Sucker Rumination: How Aversive Self-Directed Cognitions Affect Purchase Intentions

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AFFECT PURCHASE INTENTIONS

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ABSTRACT

If there is a silver lining to having been tricked in an economic context, perhaps it is that one can be wiser for the experience. Presumably, people are able to learn from such transactions and avoid them in the future. The current study employed an experimental design in which some participants were assigned to a control condition and others were told that they had recently been duped. Results indicated that among those who felt duped, people high in sucker rumination were subsequently less likely to avoid the source of deception. That is, people with a tendency to blame themselves harshly for being duped were the least likely to be wiser for the experience. For people high in sucker rumination, there is a great deal of psychic discomfort in getting duped, but no silver lining of being wiser.

INTRODUCTION

Most people have had at least one negative financial experience, such as a transaction in which they lost money. Some of these experiences are simply the result of honest mistakes or unfortunate timing. However, other detrimental financial transactions stem from a seller’s unscrupulous motives and actions. Central to the current investigation is how people think about financial transactions in which they have been scammed or duped. In particular, we used the Sucker Rummiation Scale (Preuss, Stillman, Mead, and Vohs, 2011, Preuss, Stillman, and Vohs 2014) to measure the extent to which people experience negative and aversive self-focused thoughts after being tricked in an economic transaction. We sought to understand how individual differences in sucker rumination would impact the degree to which one seeks to avoid getting duped in future transactions.

Sucker Rumination

Economic exchanges of all kinds require at least some element of trust (Arrow, 1972). According to an empirical analysis of being duped, "feeling duped involves a sense that one’s trust was violated" in an economic transaction (Vohs, Baumeister, and Chin; 2007, p. 130). The concept of sucker rumination does not speak to the degree to which
one feels violated, but the degree of self-blame which accompanies violated trust. Our expectation was that individual differences in self-blame and other negative self-focused thoughts would impact behavior in future economic transactions. Our four hypotheses about sucker rumination are specified further below.

The global concept of rumination is considered a personality characteristic, (Trapnell, and Campbell, 1999), whereas the term sucker rumination is relevant specifically and narrowly to financial contexts. Rumination in the global sense is characterized by a repetitive focus on one's negative emotions (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, and Grayson, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, and Larson, 1994) as well as a high degree of self-reflection (Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990). In contrast, sucker rumination is defined as the tendency to experience aversive self-focused cognitions after being duped in an economic transaction. The similarity between the two constructs is that they both entail an unwillingness or inability to let go of negative experiences, and the key difference is that sucker rumination is specific to being the victim of an unscrupulous financial transaction.

In what is known as the illusion of invulnerability, people are generally reluctant to acknowledge the possibility that they can be duped or tricked. However, one study found some benefits from learning that one can be tricked (Sagarin, Cialdini, Rice, and Serna, 2002). In particular, participants rated several advertisements and provided feedback as to how persuasive those advertisements were. They were then informed that they had been persuaded by deceptive advertisements. Subsequently, these participants showed greater skepticism of deceptive — but not legitimate — advertisements. Overall, participants who had been duped learned a valuable lesson and were subsequently skeptical when appropriate. One crucial assumption of the current research is that the process of learning from being duped is uneven and imperfect, such that some people learn more readily from being tricked than others. We predicted that the effect of being tricked on subsequent behavior would be moderated by (i.e., conditional upon) individual differences in sucker rumination.

**Sucker Rumination Scale**

A six-item scale has been developed to assess individual differences in sucker rumination. Sample items include "If I fall for a scam, I repeatedly tell myself that I should have known better" and "If I get suckered, it takes a long time for me to forgive myself for being so foolish." (See Appendix A for all items). Prior work has established that the scale has good psychometric properties, as assessed across a variety of methods including exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses (Preuss et al., 2011, 2014). In addition, prior work has found that people who are high in sucker rumination experienced a low degree of general and consumer well-being (Preuss et al., 2014). In particular, people high in sucker rumination made especially negative statements about themselves when describing a time they felt tricked in a financial interaction. They were also found to be less likely to experience positive emotions and more likely to experience negative emotions. People high in sucker rumination were also found to be drawn towards material purchases and away from experiential purchases, a tendency which is unfavorable to

Current Investigation

The concept of sucker rumination is relatively new, and relatively little is known about it. Prior research has established that people differ in the degree to which they experience aversive self-focused cognitions after being duped in an economic transaction (Preuss et al., 2011), and that people high in sucker rumination suffer poorer well-being (Preuss et al., 2014). Our review of the literature found nothing regarding the marketplace implications of sucker rumination. The current investigation sought to determine whether differences in sucker rumination led people to be especially careful in avoiding the potential of being duped in the future. We use the term avoidance intentions to describe the behavioral changes and adjustments one might make to avoid getting duped in the future.

