actions for confessions of germ warfare, though the Air Force nor Marine Corps brought any charges against any of the men that confessed to germ warfare. The issue of germ warfare provides an example of many of the issues that POWs and the American government faced during and after the war. These include confessions, brainwashing, atrocities, and punishment for actions while in a POW camp.

⁸⁴ Associated Press, “69 Others Are Cleared After Probe; Corporal Gets 10 Years in Prison,” *Baltimore Sun*, May 5, 1954.

⁸⁵ Associated Press, “69 Others Are Cleared After Probe; Corporal Gets 10 Years in Prison,” *Baltimore Sun*, May 5, 1954.

These were problems that the military and government had to confront, though there was not one guiding principle or policy that they each followed. The court-martials and how each branch handled them differently created discontent. Historian Matthew Dunne stated, “The discrepancies between the sentences handed out by the different branches of the military were the most visible source of controversy.”⁸⁶ This was another example of the military and government not working together and the confusion that POW confessions and collaboration caused them both.

⁸⁶ Matthew Dunne, *Cold War State of Mind* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013), 96.

Conclusion

The POWs that returned to America after the Korean War endured many hardships because there was a question as to if they were loyal citizens or if the Chinese and North Koreans brainwashed or convinced them that Communism was a better form of government. They endured many atrocities when they were prisoners of war (POWs), only to return home and have the military, government, and even family and friends question their loyalty to the country. This was because America was deeply ensconced in McCarthyism and the Cold War fears and anxieties. So, insinuations that an American was now a Communist was detrimental to that person. This was an issue that prior war POWs did not have to face, nor one that others faced after the Korean War. In Richard Bassett's memoir of his time as a Korean War POW he and co-author Lewis Carlson stated, "These investigations sought to uncover alleged prisoner misbehavior and collaboration; but, in reality, they reflected the continuing tensions and paranoia of the Cold War."¹ The Korean War was truly the "Forgotten War." One in which America did not triumphantly prevail as the winner, with the fighting stopping with the armistice agreement, a war that technically is still ongoing. Thus, the stories of Korean War POWs have not received as much scholarly attention as those who fought in World War II or the Vietnam War, with the majority of the books devoting just a chapter to what happened after the POWs returned home. These POWs suffered health issues, post-traumatic stress disorder, and other physical and mental problems due to the poor treatment the Chinese

¹ Richard Bassett and Lewis Carlson, *And the Wind Blew Cold* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2002), 93.

and North Koreans gave them while at the camps. Then to add insult to injury, the military questioned everyone, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) followed others, and the Army court-martialed a few POWs for their actions while a prisoner. Then they encountered further insult because of the lack of trust from society and their families.

This thesis utilizes a bottom-up methodology to tell the story of the returning Korean War POWs. While other scholars have covered the topic of American POWs in the Korean War, the attention to what happened to the men when they returned home has received less attention. Many books on Korean War POWs only include a chapter on the experience and hardships that they encountered at home. This thesis supports the historiography of this topic and adds to it by bringing a more enhanced study of what happened to the POWs. Certain topics such as the twenty-three men, known as turncoats, who refused repatriation have received much more attention. Scholars have also written about other aspects of this story, such as the effect that insinuations of brainwashing had on American pop culture. Due to this, this thesis does not deal with these issues in depth. The complete story of what happened to the POWs is extensive and beyond the scope of this paper, but continued research and writing are needed to tell the whole story.

There are various other avenues to explore to capture the complete story of the American Korean War POWs. One such avenue is to examine the transcripts of the military's interrogations on returning POWs while aboard ships home. The trip home took around two weeks, and after the snafu with the Valley Forge POWs, officials decided to put the majority of the returning POWs on a ship home, to have the time to interrogate them to determine if the enemy brainwashed them or if they now believed in

Communism. The National Archives in College Park, Maryland houses these interrogation records which would be valuable to gain insight into not only the questions that the interrogators asked but also the answers that the POWs gave.

A further avenue is to look at any FBI records that exist on the POWs that the FBI followed for years after the war to determine if they were Communists. This shows the great fear that some in the government had for the possibility that some POWs were now Communists. These records can also be cross-referenced with interrogation records that flagged a POW as potentially being a Communist. These records may also provide a more complete story of the men who the Army court-martialed and the story of Paul Schnur Jr., in which records stated that the FBI took him from the plane at Travis Air Force Base because they wanted him as an informant. A freedom of information act request through the National Archives can produce FBI files.