Hypotheses 1a and 1b

We identified two plausible yet mutually incompatible hypotheses. The first hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a) was as follows. People high in sucker rumination, by definition, were expected to direct abusive and highly negative thoughts towards themselves after being duped. This preoccupation with their own blameworthiness was expected to undermine their ability to respond to future situations appropriately. For example, imagine a person high in sucker rumination who has been ripped off by her local auto repair shop. She may, according to Hypothesis 1a, blame herself so completely that she reserves little blame for the auto repair shop. Consequently, she may continue her patronage of the auto repair shop that ripped her off. That is, Hypothesis 1a predicts that apportioning a high degree of blame to the self reduces the blame apportioned to the source of deception, leaving people high in sucker rumination less likely to avoid the source of deception. Hypothesis 1a followed this reasoning, and stated that high sucker rumination reduces the likelihood of avoiding the source of deception. Hypothesis 1a is supported by research in which high levels of global rumination were found to undermine problem solving in interpersonal matters (Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). In other words, a high degree of self-blame in interpersonal matters was found to disrupt effective dealing with those matters.

Hypothesis 1b was the alternative to this, and stated that high sucker rumination increases, rather than decreases, the likelihood of avoiding the source of deception. Following the previous example, this would mean that the high sucker-rumination woman ripped off by her local auto repair shop would be more likely than her low sucker-rumination peers to avoid that shop in the future, as compared to her low sucker-rumination peers. The rationale for Hypothesis 1b follows is consistent with an analysis by Vohs, Baumeister, and Chin (2007), who speculated that rumination in the aftermath of being duped would likely be dominated by counterfactual thoughts in which one considered how to avoid getting duped. If this reasoning is correct, then it follows that people who are high in sucker rumination would be especially likely to think about how to avoid getting duped in the future.
Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 addressed the process by which sucker rumination would was expected to affect the avoidance of the deceptive entity. Vohs et al. (2007) speculated that negative affect was an important part of forming avoidance intentions. In particular, they suggested that negative affect drives the kind of counterfactual thinking that would lead one to avoiding being duped in the future. According to this view, experiencing negative emotions is crucial to the adaptive process that leads to one avoiding a source of deception (cf. Ciaracco, Vohs, and Baumeister, 2010). In terms of the repair shop example mentioned above, this would mean that the high-sucker rumination customer would avoid the dishonest repair shop at least in part due to the negative emotions the event provoked. Hypothesis 2 stated that people high in sucker rumination are more likely to experience negative affect, which in turn leads to greater avoidance intentions. We use the term indirect effect (also called mediational effect) to describe the expected role of negative affect.

Hypothesis 3

Under what circumstances would one expect sucker rumination to increase avoidance intentions? We predicted that individual differences in sucker rumination would be most pronounced when one had recently been duped. Our prediction is consistent with research demonstrating that consumers who have been fooled by false advertising tend to be skeptical of future advertising from other sources (Darke and Ritchie, 2007; Sagarin et al., 2002). We expected that the effect of individual differences in sucker rumination on avoidance intentions would vary based on whether one had recently been duped. Hence, Hypothesis 3 stated that individual differences in sucker rumination would lead to avoidance intentions primarily after one had experienced being duped. We use the term conditional effect (effect also called moderation) to describe the prediction that the impact of sucker rumination was conditional upon having recently been duped. It should be noted that Hypothesis 3 was consistent with both Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b; whatever the effect of sucker rumination on avoidance intentions, the effect should emerge more strongly in the aftermath of being duped. If sucker rumination leads to reduced avoidance intentions, that relationship should be stronger when the experience of being duped is fresh in the individual’s mind. If sucker rumination leads to increased avoidance intentions, that relationship should also be stronger when an individual has recently experienced being duped.

Hypothesis 4

The last and most important hypothesis brings together elements of the previous hypotheses. Hypothesis 4 stated that the role of negative affect (indirect effect; Hypothesis 2) would vary as a function of whether one had recently experienced being duped (conditional effect; Hypothesis 3). This would mean that the extent to which sucker rumination led to negative affect, which in turn led avoidance intentions, would be stronger following being duped. We use the term conditional indirect effect to describe this (also called moderated mediation). Hypothesis 4 stated that the normal process of
high sucker rumination leading to negative affect, which in turn leads to avoidance intentions, will be strengthened in the aftermath of being duped.

Overview

We tested our hypotheses in an online experiment. There were three main steps to our procedure. First, we assessed participants’ individual differences in sucker rumination. Second, we administered the experimental manipulation whereby some participants were led to believe they had been tricked. Whereas most research on deceptive marketplace actions relies on misleading advertisements (e.g., Darke and Ritchie, 2007; Obermiller, and Spangenberg, 1998, 2000; Sagarin et al., 2002), we used misleading customer reviews. Our reasoning was that customers rely heavily on customer reviews when making purchases online (Malbon, 2013), and online purchasing continues to grow (“Shopping and the Internet,” 2012). Thus, we expected our findings would be relevant and ecologically valid. The third step was to measure negative affect and our dependent variable, which was participants’ desire to avoid customer reviews in the future.

METHOD

Participants

Participants were 200 people recruited for inclusion in an online study. We sought to have a broadly representative sample in terms of age and demographics to maximize generalizability. The demographic composition of the sample was as follows: 65% White, 24% Black, 6% Asian, and the remainder was of other races, multiple races, or did not report race. Mean age was 36.62 (SD = 13.71). Fifty-two percent of the respondents were female.

All participants were recruited via Mechanical Turk. We used the title “Hotel Preferences and Survey Questions” within Mechanical Turk and indicated that potential participants could expect to spend up to 10 minutes on the survey. We selected settings to recruit participants from across the US but not abroad. Participants were paid $2.00.

Procedure

Sucker Rumination

Participants completed the previously described Sucker Rumination Scale (SRS; Preuss et al., 2011). To disguise the purpose of the survey, we embedded the SRS within the 31-item Consumer Self-Confidence Scale (Bearden, Hardesty, and Rose, 2001). A sample item is "I know where to find the information I need prior to making a purchase." Participants rated their agreement with each item from 1 (not at all characteristic of me) to 5 (extremely characteristic of me). The Consumer Self-Confidence Scale was not of interest and was only used to reduce the likelihood that participants could anticipate our study aims.
Sucker Experience

To induce the feeling of being tricked, we first asked participants to evaluate a series of seven groups of hotels, with three similar hotels in each evaluation group. For each hotel, participants viewed an image of the hotel as well as a customer review. For each of the seven groups, participants were asked to pick their preferred hotel. After the last group of hotels was evaluated, we administered the experimental manipulation. By random assignment, some participants were given a "Hotel Choice Evaluation" in which they were told that "three of the hotels you selected included a phony review." The control group simply moved on to the next set of questions (described below) and was told nothing about their hotel choices.

To ensure that we successfully caused feelings of being tricked in the experimental group, participants were asked (later in the experiment) to indicate their agreement with the statement "I have been tricked by customer reviews" from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Results indicated that those in the sucker-experience condition evinced higher feelings of being tricked (M = 3.90, SD = 1.72) as compared to the control group (M = 2.84, SD = 1.70; F(1,199) = 19.14, p < .001. Cohen’s d was .62, which is above the threshold for a medium size effect (.50) but below a large effect (.80; Cohen, 1988). Hence, the experimental manipulation was successful.

The low mean in the control group (2.84) suggests that people are generally reluctant to state that they have been duped. Most people perceive themselves as not having been tricked by customer reviews (or are reluctant to state that they have). The mean in the control condition (3.90) was significantly higher than the control condition but still below the midpoint of the scale, indicating that participants retained some reluctance to state that they had been tricked. The most accurate way to describe the effect of the manipulation was that it reduced participant’s disinclination to state that they had been duped.

Negative Affect

To understand the role of negative affect, participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS assesses current affective state by asking participants about 10 components of positive affect (e.g., enthusiasm) and 10 components of negative affect (e.g., guilt). Participants indicated their current level of each from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely).