Another avenue to pursue is the court martial records for the POWs that the Army charged under UCMJ. The Eisenhower Presidential Library only houses a few records of the men that the Army court-martialed during this time and it is not a complete copy of the records. Additionally, any Army records on investigations that they did on POWs to determine if a person should have charges filed against them would provide useful information. Many POWs committed similar crimes while in the POWs camps, such as collaboration, but the Army only singled out a few and court-martialed them. A deeper analysis as to why this was the case would help tell a more complete version of this story. Court martial records from 1939 to 1976 are at the National Archives in St. Louis, Missouri, and available through a freedom of information act request.

Possible future research on Korean War POWs could include a comparison of the American Korean War POWs to POWs of different wars. This includes the treatment of POWs from other American wars that took place before and after the Korean War. Another possibility is to compare the treatment of the American Korean War POWs to that of Korean War POWs from other countries. The action against North Korea was a United Nations effort, so while most of the soldiers were from the United States, soldiers, and medical support from twenty-two countries supported the war under the United Nations. This comparison would also shed light on how much influence McCarthyism had on the treatment of returning POWs. A final comparison could be between the American Korean War POWs and other POWs throughout the world in different wars.

Newspapers and magazines played an important role in the experience of what happened to the returning POWs. Before Operation Little Switch and Operation Big Switch, newspapers began to report on returning POWs and stated that there was the possibility that the Chinese and North Koreans brainwashed them while at the camps. Newspapers printed warnings to Americans on how the POWs might behave when they returned and how families should treat them. The newspapers and magazines also offer an insight into what the government wanted ordinary Americans to know about the returning POWs.

The government's fears of brainwashed POWs were also something many officials believed and an example of that is the government and military handling of the Valley Forge POWs during Operation Little Switch. The military segregated the POWs due to suspicions that they succumbed to Communism. Publicly there was a disagreement

on who told the press about Valley Forge POWs and their ties to Communism and officials denied that the men went to Valley Forge General Hospital due to possible Communists' beliefs. Biographies of the Valley Forge POWs demonstrate that they came from a variety of backgrounds, have different experiences, and showed what actions they took while in the camps. The men were bitter and angry over the public accusation that they were Communists. During this time, this could mean that they could not obtain employment or have other Americans ostracize them because no one wanted to be associated with anyone with ties to Communism. An ad hoc committee evaluated the POWs and rated their level of indoctrination. The committee even forwarded the names of some of the men to the FBI. In looking at the primary documentation, the government did have a reason to believe that some of these men did either succumb to indoctrination or conducted themselves in the camp in such a way as to point to the fact that they collaborated with the enemy. The government made several missteps in regard to the Valley Forge POWs. The biggest mistake was labeling them as indoctrinated to the press and attempting to fly them in secrecy and put them in one hospital for evaluation. This caused a blame game to ensue over who told the press the story and a retraction saying the government did not label the Valley Forge POWs, though they did. The military and government did learn lessons and changed their procedures during Operation Big Switch. The military did not label anyone as Communist and did not send any one group to the same hospital. Instead, the military took the men, who were not seriously injured or sick, by boat to interrogate them. Then they allowed the men to go home to their families and receive treatment at local hospitals.

The government and military also were concerned before the war ended about accusations that North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union alleged that the United Nations forces, especially the United States conducted germ warfare against the North Korean and Chinese troops as well as the North Korean citizens. These fears grew when the Chinese and North Koreans released recordings and confessions of American pilots who stated that they participated in germ warfare. All the pilots who confessed to germ warfare recanted their statements when they returned home. The military had to decide on what if any punishment each POW should have for their false confession. In the end, neither the Marine Corps nor the Air Force prosecuted any of the POWs. The United States government did use the stories the pilots told of forced confessions as a propaganda campaign after the Chinese and North Koreans. The issues surrounding germ warfare encompass many of the issues that surrounded the POWs. This included the decision of the military to determine what should happen to those who collaborated with the enemy, the poor treatment, food, and medical care given to the POWs, and the torture and other atrocities that the POWs endured.

The experience of the Korean War POWs was different from POWs of other wars due to the popularity of McCarthyism in America, how the military and government treated the returning men, and how newspapers and magazines reported on the POWs. The Korean War POWs experienced horrible treatment from the Chinese and North Koreans and then returned home to a not-so-welcoming and suspicious America. The Korean War took place during a time of uncertainty and suspicions about anything to do with Communism due to the Cold War. William Clark Latham Jr. states, "Those who

survived captivity were subsequently branded as traitors and potential spies, thanks to anticommunist fervor and the Pentagon's own ham-fisted efforts to prosecute alleged collaborators."² This was not a war, like World War II, in which the country came together. Nor did it receive the same public hatred as in the Vietnam War. The story of Korean War POWs is an important part of history and one that deserves to have a more prominent place in the historiography of the Korean War.

² Latham, *Cold Days in Hell*, 4.

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