Avoidance Intentions

We quantified the degree to which customers sought to avoid customer reviews in future purchases with three items: "I plan on avoiding customer reviews in most future product decisions," "Customer reviews are not to be trusted," and the reverse-scored item "I plan on relying on customer reviews in most future product decisions." Agreement was scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Items were summed to create an index of avoidance intentions (α = .69).
RESULTS

Main Effect—SRS

We regressed avoidance intentions on SRS. Results demonstrated SRS did not directly impact avoidance intentions, $\beta = -.08, t = 1.08, p = .28$. This did not support either Hypothesis 1a or Hypothesis 1b. Although the belief that there cannot be an indirect effect without a main effect seems to be widespread, this belief is mistaken (Hayes, 2009; Hayes, 2012; MacKinnon, 2008; Zhao, Lynch, and Chen, 2010). Next, we tested for an indirect effect.

Indirect Effect — SRS and Negative Affect

We sought to understand whether high SRS scores would lead to greater negative affect, which in turn would lead to greater avoidance intentions. First, we observed that higher SRS scores were related to higher negative affect, $\beta = .17, t = 2.41, p = .02$. Next, we observed that negative affect had a robust effect on avoidance intentions, such that people high in negative affect were significantly more likely to evince avoidance intentions, $\beta = .53, t = 8.71, p < .001$. In short, high SRS led to negative affect, and negative affect led to greater avoidance intentions. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2.

Next, we conducted a formal test of the indirect and direct effects together in a standard test of statistical mediation (see Figure 1). We used the PROCESS bootstrapping procedure (Hayes, 2013). Results indicated the presence of mediation: a 95% confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect ranged from .003 to .13. Because the upper and lower estimates for the size of the indirect effect did not include zero, this indicates the presence of mediation. This confidence interval was calculated with 5,000 bias-corrected bootstrap sample.

The mediation analysis indicated that sucker rumination led to an increase in negative affect, which led to an increase in avoidance intentions. Results also revealed that with the indirect effect taken into account, the direct effect of SRS on avoidance intentions became significant ($b = -.12, se = .04, t = 2.92, p = .005$). The direct effect, in opposition to the indirect effect, was such that higher levels of SRS led to lower avoidance intentions.

In sum, data indicated that the effect of SRS on avoidance intentions was twofold. There was an indirect effect, such that people high in SRS were prone to negative affect, and negative affect prompted increased avoidance intentions. With the indirect effect partialled out, the direct effect became significant, such that higher SRS scores led to decreased avoidance intentions. These conflicting effects explain the absence of a significant direct effect. Another way to understand the role of negative affect is that when negative affect is statistically controlled, the effect of sucker rumination on avoidance intentions is strong and clearly negative.
Conditional Effect — SRS and Experimental Manipulation

It is only sensible for a person to avoid customer reviews if customer reviews are believed to be suspect. Hence, we expected that a clearer picture of how sucker rumination impacts avoidance intentions would emerge by examining the effect of SRS on avoidance intentions within the context of the experimental manipulation—namely whether one had recently felt duped or not.

We conducted a hierarchical linear regression in which we used mean-centered terms for SRS scores, experimental condition, and their interaction. In the first step, we centered SRS and experimental condition. The simple effect for SRS scores was not significant ($\beta = -.07, p = .31$), however the simple effect for experimental condition was significant ($\beta = .22, p = .002$) such that those who experienced being tricked by consumer reviews were subsequently higher in avoidance intentions. In the second step, we entered the centered interaction term and observed a significant conditional effect, $\beta = .16, p = .02$.

To interpret this conditional effect, we tested the effect of SRS scores among participants in the control condition, and observed a nonsignificant effect ($\beta = .09, p = .35$). Among participants who had been tricked, we found that lower SRS scores led to increased avoidance intentions, $\beta = -.25, p = .02$. We found support for Hypothesis 3, as the effect of sucker rumination was found in the context of feeling duped. Hypothesis 1a was supported, as high sucker rumination was associated with low avoidance intentions. Hypothesis 1b was not supported. See Figure 2.

Conditional Direct and Conditional Indirect Effects — SRS, Negative Affect, and Experimental Manipulation

In the final set of analyses, we tested the conditional and indirect effects together. In the first analysis, we tested for a conditional indirect effect (i.e., moderated mediation) — which is to say we tested whether the strength of the indirect effect (through negative affect) varied as a function of the experimental condition. There were two ways the indirect effect could be conditional. The first is through the A-path, such that the effect of SRS on negative affect could vary as a function of experimental condition (Figure 3). This would mean that high levels of SRS would lead to especially high (or low) levels of negative affect when people felt tricked. To find out, we used PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) with 5,000 bias-corrected bootstrapped samples. Results indicated a nonsignificant conditional indirect effect (coefficient, $=.019$, $se = .19$, $t = .10$, $p = .92$), such that the relationship between higher SRS scores and higher negative affect did not fluctuate as a function of feeling duped or not. Said plainly, high sucker rumination naturally leads to negative affect. Results again indicated a significant conditional direct effect, this time within the conditional indirect effect model (coefficient $=.22$, $se = .08$, $t = 2.79$; $p = .006$). This indicates that the tendency of people high in sucker rumination to demonstrate low avoidance intentions—in the aftermath of being duped—is not reduced when negative affect is taken into account.
The second possible indirect effect is thorough the B-path, such that the effect of negative affect on avoidance intentions would depend on experimental condition (Figure 4). This would mean that high negative affect would lead to an especially low (or high) avoidance intentions when people feel tricked. Results were similar to the prior test of conditional indirect effect, and indicated a nonsignificant conditional indirect effect ($b = .09, se = .06, t = 1.54, p = .12$). The conditional direct effect was again supported, $b = .21, se = .08, t = 2.49, p = .014$.

In sum, the indirect effect was not conditional, contrary to Hypothesis 4. Said another way, people high in SRS naturally experienced higher negative affect, regardless of whether they currently felt duped. Likewise, people high in negative affect naturally expressed a high degree of avoidance intentions — again regardless of experimental condition. However, with these indirect effects taken into account the direct effect remained conditional, such that low levels of sucker rumination led to greater avoidance intentions, but only in the aftermath of being duped. In short, there were no conditional indirect effects, only an indirect effect and a conditional direct effect. This is illustrated in Figure 5.

**DISCUSSION**

Of the five steps in the consumer decision-making process, the least attention seems to be paid to post-purchase behavior. When post-purchase behavior is investigated, the research focuses overwhelmingly on the topic of customer satisfaction and customer loyalty (Agrawal, Gaur, and Narayanan, 2012; Curtis, Abratt, Rhoads, and Dion, 2011). We certainly do not wish to dispute the importance of these concepts. However, when someone has been sucker in a transaction, these concepts are of reduced utility — as presumably no one who has been duped is satisfied. The current investigation sought to advance the understanding of a relatively new post-purchase variable — namely sucker rumination — that makes sense in the context of fraudulent exchanges.

The limited research on sucker rumination yields three main findings. First, people differ in the tendency towards sucker rumination (Preuss et al., 2011); second, the sucker rumination scale is a reliable and valid measure (Preuss et al., 2011; 2014); and third, people high in sucker rumination experience poorer well-being than people low in sucker rumination (Preuss et al., 2014). The current work extended these findings by demonstrating that individual differences in sucker rumination were predictive of consumer intentions.

The Persuasion Knowledge Model (Campbell and Kirmani, 2007; Friestad and Wright, 1994) argues that one means by which people come to understand persuasion tactics is via personal experience. The current research was consistent with this view, as people who had been duped reacted in a way that would decrease the likelihood of being duped in a similar way again. We also identified variables that facilitated and disrupted the avoidance of being duped.

The key variable of interest in the current investigation was sucker rumination, or the degree to which one has negative self-directed cognitions in the aftermath of being
duped. Data indicated that high levels of sucker rumination were inimical to the avoidance of being duped in the future, and low levels of sucker rumination facilitated avoidant responding. This fits the pattern observed for global rumination, in that high levels of rumination have been found to lead to poor problem solving (Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). However, being low in sucker rumination did not lead to undifferentiated avoidance—the effect was only observed among participants who had recently been duped. In brief, among participants who had recently been duped, those with the most negative and most aversive cognitions were the least likely to demonstrate an inclination to avoid the source of their being duped (e.g., customer reviews). This suggests an unfortunate implication: the people for whom being duped is especially painful and disruptive seem to be the least able to learn how to avoid being duped. That is, people high in sucker rumination experience the greatest negative emotional reaction to it. Yet this strong reaction does not translate into avoiding the source of deception. Hence, people high in sucker rumination are vulnerable to being duped repeatedly.

The data on negative affect were seemingly contradictory. On the one hand, we found that high levels of sucker rumination were related to high levels of negative affect. Negative affect, in turn, was related to increased avoidance intentions. This would seem to suggest that high levels of sucker rumination were associated with high stronger avoidance intentions. On the other hand, we found that high levels of sucker rumination were associated with low avoidance intentions—in the aftermath of being duped. In reality, it seems that there is an element of negative affect that is inextricably entwined with those high in sucker rumination, and this naturally increases people’s avoidance intentions. Hence, when negative affect is taken into account (controlled for statistically), a clear negative relationship emerges between sucker rumination and avoidance intentions.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The sample studied in the current research was drawn from a North American sample. Results might be different if participants had been from a different culture. For instance, research has shown that cross-cultural differences exist for materialism (Ger, and Belk, 1996), and materialism has implications for consumer behavior across a broad spectrum of variables (e.g., Furnham and Valgeirsson, 2007; Stillman, Fincham, Vohs, Lambert, and Phillips, 2012). One should avoid generalizing the results to cultures outside North America.

We think the current research could have practical implications. Said plainly, beating oneself up over being duped in an economic transaction is worse than useless—it is counterproductive. Future research should consider whether intervention strategies might help those prone to sucker rumination reduce the likelihood that they will find themselves duped repeatedly.

REFERENCES


**APPENDIX A**

Instructions: For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the statement is characteristic of you. Please use the following scale.

1 = extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you)
2 = somewhat uncharacteristic
3 = uncertain
4 = somewhat characteristic
5 = extremely characteristic of you (very much like you)

1. After getting duped, I tend to replay my actions and decisions that led up to it for a long time afterwards.

2. If I fall for a scam, I repeatedly tell myself that I should have known better.

3. If I get suckered, it takes a long time for me to forgive myself for being so foolish.

4.
Long after getting duped, my thoughts keep going back to how I could have prevented it.

5. If I get taken for a sucker, I dwell on it for a long time afterwards.

6. If I get suckered, I spend a lot of time thinking about how I can prevent myself from getting fooled again in the future.
APPENDIX B

FIGURE 1:
THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS THROUGH NEGATIVE AFFECT

Notes:
* \( p < 0.05 \)
** \( p < 0.01 \)
*** \( p < 0.001 \)

Estimates of indirect effects ranged from .003 to .13, which indicates significance at the .05 level.
FIGURE 2:
THE CONDITIONAL EFFECT AS A FUNCTION OF FEELING DUPED

Notes:
* \( p < 0.05 \)
** \( p < 0.01 \)
*** \( p < 0.001 \)

The interaction was significant, \( p = .02 \). Among participants who had been duped, higher SRS scores led to weaker avoidance intentions, \( p = .02 \).
FIGURE 3:
THE CONDITIONAL INDIRECT EFFECT ON A-PATH AND THE CONDITIONAL DIRECT EFFECT

Notes:
* \( p < 0.05 \)
** \( p < 0.01 \)
*** \( p < 0.001 \)

The conditional indirect effect was not significant. The conditional direct effect was significant, \( p = .006 \)
FIGURE 4:
THE CONDITIONAL INDIRECT EFFECT ON B-PATH AND THE
CONDITIONAL DIRECT EFFECT

Notes:
*  p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001

The conditional indirect effect was not significant. The conditional direct effect was
significant, p = .01.
Indirect effects effect size estimates ranged from .003 to .13, indicating significance at the .05 level. The conditional direct effect was significant, $p = .006$. SRS directly reduced avoidance intentions after being duped, $p = .02$.

### TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Feeling Duped (Experimental Condition)</th>
<th>Negative Affect</th>
<th>Avoidance Intentions</th>
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<td>15.27</td>
<td>9.19</td>
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<td>Standard Deviation</td>
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<td>0.50</td>
<td>7.27</td>
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<td>0.22*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Affect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.53***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

$t$ $p < 0.06$

* $p < 0.05$

** $p < 0.01$

*** $p < 0.001$